

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the British Press

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ISBN 978-1-137-52645-8 ISBN 978-1-137-52646-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5

Cover image: Stephen Chung/Alamy Stock Photo
Cover design by eStudioCalamar

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Limited
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom

For my mother, Pepa, and my brother, Enrique

Acknowledgement of Previous Publication

An earlier version of sections in Chapter 2 was published in:

Sanz Sabido, R. (2016) "Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis". In: Servaes, J. and Oyedemi, T. (eds.) *Social Inequalities, Media, and Communication: Theory and Roots*, 55–73. New York: Lexington Books.

An earlier version of some sections in Chapters 1, 4, 7 and 8 was published in:

Sabido, R. (2015) 'Palestine in the British press: A Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis'. *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research*, 8(3): 199–216, doi: 10.1386/jammr.8.3.199_1.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Promised Land and a Land of Promises

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 70 years after the creation of the state of Israel, continues to create an international impact and gain widespread media attention. This conflict has raised numerous discussions regarding the exact nature of the problem, "whether it is a clash of religions or races, or a territorial dispute involving historical claims to the land" (Devore 1976: xxii). Since the early days of the conflict, the struggles between Palestinians and Israelis have indeed been about territoriality, identity, ethnicity, religion, economics, competing nationalisms, colonialism and imperialism (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008: 22). This is, in effect, a deeply multifaceted conflict that has been complicated by a wide range of factors. It follows, therefore, that the conflict may also be subjected to a multifaceted form of analysis.

All the aspects mentioned above, along with others, have played some part in the development of the conflict. One key historical development in the history of these clashes was the establishment of the British Mandate of Palestine in 1923—a form of colonial administration that lasted until 14 May 1948, when the Zionist state was created (El-Eini 2004; Robson 2011). According to Home (2003: 293), the boundaries that are often established between the coloniser and the colonised were applied in Palestine during the Mandate, following the Lugardian ideology of British colonialism between the two World Wars. In his analysis of Lord Frederick Lugard's *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* ([1922] 1965), Bello (2017) points out that the dual mandate of the British Empire aimed to open Africa to the civilised world and the

R. Sanz Sabido, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the British Press*,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5_1

African mind to civilisation. This approach was applied through the creation of two social roles: the one of the civiliser and the one that needs to be civilised. This binary translated into discursive strategies that naturalised the infantilisation and fetishisation of the native populations. But of course, this process was not only conducted through language, nor was it only applied in Africa. Referring to Palestine, Home (2003) argues that the British Mandate modified complex land laws and regulations inherited from the Ottoman land code, and these were later passed to the successor Israeli state, eventually becoming "the tools for ethnocratic control, through which Israel came to claim public ownership over virtually all its physical territory". Similarly, Robson (2011: 2) points out how the British colonial administration made the decision to promote communally organised legal and political structures following the example of imperial policy in India and elsewhere.

Proceeding from a strict definition of the postcolonial as "what comes after colonialism" (Young 2001), 1948 would be considered by some postcolonial scholars as the temporal marker of postcoloniality between Britain and Palestine, because it was at that point when Palestinian lands would no longer be ruled or administered by Britain. From this perspective, the end of the British Mandate meant that the colonial era had come to an end and a postcolonial period had begun. Even though this is by no means the only factor that has shaped the development of the conflict, it is worth paying attention to this historical fact, as the Mandate ineluctably steered the fate of the Land and its people. When it comes to media representations of acts and agents of political violence within the conflict, the extent to which (post)colonial history and responsibilities are visible in contemporary discourses sheds light on the connections between discourse and power, and helps to identify which aspects of the conflict have been erased.

This is what this book does: focusing specifically on the postcolonial relationship between Britain and Palestine, it examines the representations of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the British press, starting from the premise that media representations in Britain should be analysed in relation to Britain's role as a postcolonial power. In this respect, Brunt and Cere (2011: 3) have argued that Britain's role as the colonial 'centre' is strongly intertwined with British contemporary media cultures, and thus these media cultures should be explored through the lens of postcolonial theory. Drawing upon a variety of discursive material, Said (1978) had previously stated that in non-totalitarian societies, certain

cultural forms predominate at the expense of other cultural forms, which are excluded. In his view, this cultural leadership is what gives Orientalism—the notion of 'us' Europeans standing against, or in contrast to, all 'those' non-Europeans—its durability (Said 1978: 7). Indeed, the term 'Orientalism' refers to the idea that European identity is superior in comparison with all the non-European cultures, which are presented as backward and dependent. In addition, there are numerous media analyses that are concerned with the representations of race and ethnicity in the western media (Hall 1997; Macdonald 2011; Poole 2002; Poole and Richardson 2006). Hall (1997) also makes explicit connections between colonialism and the use of binary opposites, such as 'civilised' and 'uncivilised'. Furthermore, most academic work on the postcolonial has focused on literary works, while overlooking media representations and, more broadly, media production.

Yet, postcolonialism is not only reflected on novels about former colonies, but it involves "a whole theoretical or ideological agenda" which is "far from historically or politically innocent" (Eagleton 1998: 125). The postcolonial agenda and lack of innocence, to use Eagleton's terms, must be partly understood in terms of Western capitalism, which also contributes to the maintenance of financial channels of domination by controlling key economic resources and through military interventions. Pawling (2011) argues that the mass media play a vital role in the dissemination of Western versions of freedom and democracy, as well as in the formation of the 'subject'. Referring to major media organisations, such as Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, Pawling (2011: 43) points out that "an Anglo-American version of political reality is presented as the only 'rational' basis for interpretation and action". This version of reality is therefore inherently orientalist and, consequently, Postcolonial Theory should not only be applied to the study of novels, but also to the study of the media discourse.

This is the debate to which Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis (PCDA) seeks to contribute. PCDA should be understood as a theoretical and methodological advance on previous discussions, and as an additional alternative to research that is concerned with the connections between postcolonial legacies and the media (Sanz Sabido 2016). PCDA draws upon Postcolonial Theory and a Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, with the objective of exploring past and contemporary discourses that are impregnated with postcolonial political, economic and social structures. It also examines the ways in which

linguistic classifications are used to divide societies into groups on the basis of difference. In this book, I apply this framework in order to analyse some of the ways in which colonial and postcolonial relations between Britain and Palestine have emerged in the news coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict since 1948, the moment when the British Mandate of Palestine came to an end.

Existing studies based on Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach have primarily focused on climate change and global warming (Carvalho 2005; Reisigl and Wodak 2009). Other topics that have also been explored from an historical perspective include racism, anti-Semitism and discrimination (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) and European identities (Muntigl et al. 2000). Here, I examine the representations of political violence within a longstanding conflict, with a particular focus on the use of the term 'terrorism', the visibility of different agents in the news discourse, and the historical contextualisation of the clashes at different points in the coverage.

As regards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, this has been widely discussed at length in various academic spheres, including history (Dowty 2008), law (Cattan 1976), art (Boullata 2009), and cinema (Dabashi 2006; Gertz and Khleifi 2008) to name but a few. Numerous studies have also been carried out on particular aspects of the media representations and reception of the conflict (Evensen 2007; Kaposi 2014; Muravchik 2003; Parfitt and Egorova 2004; Philo and Berry 2004, 2011; Zaharna 1997; Zayyan and Carter 2009), and there are some comparative studies on television abroad (First 2002; Noakes and Wilkins 2002).

Some of the more recent studies on Palestine, to mention but a few, include Matar and Harb's (2013) project on some of the ways in which the conflict in Lebanon and Palestine is narrated, including a multiplicity of experiences, discourses and memories, which are always linked to the events of 1948 and what they meant to the Palestinian people. From a different perspective, Rodgers (2015) combines his own experiences as a correspondent with the analysis of news coverage of the conflict from the end of the British Mandate to 2014, and supports his findings with a wealth of sources and contacts that he has garnered throughout his career as a journalist. In addition, Hollis (2016) offers a useful examination of the representations of Palestinians in British political elite discourse between 1915 and 2015. Her analysis only mentions media discourse in passing, as her main focus is, as she describes it,

'political elite discourse', and the contemporary role of Britain in relation to Palestine is considered to be that of a Permanent Member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Nevertheless, the findings of Hollis' analysis, namely that Palestinian statehood and independence are never identified as a central objective of policy, reflect a similar discursive approach to some of the material examined in this book.

This book argues that the analysis of the representations of Palestine in the British news is particularly important due to the historical and (post)colonial relation that exists between Britain and Palestine—a connection that has been erased in the recent coverage of the conflict. Analysing these representations through the postcolonial lens means that this historical, postcolonial context, which has been neglected, can be restored and taken into account in this analysis.

Palestine and the Postcolonial

The postcolonial nature of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a complex one for various reasons. In addition to the debates surrounding the definition and use of the term 'postcolonial' (Gandhi 1998; Harper 2001; Loomba 1998; Prakash 1995; Young 2001), the postcolonial history of Palestine is intrinsically connected to the history of Israel, as one cannot be separated from the other. Massad (2000: 311) points out that the diachronic presentation of the history of colonialism and postcolonialism (in which the latter follows the former) has "ignored the potential, if not the actual synchronicity, of these 'two' eras in some contexts", such as with the case of 'settler colonialism'. The creation of the state of Israel, in 1948, provides an example of settler–colonists declaring themselves to be independent, and therefore postcolonial, "while maintaining colonial privileges for themselves over the conquered populations" (Massad 2000: 311).

Although the end of the Mandate led to the simultaneous creation of Israel, Britain's postcoloniality in relation to Palestine should not be confused with the settler–colonist situation that still exists in Israel. Indeed, this book is primarily concerned with the postcolonial relation between Palestine and Britain, rather than the settler–colonist situation that exists between Palestine and Israel. Nevertheless, the fact that Palestinian history has been determined by Israel from the moment of its creation is, of course, an inherent and indivisible part of the study, and remains an integral part of the events that have taken place since 1948.

The analysis of media representations from a postcolonial perspective is complicated further by another factor. The role of Britain in Palestinian postcoloniality was later superseded by the intervention of the United States in the conflict. The United States always supported the creation of the Jewish homeland and, especially after the official proclamation of the state, became the most prominent source of power in the international arena in terms of this conflict. Therefore, while the dichotomy between coloniser and colonised is usually thought to be the basis of postcolonial relations of power (JanMohamed [1985] 2003), the direct intervention and support of the United States for Israel affected the ensuing postcolonial relation between Britain and Palestine. The role of the United States must also be understood in relation to the Cold War and the development of political and military connections that were used to support its presence in the Middle East, and to protect its interests against the Soviet threat. Therefore, the frame of this major international conflict also had an effect on the ways in which the Israeli–Palestinian conflict evolved, because the United States supported Israel while the USSR supported some of the Arab states.

Britain, in the meantime, maintained its strategic interests in the Middle East (as highlighted, for example, during the Suez Crisis), which conforms to a typical aspect of postcolonial relations: the continued presence, in one way or another, of the original dominant metropolis in those territories. However, we must bear in mind that British postcolonial relations with Palestine (and, hence, with Israel) were, from the early days, marked by the British intention to ally itself with the United States. Consequently, regardless of the British attitudes towards the creation of the new state, and regardless of the fact that Britain was officially the former colonial power in those lands, these aspects were reformulated in the 1950s within the context of international relations.

Discourse, Classifications and the Postcolonial

Said's (1978) Orientalism introduced the concept of 'Othering' to identify the ways in which Western agents expressed their understanding of the non-Western world. Said based his thesis on the analysis of a wide variety of sources and genres, arguing that the Orient only comes into existence when the Occident animates it, so that the features of its existence depend solely on the ways in which the Occident characterises its own creation (Said 1978: 208). Therefore, orientalist discourse "invents or orientalises the Orient for the purposes of imperial consumption"

(Gandhi 1998: 88), and it is based on a system of representations that was constructed and deeply learned by the West (Said 1978: 202–203). Orientalism thus constitutes a "great divide of mutual misunderstandings" (Sardar 1999: vii), in which the 'Other' entity is never truly known, and any apparent knowledge of it is based on imagination and power-related categories. These categories are based on the separation between 'us' and the 'Other', and all the positive attributes associated with 'us' contrast with all the negative attributes associated with 'them'.

The ways in which these entities, 'us' and 'them', are classified are closely connected to the ways in which power is divided. Derrida (1972: 41) points out how, in this violent hierarchy of binary oppositions, one of the two entities governs the 'Other', and it is the entity with the power to create the classification in the first place that manages to subdue the 'Other'. Although this subjugation is by no means only discursive, it is indeed supported by discursive processes that include the representation of the 'Other' as helpless and in need of assistance, and as unable to catch up with modernity.

Similarly, Hall (1997: 258) agrees that stereotyping and the use of binary opposites tend to occur "where there are gross inequalities of power". He points out that this form of power is closely connected with the practices of what Foucault called 'power/knowledge', as orientalist discourse "produces, through different practices of representation (scholarship, exhibition, literature, painting, etc.), a form of racialised knowledge of the Other (Orientalism) deeply implicated in the operations of power (imperialism)" (Hall 1997: 260). By classifying people according to a norm (under the category 'normal') and constructing the excluded as an 'Other' (under the category 'deviant' or 'abnormal'), accepted standards of normality are fixed in order for the ruling groups "to fashion the whole of society according to their own world-view, value system, sensibility and ideology", until this world view appears as 'natural' and 'inevitable' (Dyer 1977: 30).

The image that Europe constructed of the Orient was stereotypical, as it was not based on a reflection of those countries, but on a discourse through which Europeans were able to manage and produce the Orient "politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period" (Said 1978: 7). Said argues, in both *Orientalism* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1994), that the construction of these categories is closely connected with imperialism and colonialism. He contends that both imperialism and colonialism are

> supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination: the vocabulary of classic nineteenth-century imperial culture is plentiful with such words and concepts as 'inferior' or 'subject races', 'subordinate peoples', 'dependency', 'expansion', and 'authority'. (Said 1978: 8)

Although Said also acknowledges the empires built by other countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Holland and Russia, among others, he pays more attention to Britain and France. He is primarily concerned with exploring the ways in which the move to form empires beyond the European continent became—by the latter part of the nineteenth century—a consistent, continuous enterprise. He acknowledges that these expansions were attributable to the goal of increasing profits, which included obtaining supplies of spices, sugar, slaves, cotton and other materials, as well as investing in related enterprises, markets and institutions. However, Said further argues that the commitment to expansionism was motivated by more than just the prospect of financial profits. He refers to this as a "commitment to circulation and recirculation", which allowed decent men and women "to accept the notion that distant territories and their native peoples should be subjugated", while it also "replenished metropolitan energies so that these decent people could think of the imperium as a protracted, almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior, or less advanced peoples" (Said 1978: 10). Thus, the enterprise of forming empires away from Europe was based on the very idea of "having an empire" (Said 1978: 10). The ruler and the ruled begin to be defined in relation to the imperial association that joins them, which becomes part of both the coloniser's and the colony's society.

More recently, Krishna (2009: 29) has pointed out that "capitalist colonialism has rendered our understanding of the world Eurocentric, and we are unable to think outside the categories and concepts that emerged in post-Columbian Europe". Regional, national and international inequalities can only be understood and reversed through "the relentless focus on the world historical experience of capitalist colonialism and its contemporary manifestations everywhere" (2009: 29). In order to achieve this, an act of profound decolonisation is necessary in order to "reverse the political, social, intellectual, and cultural interactions with the colonial world over the past few centuries" (Krishna 2009: 29). In brief, the purpose of postcolonialism is to allow the

conditions for a human development that is based on a true decolonization and a fundamental move away from Eurocentrism.

The significance of these arguments does not simply lie in the exposure of the negative nature of discursive representations of the Orient, but also in the fact that, beyond those orientalist discourses, policies and actions have also taken a similar approach, through which 'Others' must and can legitimately be mastered and controlled for 'our' purposes (Jensen 2012: 216). Ghandour (2010: 58), for instance, explores the discourse that informed the creation of the legislation and approach to Palestine during the British Mandate. She points out that native Palestinians were represented as "characterised by debris and a load of atrophied concepts and theories" during the British Mandate. The fact that this orientalist discourse ultimately had direct institutional implications on the decisions that were made about Palestine illustrates the extent to which orientalist classifications remain at the heart of this conflict.

More specifically, Ghandour reviews the ways in which Ernest Dowson, who had a significant influence on the British Mandatory administration and on the formulation of land policy in Palestine, assessed the Palestinian agricultural system after a visit in November 1923, in order to advise the British administration on landholding and agriculture (Bunton 1999: 81, in Ghandour 2010: 58). Dowson described the land and the system as useless, and employed a language of disease and degeneration to define it, using words such as 'derelict', 'lack', 'apathy', 'evil', 'deadening', 'rubbish', 'sickness', 'unhealthy', 'afflicting', 'disability', 'annihilated', and 'blighted' in his report (Ghandour 2010: 59). In her analysis, Ghandour contends that

> The pioneering Dowson is very 'masculine'. His tone is robust, commanding and sure-footed, even as he blunders over quite important things. Dowson harbours no ambivalence or reservations regarding his superior status/heroic role. He is a potential saviour, if only his advice were heeded. Convinced of this and his mind reform, he has come to cleanse, or in his own words, to purge. When he suggested a registration system for Palestine, it was one which would facilitate the dual role of the State: as a custodian of Public land, and as steward of its exploitation. (Ghandour 2010: 60)

Said (1978) also describes the processes of Orientalism as 'masculine'. The view that the Orient is a "geographical space to be cultivated,

harvested, and guarded" leads to sexualised images of a weaker or more inferior entity (the Orient) that invites British or French "interest, penetration, insemination – in short, colonisation" (Said 1978: 219). It is, as Ghandour argues, about guarding the land and exploiting it at the same time.

Orientalist attitudes are not seen only in the relationship between Britain and Palestine, but also in the ways in which Israel treats the remnants of the Palestinian polity. In this respect, considering the creation of citizenship within the Israeli state, Israel represents a political system that combines democratic institutions with the dominance of one ethnic group (Peled 1992). There are, therefore, two types of citizenship: the Jewish citizen and the Arab citizen. The rights of Arab citizens are much more restricted than those held by Jewish inhabitants of the region, not to mention the complete lack of rights of the non-citizen Arab. In their resistance to foreign colonialists, Palestinians were presented as negligible and as savages, so only Jewish citizens could be granted full civic rights, including the right to return to their homeland. Arabs, being "less developed", are given fewer rights, and do not have the right to return, even though they are the original inhabitants of the Land. Zionist discourse and Israeli policy are therefore inherently orientalist, and based on this principle, it distinguishes between "good Arabs (the ones who do as they are told) and bad Arabs (who do not, and are therefore 'terrorists')" (Said 1978: 306–307).

Britain, in accepting the state of Israel and considering it to be the legitimate source of power in the region—at the expense of Palestine—reproduces a similar perspective, which will be evidenced by the empirical findings discussed in the book. In any case, we must not forget that Palestinian history "tends to be viewed solely in relation to Israeli history or narrative", and that "the story of the Palestinians, as ordinary human beings subjected to violent forms of power, remains a largely hidden one" (Matar 2011: xi). This indicates that there is an intrinsic dependency between Palestine and Israel, as each of them are "often talked about as a political, national, collective or resistant identity that has been constructed […] as a category of being in relationship to a significant 'Other'" (Matar 2011: xi). This approach to Palestine and the history of Palestinians is in itself orientalist, as Palestine does not exist, in any way, as an entity in its own right: not as a state, but also not discursively, or even in terms of the historical accounts recorded in the literature on the region.

Post-mandate Palestine in the British Press: Book Structure

Focusing on Britain's colonial and postcolonial connection to this conflict, this book is based on the findings of a PCDA of 1059 news articles published by four British national newspapers (the *Guardian*, or *Manchester Guardian*; *The Times*; the *Daily Herald*, or the *Sun*; and the *Daily Mirror*) at five different historical periods that took place after the end of the British Mandate of Palestine in 1948: (1) the end of the British Mandate and the beginning of the First Arab–Israeli War, including news articles published between 15 May 1948 and 12 June 1948; (2) the 1967 War, comprising news articles published between 1 June 1967 and 15 June 1967; (3) the beginning of the First Intifada, which consists of news articles published between 25 November 1987 and 24 December 1987; (4) the Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, which includes news articles published between 27 December 2008 and 20 January 2009; and (5) the Great March of Return, the six-week campaign of protests that took place between 30 March 2018 and 15 May 2018, coinciding with the seventieth anniversary of the creation of Israel.

The methodological framework and the sampling strategy are explained in further detail in Chapter 2, which presents the tenets of PCDA as a theoretical and methodological framework. It introduces the notion of the 'postcolonial' and 'Orientalism', before providing a review of Critical Discourse Analysis, and the connections between language and social structures of power. I then focus on the ways in which both Postcolonial Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis share an interest in resisting social structures that are based on unequal relations of power, and how they both favour those who occupy the lower echelons of these structures. This section reviews the arguments that support the combination of both theories into the framework of PCDA. These arguments include the multidisciplinary nature of Critical Discourse Analysis and the importance of recognising a Postcolonial rubric within Critical Discourse Analysis, the use of linguistic classifications that result from, and reproduce, social inequality, the definition of 'Critical' in Critical Discourse Analysis in relation to Postcolonial Theory, and the importance of contextualising media discourse historically and theoretically from a postcolonial perspective. This theoretical framework is complemented by a methodological approach, which is based on an adaptation

of historical approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis (Carvalho 2008; Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 2009), which also includes quantitative Content Analysis (Hansen 2008; Krippendorff 2004; Krippendorff and Bock 2009; Neuendorf 2002; Riffe et al. 2005; Weber 1990). Finally, I specify the sampling criteria and the process of data collection and analysis for this research.

Chapters 3 and 4 pay attention to the contextualisation of the conflict. Chapter 3 offers *a* brief history of the Land, which provides the background for the empirical analysis provided in Chapter 4. The historical overview in Chapter 3 starts from the end of the nineteenth century, when Jewish immigrants began to arrive in Palestine. This is because, in order to understand the end of the British Mandate, it is also necessary to comprehend the historical conditions that led to its establishment and to the development of the conflict. In Chapter 4, I focus on the (lack of) discursive connections with, and references to, the (post) colonial link between British Mandate and Palestine. The data shows that the historical contextualisation of the conflict in the news coverage was minimal, and examples of recontextualisation and decontextualisation of past events have also been found in the news coverage at different stages of the conflict. The postcolonial approach adopted in this book enables us to point to the generalised lack of references to the historical facts that underpin Britain's role in the development of the conflict. This approach also poses a challenge to the attempt to move away from the historical responsibilities derived from colonial encounters. The PCDA framework therefore helps to restore the largely neglected historical connection of the British Mandate to its proper place in the analysis of these mediated events.

Having situated the discussion historically and gained an initial understanding of the ways in which news reports contextualise the conflict, Chapters 5 and 6 focus on 'terrorism' and discourse. More specifically, Chapter 5 offers a discussion of the ideological and discursive elements that need to be considered in the analysis of this concept as it appears in the media. Chapter 6 provides empirical findings about the discursive representation of 'terrorism' and 'terrorists' in the news coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Bearing in mind that these are negatively situated terms, the frequency with which they are used and, more importantly, the contexts in which they appear provide insights into how the British press constructed its various ideological positions in relation to

this conflict. The discussion includes an overview of synchronic data, which serves to highlight some differences in the frequency with which different publications used these terms within each samples period. This is followed by a more detailed discussion of diachronic findings, according to the five historical phases that were analysed. One of the study's revelations is that the use of these terms has evolved over time, as violent acts and agents were perceived differently according to the dominant political discourse in each sampled period. While Zionists were classified as 'terrorists' in 1948, Arabs, Palestinians and Islamic organisations such as Hamas received this label in later discourses. The diachronic evolution of these representations demonstrates that meanings and ideological positions are not fixed.

The empirical data has also shown some relevant aspects regarding the visibility and invisibility of different agents in the discursive constructions of the conflict. Chapter 7 offers an analysis of the appearance of different entities in the discourse. References to Palestine, Palestinians, Israel, Israelis, Jews, Muslims, Zionists, and Arabs are included or excluded to different extents at different points in the conflict, and these findings are also contextualised in relation to their respective historical periods. For example, the near erasure of Palestine as an entity, even in discourse, is indicative of the overall stance towards its very existence, while efforts not to denounce the Zionist agenda can be discerned from the fact that Zionism has tended to recede from view. In addition, references to Palestinians fluctuate across the sampled periods, not only in quantitative terms, but also in the ways in which Palestinians are described and talked about, and in the extent to which they are given the opportunity to shape the discourse.

Finally, Chapter 8 offers some concluding remarks about the usefulness of PCDA as an approach to analyse the news coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and to examine media discourse more generally. Bringing together references to news articles published in 1948 and 2019, it is striking that some of the earlier coverage and journalistic analyses still sound relevant today. Some of the consequences of this ongoing conflict on the Palestinian population are discussed in this chapter, alongside references to the contemporary roles played by some agents. It also provides a summary of the main findings of this study in relation to the ways in which the British press has stood in relation to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict at specific points throughout the past 70 years.

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CHAPTER 2

Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method

This chapter presents Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis (PCDA) as a theoretical and methodological framework that, drawing upon Postcolonial Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), foregrounds the need to analyse media representations by placing postcolonial power relations at the centre of the enquiry. The combination of both Postcolonial Theory and CDA stems from the observation that both disciplines have certain aims and principles in common. Although they are completely independent of each other, both theories are concerned with the concept of power and, through their own particular means, both seek to expose oppression and power inequalities (Bhabha 1985; Hall 1997; Prakash 1995; van Dijk 1993). While CDA deconstructs discursive strategies to uncover the ways in which power is reproduced in media discourse (Fairclough 1995; Wodak 2009: 578), Postcolonial Theory focuses on the power imbalances derived from (post)colonial conditions, practices and structures, which are perpetuated in contemporary societies (Krishna 2009; Young 2001). Thus, Postcolonial Theory provides a useful theory of meaning to contextualise the application of CDA, whenever the objective is to examine discourses produced in postcolonial milieus.

This perspective has some precedents. For example, Brunt and Cere (2011) argue that Britain's role as the colonial 'centre' is strongly intertwined with British contemporary media cultures, so these should be explored through the lens of Postcolonial Theory. Here, I argue that Postcolonial Theory can offer useful insights and tools for the analysis

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https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5_2

of media representations. However, Postcolonial Theory is a broad field of knowledge, and we must acknowledge that different theories of post-coloniality developed as the result of a wide variety of (post)colonial experiences. Hence, an understanding of the historical particularities of each postcolonial context is required in order to develop an appropriate theoretical perspective that can be applied to distinct case studies. Here, since this book focuses on the Palestinian conflict, much of the theoretical insights and approaches taken here derive from Orientalism. For now, however, the main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the theoretical connections that exist between CDA and Postcolonial Theory.

My argument begins with a discussion of some of the central challenges that must be considered when defining the postcolonial, with the intention of suggesting a working definition of this term that will, in turn, allow us to analyse samples of media content. This is followed by an overview of CDA, the purpose of which is to prepare the ground for the theoretical framework of PCDA itself. This theoretical framework precedes the final part of the chapter, which focuses on PCDA as a methodological approach, and includes details of the sampling strategy followed in this project.

In this chapter, I argue that PCDA provides a useful approach to the analysis of media content insofar as it focuses predominantly on the post-colonial relations of power that underpin the production of that content. My contention is that a focus on the postcolonial helps to concentrate attention on the historical background, and therefore also on the responsibility the postcolonial has to its former colonies, a connection and an obligation which is increasingly neglected and which must be restored to its proper place.

Defining the 'Postcolonial'

Definitions of the term 'postcolonial' are widely contested, as a result of the complex nature of Postcolonial Theory itself. The many contradictory perspectives produced by academics become even more difficult to negotiate due to the fact that the postcolonial is deeply interrelated with ethical, political, economic, religious and cultural issues (Eagleton 1998; Young 2001). The seemingly endless 'redefinition' of the postcolonial is a recurring feature within the literature, and must therefore be addressed here. In addition, the difficulty of establishing a clear definition of the

terms 'colonial' and 'postcolonial' arise from disagreements about whether, in fact, the postcolonial actually exists. The juxtaposition of 'post' to 'colonialism' implies, in simple terms, that postcolonialism began after colonialism ended. However, the notion of there being a colonial aftermath has been contested by several authors on the basis that colonial domination still continues today in one shape or another (Gandhi 1998; Harper 2001). For example, Harper (2001: 241) claims that the term 'postcolonial' is usually based on the belief that the 'colonial' has already passed, or that the shift away from the colonial reality and towards a postcolonial one is at an advanced stage.

Ultimately, Harper (2001: 241) argues that this is not really the case, as the 'colonial' is still too close to contemporary times, so the prefix 'post' can only be understood by way of alteration rather than advancement, "not because of actuality but only […] because of a widening commitment to the desire to see such things left in the past". Similarly, Leela Gandhi (1998) observes that colonialism does not terminate with the end of colonial occupation and the subsequent independence of the colony. In her view, the notion of a 'colonial aftermath' must not only include the history of the colonial encounter, but also the subsequent nature of its development. She also cites David Lloyd when he states that colonial history must take into account those fragments of history which are still 'in process', which means that what is known as postcolonialism is, in fact, still a form of colonialism.

A strictly 'temporal' understanding of postcolonialism as *the time that came after colonialism* would therefore mean that the postcolonial is a new era, one that is simply defined by its chronology. In other words, such a position would suggest that the end of colonialism is simply followed by postcolonialism. This view involves accepting the oversimplified idea that the postcolonial is marked by the moment when a colony has achieved its independence from the metropolitan centre, ignoring the continued influence that the former metropolis may have over the new nation after its independence. A more subtle temporal approach appears in Young (2001), who argues that many of the problems arising from the theorisation of the postcolonial would be resolved by defining it as "coming after colonialism and imperialism, in their original meaning of direct-rule domination, but still positioned within imperialism in its later sense of the global system of hegemonic economic power" (Young 2001: 57). According to Magdoff (1978), we must be clear about the difference between 'colonialism' and 'imperialism', as "the customary identification

of imperialism with colonialism is an obstacle to the proper study of the subject, since colonialism existed before the modern form of imperialism and the latter has outlived colonialism". There are premodern forms of imperialism (for example, the Roman Empire) and the modern form which, from a historical viewpoint, follows "the colonialism of the last five centuries", which is "closely associated with the birth and maturation of the capitalist socioeconomic system" (Magdoff 1978: 117).

Prakash (1995: 5), following the theme of time and development, refers to postcoloniality as "a new beginning, one in which certain old modes of domination may persist and acquire new forms of sustenance but one that marks the end of an era". She argues that the postcolonial question is not whether the colonies are now totally free from domination, but whether the existing postcolonial relations (those inherited from colonial times) "can be shaken loose from the domination of categories and ideas" produced by colonialism (Prakash 1995: 5). She particularly refers to the construction of categories based on binary opposites such as 'coloniser' and 'colonised', 'white' and 'black', 'civilised' and 'uncivilised', 'modern' and 'archaic' or 'tribe' and 'nation'. Her concern is about the legacy of colonialism, that is, the effects of the previous colonial phase and the perpetuation of similar dividing categories that continue to shape the development of (postcolonial) world affairs today.

Loomba (1998) also acknowledges the definitional problem posed by the field of postcolonialism. She states that the prefix 'post' implies that there is an 'aftermath', and she makes a distinction between two types of aftermaths: on the one hand, the aftermath is temporal, as in 'coming after'; on the other hand, the aftermath is ideological, as in 'supplanting'. While the temporal perspective accepts that the postcolonial begins from the date of independence, the ongoing definitional problem arises from the second implication, as it is the existence of an ideological aftermath that has been contested by critics. The notion of postcolonialism as an ideological aftermath understands postcolonial rule as a *developed* form of rule, as it has evolved from the ways in which it was implemented in colonial times. However, Loomba believes that, as long as the "inequities of colonial rule have not been erased, it is perhaps premature to proclaim the demise of colonialism" (1998: 7). From this viewpoint, the 'colonial' will only end when the inherited residues of colonial times have completely disappeared from all political, economic, cultural and social practices, giving way to a totally different form of relationship between all the inhabitants of the world. This is the ultimate objective

of Postcolonial Theory: to defend the formerly colonised people, to denounce the unequal divisions of power to which they are exposed and to defend the existence of a truly colonial-free world in socio-political, economic and cultural terms. The question remains whether it is possible to reach an advanced point in history that does not, in ideological terms, make references to, or draw its strength from colonialism.

In attempting to resolve this question, at least with regards to definition, I take the view that postcolonialism refers to the processes of decolonisation by which former colonies achieved their independence, while new imperialistic contexts of economic and sometimes political domination emerged (Young 2001: 57). This perspective does not deny the fact that there are renewed forms of control in the postcolonial era. If we agree that the subsequent postcolonial forms of control and domination present distinct characteristics from those found under colonial jurisdiction, we can consider that colonialism and postcolonialism are two distinct periods with transforming features which are *specific to each phase*, even though domination and inequality still persist on various levels, depending on the particularities of the specific context.

Consequently, if we agree that there is a postcolonial era, the question then is how to establish when it begins. In order to advance the discussion and enable the formulation of an empirical approach, here the postcolonial is defined in temporal or chronological terms, that is, the postcolonial begins with the official date of independence. As discussed above, by adopting this definition I am not denying the existence of continued forms of control, nor am I suggesting that the experience of becoming 'postcolonial' takes place at the exact time that independence is granted. This approach, however, allows us to establish a defined temporal marker that facilitates the research design.

Critical Discourse Analysis

CDA involves the study of the "relations between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the discourse analyst in such social relations" (van Dijk 1993: 249). The field originally built upon critical linguists such as Fowler et al. (1979) and Hodge and Kress (1993), who in turn based their work on Halliday's functional grammar (1973). Initially, these studies were mainly exclusively concerned with linguistics, although they already recognised that there was a need to study linguistic elements along with "the relations between language

and society and between language and mind, in a single integrated enterprise" (Hodge and Kress 1993: 2–3). The study of linguistics consequently became concerned with the ways in which language is used both to represent unequal relations of power, and to perpetuate them.

The asymmetrical distribution of power and social functions between social classes or different national or racial groups is reflected, and sustained, in language. Therefore, interest has focused more recently on the connections between the use of language and the socio-political practices and contexts that surround it, by placing discourse analysis within critical social theory and understanding that media discourse both constitutes, and is constituted by, social formation (Fairclough 1995). CDA explores the connections between the use of language and its context in order to draw conclusions not only about the transmission of meaning, but also about the role that this use of language plays in maintaining the conditions and relationships of power which are at the centre of those meanings.

In this respect, Fowler et al. (1979: 2) argue that language embodies the inequalities of power that exists in society and that it is used to ensure that those inequalities persist. This is achieved by explicitly manipulating and creating "an apparent 'natural world' in which inequitable relations and processes are presented as given and inevitable". This type of linguistic manipulation is based on the premise that, if specific choices of words lead to contrasting views of reality, then those linguistic choices may be motivated by a will to offer a particular perspective or view of reality (1979: 1). If the use of language is determined by the will to perpetuate certain power relations, then we can argue that the production of discourse depends upon the circumstances and relationships that determine the ways in which social meanings are formed in any given context. The roles of the 'more powerful' and the 'less powerful' are consequently reaffirmed, reinforcing the division between those who have the power to control others, and those who are controlled (Fowler et al. 1979: 1–2).

One of the processes involved in the promotion of certain discourses (and the obscuration of others) is the naturalisation of linguistic categories, "whereby elements and categories of media discourse, and its overall forms, become embedded in everyday practice and so become self-reproducing simply by being taken-for-granted as 'natural'" (Couldry 2008: 78). This apparently 'natural' use of language is the focus of CDA research. CDA understands that this naturalisation plays a role in obscuring certain aspects of reality, especially those related to

social practices and power relations (Carvalho 2008: 162; Fairclough 1995: 54). However, it is not language itself that obscures the reality of socio-political structures, but the processes that surround the use of language and the production of discourse, including its naturalisation and the development of communicative needs that must be served at each moment in time (Fowler et al. 1979). These communicative needs are served by institutional and media structures which work in the interest of the powerful. The role of CDA is to deconstruct the resulting discourses and the inequalities that they reproduce.

According to van Dijk (1993: 255), one of the social resources on which power is based is "the privileged access to discourse and communication". By 'privileged access' van Dijk refers to the fact that different language users have varying degrees of "freedom in the use of special discourse genres or styles, or in the participation in specific communicative events and contexts", which include control over the conditions and consequences of discourse (1993: 256). In other words, there is a parallel between access to discourse, which, in journalism, involves the use of sources in the news, and social power (Bell 1991; Manning 2001). The power that social groups, institutions or elites hold is directly proportional to the number of discourse genres, contexts, participants, audience, scope and text characteristics that they (may) actively control or influence (van Dijk 1993: 256). The reverse is also true: Lack of power can be measured based on the lack of active access to discourse.

An important part of access to discourse involves access to the news media. This access is defined in terms of the news sources that provide the material that appears in the news. Overall, we can argue that there is a strong relationship of dependency between the news media and official sources, such as the government (Gans 1979). The consequence is that the media tend to reflect the interests of those in power by reproducing the categories and representations that they promote (Manning 2001), and by drawing attention to particular social issues, while other issues are not covered or receive less attention (Spector and Kitsuse 1977). The journalistic process of newsgathering ensures that the powerful maintain their access to the media, perpetuating the imbalance of access to discourse and, subsequently, the power imbalance in the existing social order. Official views are privileged by the "hierarchy of credibility" that journalists rely upon and which reflects "the structures of power in society" (Manning 2001: 138). In this respect, Trew (1979: 115) argues that alternative versions can only happen if the news reports are committed to

transforming the existing social order. Otherwise, the British media only allows for alternative voices to be heard marginally, as the media generally tend to reproduce official views. For this reason, one of the concerns of CDA is to explore the ways in which reliance on certain sources determines the content of the news media, and to expose the underlying power relations in relation to these practices.

Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis as Theory

In the previous section, I have explained that CDA seeks to critique the social relations of power that constitute, and are constituted by, discourse, in order to denounce the dehumanising and restrictive meanings and social inequalities which, as we have seen, are embedded in 'dominant' discourses (Fairclough 1995; Fowler and Kress 1979: 196). These meanings must be analysed by considering the historical context and the socio-political processes that shaped their formation and reproduction in media discourse. If we understand this historical context and socio-political processes in relation to the (post)colonial, it is worth exploring the ways in which postcolonial power relations are embedded in discursive practices. This is the objective of PCDA.

Martin and Rose (2003: 29) argue that the most effective way to understand the wider economic-historical context of a text and to gain a "clear view of social, cultural and economic changes at the macro level" is to explore both the text and the context that surrounds it from a discourse-historical perspective. These authors argue that feudalism, mercantilism, capitalism and corporatism are historical developments in western economic systems which have "tended towards an increasing reliance on abstract discursive rather than brute-physical coercion in the maintenance of inequalities" (2003: 29). While I argue against Martin and Rose's position with respect to their separation between discursive and brute-physical coercion (since they both take place at the same time), I suggest that colonialism and postcolonialism should figure among the historical developments that they enumerate, since these two practices have played a crucial role in shaping contemporary power relations and structures around the world.

In a similar vein, as discussed earlier, Brunt and Cere (2011) argue that Postcolonial Theory is relevant to the interpretation of contemporary media cultures in order to demonstrate how these relate

to the 'metropolitan centre' of Britain. Developing this argument, Cere (2011: 3–12) introduces a cognitive map of concepts drawn from Postcolonial Theory to indicate how the British media are transformed by postcolonial perspectives. These concepts include the relationship between the 'coloniser' and the 'colonised', 'hybridity' and 'mimicry', 'orientalism' and 'subalternity'. The underlying rationale is that contemporary Britain and its media production (including news production) should not be studied from the present, but should take into account how British political, social and media discourses are shaped by the postcolonial. If the British media are infused with the historical, postcolonial connections between Britain and its former colonies, then a postcolonial theoretical framework should be considered for the analysis of discourse produced in postcolonial times. In keeping with the general premise argued by CDA, the discourses and representations derived from postcolonial times are representative of, and can be explained by, the postcolonial contexts in which they occurred.

Before exploring the tenets of PCDA, one more clarification regarding what I mean by postcolonial discourse may be useful. Bearing in mind that the postcolonial affects both entities within the former coloniser–colony relationship (Memmi 2003), the study of postcolonial discourse must explore discourses produced by any of the particular postcolonial entities. In other words, Postcolonial studies have indicated that both the colony and the metropolis are deeply affected by colonialism. Hall (1997: 246) argues that the postcolonial was "never simply external to the societies of the imperial metropolis" but was "always inscribed deeply within them". In this respect, we must acknowledge that "the West and the third world are seen as mutually constitutive entities that have emerged with their distinct characteristics due to their interaction" (Krishna 2009: 29–30). Therefore, although postcoloniality should not be understood in the same way in the metropolis as in the colony (since the roles of the metropolis and the colony were radically different in the colonial relationship, and the effects of this relationship were also profoundly dissimilar), we must acknowledge that the political, economic, social, cultural and historical effects of postcolonialism did not only impact the colony, but were also existent in the metropolis (Loomba 1998: 19). According to this view, Britain has a 'postcolonial' relationship to its former colonies just as they are in a 'postcolonial' position with regard to Britain, even though the consequences of the connection are considerably different. The objective of PCDA is,

consequently, to explore postcolonial discourses produced within a postcolonial relationship, which means that the discourses analysed may have been produced by any one of the postcolonial entities about the other.

The Multidisciplinary Nature of Critical Discourse Analysis and the Postcolonial Rubric

As an analytical approach, CDA is inevitably multidisciplinary in nature, as it seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the relationships between text, social cognition and social structures of power, always paying attention to "problems of oppression, injustice and inequality" (van Dijk 1993: 253). This multidisciplinary and issue-oriented approach calls for the combination of CDA with other theories and methods that can provide a critical approach to the understanding of social inequality and injustice (1993: 279). The inherent flexibility of CDA allows for a variety of "linkages among other well-established theoretical and methodological approaches" (Scollon 2001: 1), which means that CDA should draw openly from other theories of meaning in order to inform its research. In this respect, CDA benefits from Postcolonial Theory because, through combination, Postcolonial Theory provides CDA with theoretical insights for the development of a specific framework for discourse analysis. This framework, which is one of the existing "spin-off approaches" to CDA (Schrøder 2012: 114), is based on (post)colonial encounters, both historical and contemporary.

Much work has already been done in applying linguistic analyses to postcolonial texts and literature (Krupat 1996; Thiong'o 1981; Tiffin 1987). Although there are some exceptions (see, for example, Macdonald 2011), most available analyses focus on ethnicity and inequality. These approaches, however, do not make specific links with the postcolonial perspective, and as a result cannot be used to support the idea that understanding the specifically *postcolonial* nature of existing relations of power would help to advance the more established study of media production and representations (Brunt and Cere 2011). In order to make an advance of this kind, the causes and origins of some of the inequalities with which CDA is concerned must be linked with the objectives of PCDA. This connection between the two positions would help to contextualise these inequalities, both historically and theoretically. The postcolonial approach should, therefore, be recognised as an essential tool and applied to a variety of media formats and case studies, so that the analyst can move beyond the study of literature.

Documenting PCDA as a recognised collection of studies contributes to the strengthening of the field and its objectives in relation to the power inequalities with which both CDA and Postcolonial Theory are concerned. Thus, the Postcolonial rubric within CDA helps to identify studies that examine discourse in relation to the power relations inherited from postcolonial backgrounds. It is also useful to acknowledge the wide range of contexts and experiences which are included within the Postcolonial heading, at the same time as we bring those postcolonial experiences together in order to define the boundaries of what constitutes this specific branch of CDA. A similar argument was made by Lazar (2007, 2008) in relation to Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis, based on the post-structuralist "view of discourse as a site of struggle, where forces of social (re)production and contestation are played out" (Lazar 2007: 4).

Classifications and Social Inequality

We have seen that CDA is concerned with exposing the ways in which imbalances of power are reproduced in the discourse, while Postcolonial Theory deals with imbalances of power which derive from (post)colonial encounters. Although they are separate theories, we may argue that they both share similar goals from their own particular perspectives. As pointed out earlier, the main commonality of purpose within these theories is the impulse to denounce social inequality and injustice. While CDA takes a broader view of social inequalities, Postcolonial Theory focuses specifically on the inequalities that relate to (post)colonial legacies. In this respect, the broad scope of CDA, which includes gender, race and class inequalities, means that any unequal power relations that are visible in the discourse must be analysed critically. According to Carvalho (2008: 162), the CDA researcher wants to "expose the causes and consequences of specific discourses and to denounce the social, cultural or political wrongs which they sustain". From the perspective of Postcolonial Theory, the wrongs that are sustained result from previous colonial relations. Therefore, PCDA is a productive approach because it helps to expose some of these causes and consequences by recognising that postcolonial legacies are at the centre of some of the existing power imbalances in the world.

Earlier in this chapter, I have discussed some of the ways in which people are classified into binary opposites (Hall 1997; Prakash 1995; Said 1978). One of the key aspects in this debate is precisely the concept

of 'classification', by which different agents are defined according to certain categories. Classifications are a concern of both Postcolonial Theory and CDA and, therefore, PCDA focuses on the discursive uses of classifications, which signify the difference between various agents, and contextualises these uses in relation to the (post)colonial in order to shed light on the ways in which unequal relations are perpetuated within this context.

For example, the use of Orientalist classifications (Said 1978) as expressions of power becomes "both an instrument for exercising that power and containing perceived threats to that power" (Sardar 1999: 110). Orientalist discourse justified British rule thanks to the careful "enunciation of culturally nuanced knowledge", which inferiorised, exoticised and reified aspects of Oriental culture through the use of "seemingly benign and innocuous language" (Ghandour 2010: 3). For example, with regard to the emergence of orientalist binary opposites in the Palestinian conflict, Ghandour (2010) argues that

> The introduction of conceptual basics such as 'Jews' and 'non-Jews', 'Moslems' and 'migrants', 'communities' and 'development', 'National Home' and 'Nation State', 'self-determination' and 'autonomy', 'extremists' and 'moderates', 'private' and 'public', 'religious' and 'secular', is one which has been taken for granted by historians as simply grasping and reflecting cultural realities but which, on the contrary, is deeply suggestive, fundamentally flawed, irrecuperably partial, and has contributed to the creation of novel/foreign binary oppositions and ditto cultural realities. (Ghandour 2010: 3–4)

Although the identification of some of these categories as products of Orientalism may not always be a straightforward task, the fact is that these categories classify and describe entities in relation to binary opposites, and they are driven by power divides and efforts to subjugate the Other.

The 'Critical' Perspective of Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis

I have stated that the aim of PCDA is to examine postcolonial discourses by placing them within the socio-political conditions in which they were produced, seeking a critical engagement with postcolonial relations of

power, rather than providing a descriptive overview of cultural issues. One of the key elements of PCDA is, therefore, its 'critical' perspective. According to Fowler and Kress (1979: 196), the 'critical' nature of any linguistic interpretation is explained by the fact that so much of social meaning is implicit or hidden in texts, so we require an "activity of demystification" to unveil those meanings. In order to achieve this, critical linguists need to resist "the social processes which make language work in communication as it does" (1979: 196), for example, with reference to the naturalisation of language and to established journalistic practices, which shape the communication of those meanings.

Indeed, CDA's notion of critique is derived from Adorno and Horkheimer (1977), which "consists of a desire and an obligation to intervene in social processes characterised by unequal power relations and mystifying ideologies, which are reproduced by discursive means" (Schrøder 2012: 116). Van Dijk (1993) argues that when CDA analysts intervene in these processes, they should be explicit about their socio-political stance in relation to the power imbalances they address. In practice, this usually means that analysts take the perspective of

> those who suffer the most from dominance and inequality. Their critical targets are the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice. That is, one of the criteria of their work is solidarity with those who need it most. (van Dijk 1993: 252)

Thus, 'critical' refers to the critique (and not the description) of discourse, as well as the critique of the agents who produce the discourse with the purpose of reproducing and maintaining the existing unequal relations of power that favour them. In other words, critical scholars seek to expose the ways in which the interests of the powerful are protected and to defend the interests of those who suffer because of them (the powerless). Similarly, Fairclough (2009a: 167) argues that the 'critical' intent of CDA begins with a "focus upon a social wrong" in order to demonstrate how it has been constructed discursively and to face its political implications. As discussed in the previous section, this political element is concerned with exposing inequalities of power both discursively and in material terms. As Wodak and Meyer (2009: 32) point out, CDA is committed to social critique, and thus "constantly sits on the fence between social research and political argumentation".

Although some authors argue that taking a stance within a given social problem may lead to accusations of partisanship and lack of neutrality, and they condemn mixing scholarship with politics (Tyrwhitt-Drake 1999), we can also argue that the notion of neutrality towards a social issue is problematic "because it fails to recognise that all knowledge is socially and historically constructed and valuationally based" (Lazar 2007: 6). In a similar vein, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) have contended that ideological commitment is an inherent part of CDA, but this does not affect its analytical ability because "the kind of interpretive work that CDA offers is closer to explanation than subjective understanding", so the theoretical and analytical value of CDA is not actually diminished (Carvalho 2008: 162).

In addition, some authors argue that the interpretative nature of CDA is also highlighted by the lack of a fixed methodological framework (Toolan 1997; Widdowson 1995). They argue that methodological diversity is problematic because CDA does not analyse discourse, but interprets it. However, I argue that methodological pluralism is not necessarily a weakness, and it can actually be considered to be a positive characteristic. This flexibility allows for the necessary theoretical, contextual and empirical combinations and adaptations required by each specific research project, and therefore helps to achieve the 'critical' objectives of the analyses.

In PCDA, the 'critical' nature of the analysis is given by the postcolonial perspective, that is, the 'critical' stance is positioned in favour of the former colonised (the powerless in this relation), and seeks to uncover the ways in which those postcolonial, unequal relations of power are reproduced discursively. The refusal to be impartial and to criticise the entities that emerge as powerful is given by the nature of Postcolonial Theory itself. Orientalism, for example, is never neutral or objective as "by definition it is a partial and partisan subject. No one comes to the subject without a background and baggage" (Sardar 1999: vii).

The Importance of Context

As mentioned throughout this chapter, a crucial part in the study of discourse is related to the context in which it is produced. Van Dijk (1993), for instance, points out that CDA takes into account the fundamental causes, conditions and consequences of discourse in order to "make a more specific contribution" and to "get more insight into the crucial role of discourse in the reproduction of dominance and inequality" (van Dijk

1993: 253). Indeed, the causes and conditions in which discourse is produced are given by its context, and therefore this context must be taken into account when attempting to understand the social conditions that surrounded the production of, and are present in, discourse.

In this respect, it is useful to remember Nunan's (1993) distinction between two types of context. The first one is the linguistic context, which is "the language that surrounds or accompanies the piece of discourse under analysis". The second type of context is the non-linguistic or experiential one. This is where the "discourse takes place", and it includes "the type of communicative events […]; the topic; the purpose of the event; the setting […]; the participants and the relationships between them; and the background knowledge and assumptions underlying the communicative event" (Nunan 1993: 8). This type of context refers to the extra-textual circumstances that surround the production of texts, and it is the one that the various historical approaches to CDA must take into account in their analyses.

However, Carvalho (2008: 163) argues that "most forms of analysis do not express awareness of the time sequence of texts nor do they clearly explain the implications of previous discursive positions on subsequent ones". She draws upon Hyatt (2005: 515) to highlight the need for an analysis of the temporal context of a text, which includes the immediate and medium-term socio-political contexts, the contemporary socio-political individuals, organisations and structures and the more long-term temporal context which includes the various assumptions of order, structures of inclusion and exclusion and generally how a society legitimates itself and achieves its social identity (Carvalho 2008: 163).

The relevance of context, whether historical or contemporary, is closely related to what Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 88) describe as the socio-diagnostic critique, which draws upon contextual knowledge and relevant social theories to identify and expose ideological and manipulative discursive elements in relation to the social, political and economic conditions that shaped them. In PCDA, Postcolonial Theory provides CDA with a macro-context by which the postcolonial perspective provides both a historical and a theoretical context. Historically, we must look at the evolution of events and conditions within each particular context in terms of its colonial past and its subsequent postcolonial relations. Theoretically, relevant postcolonial theories must be identified according to the context under analysis (in this chapter, the analysis draws upon Orientalism). While the historical contextualisation provides specific details about the particular colony's transition from being

colonised to being 'postcolonial' (including its subsequent postcolonial relations), the theoretical contextualisation facilitates an appropriate theory of meaning which helps to understand the ways in which postcolonial power relations are present in the discourse.

In addition, PCDA must also deal with the ways in which past events are constructed in more current discourses. For example, a contemporary news article may make references to a past event, thereby contextualising the events in specific ways at different moments during the history of the conflict. The historical approach of PCDA allows for the comparative analysis of the ways in which the same event was covered originally and how it was revisited and described again at a later date. Thus, the concern of PCDA with context is also manifested in the recognition that processes of recontextualisation and decontextualisation may take place when a previous event is removed from its original context and is retold from a different one, or is not told at all. Although these processes are by no means exclusive of postcolonial discourses, PCDA provides a framework to interpret how the past is recontextualised in contexts other than its original one and what these processes tell us in terms of postcolonial relations of power.

The analysis of recontextualised events must also consider the fact that, even though we are concerned with the postcolonial era, this does not mean that the postcolonial is a homogenous time period. As with all historical phases, we must acknowledge that, while postcolonial conditions are constant in some ways (so long as the complete break away from the colonial heritage does not fully take place), circumstances evolve historically to the extent that the postcolonial phase may become characterised by other parallel developments, nationally and internationally, and may therefore be overridden by other elements at different points in time. In these cases, PCDA remains a relevant framework because these developments still take place within the postcolonial era, but these parallel circumstances highlight the necessity of contextualising any case studies in relation to their own histories.

Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis as Method

Weiss and Wodak (2003) point out that the main representatives of CDA (van Dijk 1984; Fairclough 1989; Wodak 1989) share the perspective that theoretical approaches should be determined by practical research goals (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 2). While in the previous section I have

explored PCDA from a theoretical viewpoint, I will now deal with the practical application of the methodological framework. Since the theoretical approach draws upon CDA, it makes sense to develop a corresponding methodological approach which also draws upon CDA, and which provides a programme of research that is in line with the objectives of PCDA.

Of all the existing methodological approaches in CDA, Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) is particularly useful option insofar as it takes into account the historical socio-political circumstances within which specific texts are produced. This focus on context works particularly well in relation to the continued significance of the postcolonial in the analysis of media representations. Since the postcolonial is a term that is grounded in history, it is appropriate to understand PCDA as a discourse-historical methodology that places media discourse within its relevant postcolonial context. Therefore, the method of PCDA presented here consists of a seven-step adaptation of the eight steps proposed by Reisigl and Wodak (2009) to carry out DHA. While providing an overview of these methodological stages, I also explain how this approach has been applied to the analysis of British postcolonial relations in relation to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the news.

Formulation of an Appropriate Historical and Postcolonial Theoretical Framework

According to Reisigl and Wodak (2009), this step is concerned with the activation and review of preceding theoretical knowledge. In PCDA, it explores the historical and postcolonial theoretical background of the material under analysis. While DHA proposes the consultation of theoretical knowledge (which, broadly speaking, could be concerned with any theory), PCDA engages specifically with postcolonial theoretical knowledge. In this phase, we must review the historical knowledge about the conflict, thereby not only helping to contextualise the conflict and the discourses that arise within and around it from a historical perspective, but also helping to gather information about different groups in the conflict, their actions, interests and motivations. In addition, we must also become familiarised with debates about what postcolonialism means. Here, it is crucial to define the nature of the postcolonial in the context of post-Mandate Palestine (or any other postcolonial context). As discussed earlier, the notion of postcoloniality in the Palestinian context is particularly complex, and it is important to be clear about how

this concept is understood in specific projects. Similarly, we must identify a postcolonial perspective that is relevant to the particular project (in this case, Orientalism). The study of other postcolonial contexts would require an engagement with different postcolonial theorists.

In Reisigl and Wodak's original method, this step involves reviewing any relevant preceding knowledge. In PCDA, this step must necessarily include an explanation of any relevant discursive elements, such as the use of linguistic classifications (such as 'terrorism' and the emergence of any binary oppositions) and a review of any 'situated' meanings. Any additional points to consider at this stage would typically be motivated by the research question underpinning specific projects. In summary, this first step is primarily concerned with the formulation of an appropriate historical and theoretical framework where the engagement with Postcolonial Theory is relevant to the specific postcolonial history and the discursive construction of the context at hand.

Collection of Relevant Data and Historical Contextual Information

The collection of relevant data must be done by factoring in any constraints that may hinder the development of the project. These constraints may involve a limitation of human or material resources, time limits and other workloads, as well as restrictions related to financial costs. Another key constraint is related to the type of data that is available, and the investments (in terms of time and funds) that are necessary to access the data. Here I adapt some relevant criteria from DHA to select data for analysis with the postcolonial approach of PCDA in mind:

a. *Selection of specific political units.* Since PCDA is concerned with media representations in the context of postcolonial relations, the objects of analysis must bear a postcolonial connection that can be analysed within this framework. In effect, this means that case studies should involve countries, national or subnational groups, or some type of representative of any of these, which are part of a postcolonial history in relation to another country or group. Contemporary conflicts which derive from (post)colonial conditions are also relevant here, including ethnic conflicts (Blanton et al. 2001). For example, the IRA campaign against British rule in Ireland (Carroll and King 2003; Hooper and Graham 2002),

the conflict in Kashmir (Kabir 2009) and multiple conflicts in Africa (Downing 2004) are postcolonial in nature and thus they are appropriate case studies for PCDA.

b. *Selection of specific periods of time relating to important discursive events*. Carvalho (2008) refers to these periods as "critical discourse moments", which involve specific happenings, which may challenge the 'established' discursive positions. Various factors may define these key moments: political activity, scientific findings or other socially relevant events (Carvalho 2008: 166). These periods are selected in line with significant events within the historical background of the specific context. These events may be direct encounters between the former metropolis and the colony, which have taken place after independence (that is, during their postcoloniality), or they may be events where there is no direct connection between both entities. This is because PCDA may be concerned with the media coverage of one postcolonial entity by the other, so it is not necessary that the event involves both entities directly. The analysis of these representations provides data on the ways in which one entity views the other entity and how relations are shaped discursively. In PCDA, these relations are understood as postcolonial because they are indicative of how these relations work after the official moment of independence (if this is how the postcolonial is understood; see above for a discussion of this concept).

c. *Selection of specific fields of political action and policy fields*. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2009), fields of political action include the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will; the management of international relations and the fields of political control, among other options. Within PCDA, this aspect includes any political actions that have taken place within the postcolonial relation under analysis and which have had an effect on the postcolonial nature and development of the particular context. Possible fields of political action include policies and decisions which, made by the former colonial power, have had an impact on the colony, as well as acts of political violence.

d. *Selection of specific media and genres*, such as expert reports, white papers, election programmes, political debates, leaflets, advertisements, popular scientific texts, and media coverage of the relevant discursive events, including press articles as well as television interviews and discussions (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 98). In this book,

the analysis is concerned with press articles. However, according to Schrøder (2012), DHA also engages in interviews with actors (Abell and Myers 2008), as well as ethnographic studies conducted in the institutional environments where these actors have their social habitats (Oberhuber and Krzyzanowski 2008).

The above criteria are designed to help plan the collection of relevant data, which is the first requirement of this second step of PCDA. The second requirement is related to the collection of historical context information. Particular consideration is given to the contextualisation of the background and the development of the selected events, due to the necessity, discussed above, of understanding the socio-political circumstances in which the text was produced. The collection of historical information during this phase is not a repetition of the previous step, which reviews the historical background of the case study. This is because PCDA follows a different perspective from that implemented by Reisigl and Wodak in their outline of DHA steps. While DHA considers the theoretical knowledge in the first phase of the programme and the historical context in the second phase, in PCDA we must review the history of the case study first because it is necessary to be able to identify an appropriate postcolonial theoretical framework that works alongside it. In other words, the choice of a relevant postcolonial theory is made on the basis of the historical particularities of the specific context, so they both take place simultaneously during the first phase.

Therefore, while the first stage is concerned with a broad review of the history that informs the choice of an appropriate postcolonial framework, the concern of this second step with history involves a more detailed description of the historical background for the specific sample or samples under analysis. Therefore, once specific political units, critical discourse moments, fields of political action and policy fields, and media and genres have been selected, those particular moments (contexts) in history must be reviewed in further detail. This phase is concerned more directly with an account of the historical records, so the postcolonial perspective is relevant on this occasion not in terms of theory but in terms of actual historical developments.

The need to understand the context in which the text was produced presents two main difficulties for the researcher. First, a complication arises from the attempt to situate oneself in a different time period, of which the researcher may have no direct experience. In this respect, the

researcher's knowledge is only based on their review of historical events, which is mainly dependent on the accounts provided in history books and other historical documents (Anania 2010). In this sense, the analysis of more recent events may be more straightforward than events that took place a longer time ago. This is a significant point to consider especially in those cases when the researcher is not a historian (this is usually the case in studies of media representations, and it is certainly true of this project too). Secondly, considering the large amounts of data which may be gathered after the initial collection of data, it is essential to follow a precise set of criteria which helps the researcher identify the most relevant socio-political events in order to narrow down the sample to a manageable one (Carvalho 2008). This requirement is not only necessary in terms of the textual material, but also in terms of the specification of the broader societal context, which may refer to contemporary capitalism, neoliberalism, globalisation, patriarchy, postmodernism (Carvalho 2008) or, as argued in this book, postcolonialism.

In Trew's view, an understanding of the context helps to shed light on the processes of ideological transformations which take place when an event is reinterpreted "by locating it in a context which gives it a more general and less immediate cause than the one it was originally presented as having" (Trew 1979: 108). A historical approach to the analysis of media representations helps to explore whether past events are recontextualised, or presented in different discursive terms, in later historical samples.

Specification of Research Questions and Assumptions, and Preparation of Data

While initial research questions and assumptions may be formulated at the beginning of the project, at this stage we are able to define the research objectives more specifically having reviewed the relevant historical and postcolonial contexts. From the perspective of PCDA, the research question must bear a connection with a postcolonial aspect of the area under study, or it may take a broader perspective that considers the postcolonial connection in terms of the theoretical or historical contextualisation of the topic. The conclusions of a PCDA research project must, in one way or another (depending on the specific research questions), consider how the postcolonial connection is visible (or not) in the empirical findings. Ultimately, a PCDA project should aim to test the

premise that former colonial (currently postcolonial) relationships shape contemporary media representations.

In PCDA, research questions and assumptions may be concerned with the ways in which postcolonial relations of power are discursively reproduced or, in fact, how they are missing from the narratives. They may consider how and why the choice of lexical items and grammatical structures are used to portray those relations, and how social actors are represented, challenged or simply excluded. While the analysis of actors and events is always crucial in the study of media representations, we must also remember that exclusions are equally meaningful, and marginalisation is a key area of interest for both Postcolonial Theory and CDA. If exclusion from media discourse indicates lack of power, then identifying discursive exclusions must also be an essential area of concern in PCDA.

In addition, the preparation of data at this stage includes the final constitution of the sample and the coding of individual articles so that they can be easily identified during the analysis and writing up process. These codes are for the benefit of the researcher so that data can be handled and managed more easily.

Quantitative Analysis

Quantitative Content Analysis allows us to verify assumptions about the ways in which certain issues are mediated (Hansen 2008; Riffe et al. 2005; Weber 1990). This is done by carrying out a systematic count of specific terms that are of interest to the project, in order to answer the research question at hand. These terms are counted within a specific corpus of media discourse, known as the sample. Schrøder (2012: 108) argues that such analysis need not always be large-scale, although it is usually agreed that large-scale samples are more appropriate to ensure the representativeness of the research findings (Hansen 2008). This point is particularly applicable to projects that are based on electronic material, as the process of searching and counting tends to be more automated and fast.

This step in PCDA varies from the one suggested by Reisigl and Wodak's approach. DHA includes the possibility of applying both quantitative and qualitative approaches, although it prioritises qualitative analysis. Due to the systematic nature of quantitative Content Analysis (Krippendorff 2004; Neuendorf 2002), this methodological step is

applied to all sampled articles in PCDA, hence acquiring more significance here than in DHA. The objective is to quantify the frequency of preselected units of meaning that will later lead to further qualitative analyses—which remain central to the analysis. Although in this project the sample is relatively large (1059 articles), most of the coding has been done manually (with the exception of three newspaper samples published in 2008 and all the 2018 samples). The decision of whether a sample should be large- or small-scale ultimately depends on the requirements and constraints of the project.

In this study, Content Analysis is primarily used to monitor the frequency of the terms 'terrorism', 'terrorist' and other classifications of acts and agents of political violence. Therefore, this approach to Content Analysis is purely quantitative (Riffe et al. 2005; Weber 1990). This type of systematic Content Analysis has the advantage of corroborating (or contradicting) a given hypothesis by providing evidence "through numbers that express the frequency and prominence of particular textual properties" (Schrøder 2012: 109). The main drawback of this approach is the decontextualisation of these numbers, which reduces the ability to interpret the meanings associated with these terms within the texts (Schrøder 2012: 109). However, this methodological weakness is addressed later by implementing a qualitative approach.

Nevertheless, the fact that the data consist of a set of numbers is particularly useful for historical studies that seek to trace the evolution of media representations. This is because quantitative data can be compared easily across different historical periods (diachronically) as well as across newspaper titles (synchronically). The ease with which data can be compared in Content Analysis does not resolve the shortcomings of decontextualisation, but it partly compensates for it considering the usefulness of the data to make comparisons and to monitor trends in coverage (Deacon et al. 1999; Krippendorff 2004), which is crucial for the historical component of PCDA.

Since this project is concerned with the choice of lexical items to classify agents and acts of political violence, the quantitative analysis is performed around a coding sheet that consists of four sections. All sections are exclusively dedicated to counting the frequency of terms, but these terms have been separated into four separate categories in order to structure the resulting data for analysis and discussion: (1) 'Frequency of key terms' pays attention to the key terms 'terrorism', 'terrorist' and

'terror'; (2) 'Frequency of alternative terms to describe agents of political violence' counts the number of times that other descriptions or classifications of agents appear in the texts, including terms such as 'guerrilla', 'soldier' or 'extremist'; (3) 'Frequency of terms to describe agents according to their background' provides a more detailed account of the lexical choices made to refer to agents in the conflict, acknowledging that agents are often described according to their countries of origin, their religious beliefs or their ethnic backgrounds, rather than by recognised ways of classifying agents of political violence (so this section includes terms such as 'Israel', 'Palestinians' and 'Jews'); and (4) 'Frequency of alternative terms to describe acts of political violence' counts the occurrences of an extensive variety of terms describing or classifying acts of political violence, such as 'assault', 'war' or 'bombardment'.

Qualitative Analysis for Case Studies

I have stated that performing quantitative analysis leads to the decontextualisation and loss of essential details. While in DHA qualitative analysis is prioritised over quantitative methods, in PCDA qualitative analysis is performed on a smaller selection of articles or case studies that are identified as particularly relevant during the Content Analysis. This step should answer questions regarding the emergence of ideologies and how some meanings are prioritised over other perspectives. This stage is also concerned with exploring the postcolonial nature of media representations by paying attention to the actors who appear to be benefitted in the representations, those who are represented negatively, and those who are invisible, and by examining the ways in which the conflict is contextualised within each sampled period.

Ultimately, we cannot ignore the fact that meaning does not only depend on the isolated use of words, but it also depends on the organisation of words in complex grammatical structures (Escandell Vidal 2009: 207). Therefore, the qualitative analysis is aimed at complementing the quantitative findings by offering further insights that help to trace the evolution of the media representations of the conflict over time and within their specific historical contexts. Qualitative analyses may also be concerned with agency, relations between discursive features and realities beyond discourse, argumentations and claims, among other discursive aspects (Fairclough 2009a, b; Reisigl and Wodak 2009).

Formulation of a Critique in Relation to the Postcolonial-Historical Background

CDA—and its DHA variant—is based on a critical-dialectical concept of theory, which means that it is concerned with the analysis of inequality in socio-political reality, and with the criticism of scientific-theoretical results (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 2). Weiss and Wodak argue that critical-dialectical theories are

> challenged with other options, examined for contradictions and considered in overall context. The aim of theoretical work in this sense is true and instructional enlightenment about the historical and social situation. […] Theory should not be considered an *instrument* of knowledge but rather a social reality that has taken on a different shape (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Academic interests and thus the selection and objectives of theories are deemed closely connected with the relations and contradictions between varying social interests. (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 2–3)

PCDA must be understood as a theory of social reality that is concerned with the discursive reproduction of postcolonial relations, agents and interests. The implementation of PCDA must also be critical of itself and of the insights it derives, and it must add some insights into existing debates about postcolonialism in general or about the postcolonial background of the specific context, based on the knowledge gained from the analysis of media representations. In this respect, the purpose of applying PCDA to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is to emphasise the historical and (post)colonial connection between Britain and the conflict and to draw insights about how this connection is reproduced discursively.

Application of the Analytical Results

This phase, which is similar to the one proposed by Reisigl and Wodak (2009), recognises that academic research must be shared with members of the public in order to effect some social change or contribute to the knowledge and awareness about the researched topic. While always important, this point is particularly relevant in the current Higher Education context that encourages the production of social and economic impact deriving from academic research. Publication and dissemination of findings in academic and non-academic environments help to stimulate debate and raise awareness of the issues at stake.

Sampling Criteria: Collection and Preparation of Data

The discussion covered in this section responds to the requirements of the second stage of PCDA, which is concerned with the collection and preparation of data (see above). As mentioned earlier, this process must be completed alongside relevant historical reviews, and any constraints must also be considered during this stage, such as the availability of historical newspapers, accessing archives, as well as the time-consuming task of selecting particular newspaper articles from the entire collection of newspaper material. As Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 96) point out, the total amount of empirical data will depend on these constraints, so data should be collected following certain criteria, restricting the range of the data collection as necessary. The rationale for selecting the sample is explained here both in terms of the historical periods as well as the newspaper titles that I have analysed. I also describe the collection and analysis process in order to provide a detailed account of how the sample was gathered and analysed to ensure the highest degree of replicability.

Selected Historical Periods

Five phases in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict were selected. In line with the postcolonial perspective taken in this project, it is crucial that these five phases are postcolonial in nature. As discussed earlier, the contested nature of the term 'postcolonialism' means that we must make decisions in relation to when the postcolonial era begins and, taking it a step further, whether the postcolonial has ever begun at all. Having acknowledged a variety of arguments, I have argued for the use of the temporal marker of postcoloniality that allows us to move beyond the ideological issues that arise from these debates.

Although the decision to end the British Mandate and the wish to withdraw from the land had been a fact from much earlier, selecting the official date when independence was granted serves as a historically recognised marker that separates the colonial from the postcolonial. Thus, I consider 14 May 1948 as the postcolonial marker between Palestine and Britain, as the British Mandate of Palestine officially ended on that day. This decision can be easily challenged insofar as postcolonial sentiment is usually present before the official date of independence, the official date when a colonial relation ends does not necessarily translate

into an immediate transformation in the ways in which the former colony is perceived by the metropolis, and vice versa. As Goldsworthy (1971) points out, there was an existing feeling of the Mandate nearing its end months before the official end of the British Mandate. It is ultimately up to the researcher to make a rational decision in order to advance the project. The decision to use an official, temporal marker means that we can technically set boundaries in the selection of news articles. The date of independence of Palestine in relation to Britain was the most straightforward option, as this date signifies the moment when Britain was able to take a different stance, at least in official terms, towards Palestine.

While 14 May 1948 is the official moment when Palestine became independent from Britain, we must not ignore the fact that this is also the date when the creation of the state of Israel took place. Matar (2011: xi–xii) describes this date in 1948 as the moment when "Palestinians were denied their land and, most importantly, their commonality with other human beings". Although I fully acknowledge the settler–colonist situation between Palestine and Israel, this project remains focused on the postcolonial link between Britain and Palestine (and, by extension, Israel).

The historical phases that were selected for analysis are the following:

1. The end of the British Mandate and the beginning of the First Arab–Israeli War (henceforth, the 1948 sample). The actual sample includes news articles published between 15 May 1948 and 12 June 1948. This sample has been selected in order to analyse the initial period of postcoloniality and to take into account the historical significance of the *Nakba* (catastrophe) in Palestinian history (Matar 2011).
2. The Six Day War (henceforth, the 1967 sample). The actual sample includes news articles published between 1 June 1967 and 15 June 1967. Approximately twenty years after the first selected period, 1967 is a key point in Israeli-Palestinian history due to the drawing of new borders following the war. Some contemporary arguments suggest that a Palestinian state should be created based on the pre-1967 borders.
3. The beginning of the First Intifada (henceforth, the 1987 sample). The actual sample includes news articles published between 25 November 1987 and 24 December 1987. Again, approximately twenty years after the second selected period, the sample focuses

on the beginning of the Intifada in order to measure the coverage of the conflict as the uprising began to develop.

4. The Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009 (henceforth, the 2008 sample). The actual sample includes news articles published between 27 December 2008 and 20 January 2009, once again, approximately twenty years after the third selected period.
5. The Great March of Return in March, April and May 2018 (henceforth the 2018 sample). The sample includes news articles published between 30 March and 15 May 2018, to coincide with the seventieth anniversary of the *Nakba* and the creation of the state of Israel.

These moments, which were chosen because of their significance in the history of Palestine and Israel, were different in terms of the motivations that sparked them and the agents that became involved in the confrontations, which were not always between Israelis and Palestinians. The fact that the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and the Six Day War have been considered historically as 'wars', the Intifada was an 'uprising', the 2008 attacks have been described as an 'invasion' or 'bombardment', and the 2018 events were meant to be peaceful protests that turned into violent clashes, coinciding with the seventieth anniversary of the creation of Israel and the move of the US embassy to Jerusalem, means that we have a variety of scenarios which provide optimal case studies for the use of linguistic classifications of political violence. While there have been other significant moments in the conflict, five events provided a manageable but representative sample.

Selected Newspapers

The choice of the newspaper format over online news was primarily based on the constraints of the historical perspective of this project. Since the conflict predates the development of the multiple media platforms that are available today, the print press provided the most favourable medium to analyse the news across the five selected historical periods as the material is accessible through archives. Newspapers were not selected based on circulation statistics as this indicator was not deemed as being as relevant for this research project, which is not as concerned with the impact of the newspaper on the readership (based on the number of

readers that may, or may not, have consumed these news articles) as it is with the actual production of discourse in newspapers.

Therefore, I selected four British national daily newspapers: the *Guardian* (or *Manchester Guardian* until 1959), *The Times*, *Daily Mirror*, and the *Sun* (or *Daily Herald* until 1964). This selection aimed to include news articles published by both quality (*The Times*, *Guardian*) and tabloid press (*Sun*, *Daily Mirror*), as well as to include a variety of political stances, from more liberal newspapers, such as the *Daily Mirror* and the *Guardian* (Allen and Frost 1981; Ayerst 1971; Edelman 1966; Taylor 1993) to more conservative ones, such as the *Sun* and *The Times* (Chippindale and Horrie 1999; Stewart 2005). These decisions were made based on the contemporary characteristics of these publications as of 2009, due to the fact that ideological stances and ownership have varied along the years. For example, the relaunch of the *Daily Herald* as the *Sun* by International Publishing Corporation in 1964 and in 1969 by Rupert Murdoch illustrates the complexities involved in the choice of newspapers for a historical analysis, as these changes also led to variations in the ideological stance of the newspaper (Chippindale and Horrie 1999; Smith 2000). Bearing in mind that there have been variations in the histories of these publications, I had to make a decision in terms of how to select the newspapers for this analysis, and this decision was made based on the contemporary characteristics of these publications. Even though there is some literature on the stance of the press towards Israel, particularly with reference to the *Guardian* (Ayerst 1971; Shindler 2004; Taylor 1993), the stance towards Palestine was not considered in the selection criteria because I did not wish to restrict the investigation by using narrow definitions based on formal political stance of the papers in this respect, as it may in turn have produced categories that would have prefigured the empirical data.

Collection and Analysis Process

The sampled material was collected by implementing a combination of manually sifting through microfilm rolls which are available at the British Library (London) and using some online facilities. The articles published by *The Times* were accessed online via *The Times Digital Archive 1785–1985* (for the 1948 and 1967 samples), the British Library's *The Times Digital Archive* (for the 1987 sample) and LexisNexis (for the 2008 and 2018 samples). All the *Sun* (and *Daily Herald*) and *Guardian*

Table 2.1 Distribution of sampled articles per year and publication

	1948	*1967*	*1987*	*2008*	*2018*	*Total*
(Manchester) Guardian	84	95	35	134	53	401
The Times	84	103	35	96	19	337
Daily Mirror	18	42	8	48	31	147
Sun/Daily Herald	27	35	3	84	25	174
Total	213	275	81	362	128	1059

samples (with the exception of the 2008 and 2018 samples) were collected by manually searching for relevant articles in microfilm rolls at the British Library. The *Sun* and the *Guardian*'s 2008 and 2018 samples were collected from LexisNexis by searching for the keywords 'Israel' or 'Palestinian' or 'Palestine' between the dates specified in the criteria above. This Boolean search (based on the use of 'or') was made in order to avoid missing relevant articles that may not have mentioned one of the two terms. Duplicate and irrelevant articles resulting from this Boolean search were manually removed from the sample. The *Daily Mirror* samples were collected using the British Library's facility 'UKPressOnline', with the exception of the 2018 sample, which was collected via LexisNexis. This online search was also based on the keywords 'Israel' or 'Palestinian' or 'Palestine', following the same criteria explained above.

As Table 2.1 indicates, after the collection and preparation of data stages, a total of 1059 articles were analysed, with the following distribution:

Some Final Remarks

In conclusion, I have argued in favour of recognising a Postcolonial rubric within CDA, as PCDA is particularly concerned with discourses rooted in postcolonial relations of power. We have seen that CDA is concerned with "the relations between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the discourse analyst in such social relations" (van Dijk 1993: 249). It is concerned with issues of unequal access to discourse and information, and with the role of discourse in the reproduction of existing power relations. When analysing social inequalities, CDA favours the oppressed or powerless and considers the broader

social processes that are involved in the production of discourse. I have argued that the insights of Postcolonial Theory, which is concerned with the struggle against the "domination by repressive and exploitative imperial powers and their local allies" (Martin 2010: 281), are useful to contextualise some of these broader social processes from a theoretical perspective. I have also pointed out that this postcolonial approach not only contextualises the analysis theoretically, but it also places it historically in terms of the particular developments and scenarios that have characterised the postcolonial era in each context.

The empirical application of PCDA helps to reveal how, and the extent to which, media production and representations are shaped by postcolonial relations, based both on the textual elements that are visible in the text and those that are absent. Specifically, I have discussed the importance of analysing linguistic classifications that reflect, and are explained by, specific ideological standpoints and power divisions. This is only one of several aspects that PCDA can help to unpack. It also offers a framework for examining other aspects such as, for example, the use of news sources which promote the postcolonial centre's perspective, while other news sources (particularly those from the periphery) tend to be neglected. In addition, the focus of PCDA on the postcolonial also helps to examine the historical contextualisation of contemporary conflicts and struggles that are rooted in colonial times. In this respect, we can identify the extent to which this contextualisation is developed in the news coverage of those issues. Exploring them from the postcolonial approach emphasised by PCDA restores the largely neglected historical connection of the (post)colonial centre to its proper place in understanding the significance of media representations.

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CHAPTER 3

Contextualising the Conflict: A Brief History of the Land

Hurewitz pointed out in 1949 that so much has been written about Palestine that any attempt to analyse all the material on this conflict would "demand a volume in itself and the collective effort of many scholars, for no one can pretend to have read – let alone digested – all of this material" (in Devore 1976: xxxiii). If this was already the case in 1949, when the state of Israel had only been proclaimed one year earlier, the developments that have taken place in the area since then make this attempt to collect, read and digest material a much more complex process seventy years later, due to the accumulation of historical events, interests, attacks and retaliations that have come to be an integrating part of the conflict.

This complexity is also determined by the various ideological positions involved in the development of the conflict. Ghandour (2010) argues that the history of Mandate Palestine has always been characterised by countless ambiguities, including

> double (triple, quadruple) deals, irreconcilable promises, an indeterminate moral compass, improvisational strategy, intense diplomacy but no real implementation plan, the chaotic introduction and suspension of laws, regulations and customs, the classification (eradication?) of native culture. (Ghandour 2010: 1)

This description of the conflict summarises some of the aspects that are discussed in this chapter and in the rest of the book. This brief history

R. Sanz Sabido, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the British Press*,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5_3

of the conflict is by no means an exhaustive account, nor could it ever be neutral or free from biases or exclusions. Within the available room, the purpose of this chapter is to offer some historical contextualisation before the analysis, in line with the early stages of PCDA as a methodological framework (see Chapter 2).

A Land Without People: Palestine and the Rise of Zionism (1881–1914)

Until the late nineteenth century, Palestine was inhabited by Muslims, Jews and Christians, who lived peacefully alongside one another (Harb 2011; Morris 2008). Morris (2008: 2) points out that "in 1881, Palestine had about 450,000 Arabs—about 90 per cent Muslim, the rest Christian – and twenty-five thousand Jews". According to Harb (2011: 56), in the 1890s, "the Jews were a tiny minority, numbering between 8,000 and 25,000 according to different counts, and relations with Arabs were reasonably cordial". Jewish immigrants began to arrive in Palestine from Russia from the end of the nineteenth century and from Europe later on. While a strong current of emigrants went to America, others (about 25,000–30,000 Jews) moved to Palestine during the first wave of immigration or First *Aliya*, from 1882 to 1903 (Janowsky 1959: 12; Morris 2008: 2). These immigration waves were explained by the attempts to escape the persecutions that the Jewish people were subjected to in the countries where they lived, and sparked fears among Arabs of a "new crusade" (Harb 2011: 56).

By the end of the First *Aliya* in 1903, Theodor Herzl had launched the Zionist movement (Janowsky 1959: 12). Herzl had experienced the persecutions as a Jew in Europe, and decided that the solution to the Jewish problem was to establish an independent Jewish state to assimilate the migrations of Jews and protect them (Harb 2011: 59; Morris 2008: 5). Martin (2010: 282) defines Zionism as "an intellectual movement that sought to establish the proper means, conditions, and timing to resettle Jews in Palestine". It is a political ideology that argues for the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish people, so that they can be safe and build a sense of national identity (Massad 2000). The success of this movement eventually materialised in the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.

At the time, Palestine was considered to be the remaining refuge and solution to Jewish problems (Sachar 1977: 12–13). Against all the

evidence to the contrary, Palestine conveniently emerged as a land without people that could receive a people without land (Heikal 1996; Herzl 2012). It was not necessary to worry about the people who actually lived in the land because, supposedly, those people did not exist. During the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, Herzl did not acknowledge that Palestine was inhabited and, even though this was challenged by reports received after some visits to the land, the existence of Palestinians continued to be ignored and denied by the Zionists (Harb 2011: 59). The predominant attitude was that any native population living in the lands were uncivilised and unworthy of being taken into consideration. Harb (2011: 60) argues that, subsequently, "the denial of the existence of the Palestinian people as a nation was transmitted to future generations of Zionism". For Said (1992), Zionism is a fundamentally orientalist endeavour which has shaped Palestine from before the establishment of Israel, and it has also characterised "Israeli occupying forces on the West Bank and Gaza after 1967" (Said 1992: 17) and beyond.

By this time, most of the Jews in Palestine lived in Jerusalem, while about 80% of the Arabs lived in small towns and agricultural villages, where many rural inhabitants "were tenant farmers, their lands owned – in a semifeudal relationship – by wealthy urban landowners, or effendis" (Morris 2008: 2). The second wave of immigrants or Second *Aliya* (1904–1914) brought 30,000 more Jews to the land. At this point in time, out of the 50,000 Jews living in Palestine, only 5000 were to be found in the twenty rural colonies (Sachar 1977: 71–72). These new waves of immigrations sought to increase the Jewish presence in rural areas with the objective of strengthening Jewish labour and supporting the growth of the Jewish population until it became a majority (Morris 2008: 2; Sachar 1977: 71–72; Shapira 1992: 55). By the time that the first Arab National Congress was held in Paris in 1913, Arabs in Palestine started to demand an end to Jewish immigration and land purchase (Ovendale 1989: 10). Morris (2008: 4) points out that, in hindsight, what had effectively become a demographic-geographic contest for the lowlands or rural areas, eventually gave the Zionists the territorial base for statehood.

However, Cohen (1987: 9) argues that despite the increase in Jewish population in Palestine, before World War I "there was no Palestinian problem", even though Zionist settlements had already aroused some Arab opposition. In fact, at the time it seemed as though the Turks would continue to rule the area, but World War I "offered unique

political opportunities for both Arabs and Jews". Indeed, the Ottoman Empire became "a major arena for big power politics" by the start of the conflict (Freedman 1979: 3).

A Land of Promises: World War I and the British Mandate (1914–1948)

The Ottoman Empire, which had existed for some 400 years, still dominated the Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth century, although the empire had spent the previous hundred years attempting to deal with Europe's growing power, especially in the years just before 1914 (Owen 2004: 8–9). The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was particularly important for the reforms that the Ottoman institutions needed to implement, in order to deal with their losses against Europe. This Revolution had brought to power a group of officers and officials who were dedicated "to an incipient Turkish nationalism which threatened to drive a wedge between the Turks who controlled the empire and the Arabs who had previously been regarded as their main partners" (Owen 2004: 9). Turkish nationalism led to some strains, but the Arab reaction did not go as far as proposing the creation of an Arab state, since they regarded the Ottoman Empire as their protector. Furthermore, the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who ruled from 1876 to 1909, focused on keeping the loyalty of Arabs in his remaining Empire, particularly in Palestine, "precisely because of outside interest in the Holy Land" (Dowty 2008: 59).

However, the process of 'Turkification', which sought to preserve the Empire, eventually led to the organisation of Arab nationalists as a movement which proposed a unified Arab state as an alternative to the Ottoman Empire (Dowty 2008: 66). Palestine was at the heart of this movement, as Palestinians and other Arabs reached a consensus about the Zionist project:

> Put simply: Palestine is at the heart of the Arab world, and has had an Islamic and Arab majority population since the ninth century –for a millennium. […] Palestinian Arabs must be permitted to defend their homes, their livelihoods, their culture, and their way of life against the uninvited intrusion of an alien nation that openly declares its goal of taking over their country by transforming its demography. Jews have enjoyed the status of *dhimmi* (protected people) in Islamic lands, so long

> as they accepted the existing framework and assimilated culturally. The Zionists are a different matter. Zionists come from Europe, infected with the colonialist mentality that justifies the conquest and subjugation of non-Western peoples and lands. (Dowty 2008: 68)

Within this context, Husayn ibn Ali, the Sharif of Mecca and head of the Hashemite dynasty (he was thirty-seventh in direct descent from Prophet Mohammed), would be the one to forge a vital link between the Arabs and the West, providing the key to the fulfilment of Arab aspirations (Cohen 1987: 10). Husayn entered into an exchange of letters with Sir Henry McMahon, the new British High Commissioner for Egypt. This exchange became known as the 'Husayn-McMahon correspondence', which began on 14 July 1915 with a letter from Husayn to McMahon seeking British agreement to the proclamation of an Arab caliphate for Islam. At that time, Arab soldiers were fighting with the Turks against the British side in Mesopotamia, so Husayn was rebuffed (Cohen 1987: 14). However, a series of reverses against British positions meant that Britain was about to withdraw from the war, when a second letter from Husayn arrived on 9 September 1915.

This letter and the discussions that ensued constitute a crucial moment in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, due to the controversies that it sparked later on. Husayn and McMahon agreed that, if the Arabs joined the British to fight the Turks, then Britain would support "the establishment of an Arab state or states under Hashemite rule in the Arabian peninsula, Syria, Iraq, and – in the Hashemite interpretation – Palestine" (Dowty 2008: 70). In exchange, Husayn had to instigate an Arab Revolt within the Ottoman Empire in order to weaken it (1916–1918). However, the British promise, as documented in a letter by McMahon dated 24 October 1915, was not fully addressed.

Cohen (1987: 18) provides an analysis of this letter and the circumstances around it and argues that Arab–British relations during World War I were characterised by several anomalies. The main cause for controversy was that the letter had not defined clearly what territories were covered by the agreement, as McMahon's letter was rather ambiguous. The main problem was that "it did not specify the boundaries within which the British would recognise Arab independence", and the point that raised more controversy was the one regarding the exclusion of areas which Britain did not regard as purely Arab by population. Arab-Zionist polemics arose from here, as it was not clear whether Mandated Palestine

was in fact excluded from the areas assigned to Husayn in October 1915. In any case, Ovendale (1992) points out that it does not appear as though Palestine was an issue at that time in the minds of either the British or Arab negotiators, and it was only later that they thought of Palestine as being a problematic area. With regards to the content of McMahon's controversial letter, Cohen (1987) concludes that

> It was basically on Britain's word, given by a single letter by a relatively minor official, that the Hashemites, and later the Palestinian Arabs, would base their political aspirations. They relied somewhat naively on the assurances of an imperial power that was unconscionably willing, when caught up in the exigencies of a global struggle, to scatter promises to minor actors in the greater drama with little or no thought for future consequences. (Cohen 1987: 28)

Cohen also adds that, while the British undoubtedly incurred some moral commitments to the cause of Arab independence in 1915, the Husayn-McMahon correspondence cannot be considered to be a legally binding agreement on either side. However, regardless of the ambiguity of Britain's promise to the Arabs, this was not the only promise that they made during the war. In order to win support in Russia and the United States, and possibly also in the future Middle East, Britain also made promises to the Jews regarding the establishment of a Jewish homeland if they adhered to the British cause in the war (Dowty 2008: 71).

This promise materialised in the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which was a policy statement in the form of a letter from British Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur Balfour to Lord Lionel Rothschild, head of the British Zionist Federation. This policy statement "became legally relevant when it was written into the British Mandate of Palestine by the League of Nations" (Dowty 2008: 71). Although the statement never spoke of a Jewish state, and it also specified that the rights of the non-Jewish population were to be respected, Zionists welcomed this statement as a major victory in their run for the creation of a Jewish state. The Balfour Declaration was later incorporated as part of the draft of the Mandate, which was passed by the League of Nations in July 1922.

However, in 1919 the Arabs were suspicious of British plans and policies, to the extent that King Faisal, in despair, had warned the British government that if faced with the dismemberment of their country, they would rejoin the Turks in a holy war against the West (Tibawi 1978: 381).

In fact, due to the promises that they had made to both parties, the British government had to deal with two conflicting issues even before the Mandate had been ratified. On the one hand, they had to honour the promise of building a Jewish national home. On the other hand, they had to prepare the population for self-government after independence, which was a problem considering the Arab opposition to the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

In an attempt to find a solution for both sides, the British government, under Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill, issued a White Paper in June 1922 stating that a "national home" did not mean making all of Palestine into a Jewish nation, and that Jewish immigration would be limited by the "absorptive capacity" of the country (Dowty 2008: 72). The White Paper gave some breathing space to Palestinians, but it was far from acceptable for the Zionists (Wasserstein 1991: 148). Shapira (1992: 167) points out that the attempt to neutralise the question of majority led to the idea of a binational state, in which neither people is dominant, but sovereignty and the right of ownership are shared between both parties, regardless of the numerical relation between them. This was not a suitable development for the Zionists. While Jewish immigration was one of the Palestinians' worst nightmares, for the Zionists it was the best opportunity to tilt the balance to their side in terms of population, and their plans to create a state of their own, in which they would not have to mix with others, depended on the creation of a state which was essentially Jewish.

Following the White Paper, the British Mandate was ratified in July 1922 (Caplan 1982: 22). Owen (2004: 19) points out that, as a Mandate, Palestine was technically an independent country, so there were limitations to what Britain could do. However, this type of system displays the principles and policies of a colonial state, including the belief that the land lacked "any endogenous dynamic for development" and hence British colonial rule was the bearer of "new enlightenment for the natives" (Alavi 1989: 5). The history of the Palestinian Mandate is, essentially, that of Britain's effort to find common ground between Zionism and Arabs (Stookey 1986). The key colonial principles in the Mandate system include features such as central administration from a foreign government (in this case, the British government), the policies imposed by the colonial power as part of their administration of the land, and colonialism as a conduit for external influence (Owen 2004), as determined by the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1917, by which British and

French "spheres of influence" were set up in the Middle East after World War I (Friedman 1992; Owen 2004).

Zionist anxieties regarding the creation of a Jewish homeland continued, and this led to a lack of confidence in the British administration. Their perspective was reinforced in 1925 when Colonial Secretary Amery confirmed, in a visit to the land, that "the Government is not thinking of actively helping in the creation of the Jewish National Home" and that they would have to build it up themselves (Caplan 1982: 23). Although reaching a convenient solution was always of paramount concern for both parties, the British government only counted this as one of the various issues concerning the administration of these lands, particularly when the economic situation began to deteriorate at the close of the 1920s. The question of the Jewish homeland hence became more marginal for Britain (Shapira 1992: 170).

Nevertheless, tensions between both peoples mounted with the increase in Arab crimes against Jews (Shapira 1992: 170) and due to the combination of positive political developments between the British administration and the Arabs together with the disillusionment of the Zionists (Wasserstein 1991: 223). These tensions eventually led to the events of Yom Kippur in 1928, when Jews placed a dividing curtain between men and women praying at the Wailing Wall. This curtain was removed by the British police, offending Jewish religious sentiments and causing protests throughout the Jewish world (Shapira 1992: 171; Wasserstein 1991: 225). Later, the riots in August 1929 over the Wailing Wall included demonstrations by Jews and Arabs, disturbances and concentrated bursts of violence on both sides (Shapira 1992: 174).

The 1929 riots did not bring any immediate, substantial changes to existing policies, and the balance between all forces remained as it had been until that moment (Shapira 1992: 173; Wasserstein 1991: 238). However, the riots marked a turning point in terms of the political attitudes that would follow in the 1930s. Attention was gradually shifted to Germany and the rise of Hitler and his policies. The subsequent Fifth *Aliya* or wave of immigration (1932–1936) helped the Zionists increase their confidence in their homeland project (Shapira 1992: 173). At the same time, the Zionists realised that the alliance between the British government and Zionist leaders was preventing those positions of Zionist leadership from being revised, and that the only way to change this political system was to target and undermine the legitimacy of the British administration. In other words, the struggle for Palestine became one

between the Jews and the British, and the third party, the Arabs, simply ceased to exist in the eyes of the Zionists (Shapira 1992: 200).

The direction of events in the first half of the 1930s led to the eruption of the Arab Rebellion in April 1936, which saw Arabs resorting to arms in reaction to the new wave of immigration (Abboushi 1985: 92; Samuel 1971: 52). This was the first campaign in the violent struggle between the two peoples for supremacy of Palestine (Shapira 1992: 219). Arab violence made the British Government favour the Arabs due to the threat of further revolts in other mandated territories, so Jewish rights and immigration were reduced. British reports on these violent events did not portray the Arabs as the aggressor or as responsible for the violence (Samuel 1971: 53–54). It was at this time that the Haganah (the Hebrew word for self-defence) emerged as the Jewish response to the Arab and British attitudes and actions. Samuel (1971: 54) points out that, by 1937, most of the able-bodied Jewish population of Palestine was linked with the Haganah, an essentially military organisation that was forced to work underground, although the British administration knew of its existence. During this period, the option of the partition of Palestine into two states arose (Samuel 1971; Shapira 1992).

In May 1939, after Jews and Arabs had been summoned to take part in talks in London, the British government issued a new White Paper that officially confirmed that "British support of the Jewish national home had ended" (Samuel 1971: 59). This White Paper were not only concerning for the Jews in Palestine, but also for the Jews who were being persecuted in Europe. The Zionists could not accept this White Paper, and began to organise various strategies to fight British policies and resources in Palestine (Cohen 1982; Samuel 1971). Indeed, Shapira (1992: 277) argues that the years between September 1939, when World War II and the Holocaust began, and May 1948, when the state of Israel was proclaimed, were perhaps the most traumatic in Jewish history. Despite the deep problems of Europe during World War II, and even though the Jews had offered to help Britain in an attempt to change their minds about the Jewish homeland, after the end of the war Britain decided to uphold the 1939 White Paper (Cohen 1982).

According to Louis (1986: 2–3), the British administration felt that the solution to the Jewish problem should be sought in Europe instead of Palestine, which was regarded as a predominantly Arab country. The British could not support a Jewish state without alienating the Arabs, nor could they impose a favourable settlement for the Arabs without

antagonising the United States, which was in support of the Jews. The concern of Britain with Palestine can be summarised in their wish to remain a dominant power in the Middle East, and they could only achieve this with the support of the United States and with the cooperation of the Arabs. The accusations against Britain that were sparked due to their lack of concern for the suffering of Jews in Europe were explained by the fact that they were "pursuing a grand 'imperial' strategy in which Palestine played only a small part but most irritating part" (Louis 1986: 3).

The Zionist acts of violence that followed the 1939 White Paper, including the emergence of the Stern Gang in 1940 (Brenner 1982; Heller 1995), did not ease the anti-Jewish feelings among the British people (Cohen 1982: 138). Britain was not able to cope with the violence that Zionists were directing against them (Charters 1989; Cohen 1987) and, considering that Palestine had become the main trouble spot in the British empire, requiring 100,000 troops and a significant budget to maintain, Churchill decided that "tiny Palestine" was not worth keeping after they had relinquished territories such as India and Burma (Cohen 1987: 122). Eventually, Britain lost control over Palestine and realised that they would not be able to make the opposing groups reach an agreement.

Consequently, in February 1947, Britain referred the issue to the United Nations, and a proposal was drafted to divide the land into two states. Arabs rejected the creation of a Palestinian state under the conditions suggested in the UN proposal, but this did not prevent the Jews from advancing their own cause. In November 1947, after the first round of votes failed to approve the creation of a Jewish state, the Zionists had forty-eight hours to convince some of the delegations to change their votes, which finally led to the approval of the UN Resolution on the Partition of Palestine (Cohen 1987: 126–127). On 14 May 1948, the British Mandate would officially end and the new state of Israel would be proclaimed.

The Land of Israel: From the Zionist Homeland to Zionist Expansionism (1948–1967)

The end of the British Mandate meant the official dissolution of the colonial administration and the subsequent start of the postcolonial era of Britain towards Palestine, which is marked by the proclamation of the new state of Israel as a sovereign state on 14 May 1948. The postcolonial

'feeling' was already in existence long before the official date, especially for the Zionists, but as explained earlier, postcoloniality can be a complex term and, for the sake of argument, is defined here in official, temporal terms. This moment in the history of Palestine is also known as *Nakba* or *Karitha*, which mean 'catastrophe', 'trauma' and 'disaster' (Matar 2011; Pappé 1992). This was the moment "when the state of Israel was created and the Palestinians were denied their land and, most importantly, their commonality with other human beings" (Matar 2011: xi–xii). On the other hand, following on from the Zionist decision of dealing with the conflict as though this was only between Britain and the Jews, the ensuing war was a war of independence and, in contrast to the Palestinian experience, this was for them a glorious moment (Pappé 1992).

The First Arab–Israeli War consequently began on 15 May 1948 (Janowsky 1959; Pappé 1992). The fighting went on between Jewish forces and Palestinian as well as, more generally, Arab forces, while diplomatic efforts were led by Count Folke Bernadotte on behalf of the United Nations. Bernadotte attempted to mediate between both conflicting sides and proposed various plans to resolve the clashes, with no success. The war ended in January 1949 although there were several ceasefires during those months (including those of 11 June and 19 July). Count Bernadotte continued to work on a peace plan that would replace the unworkable partition scheme, but he was assassinated by the Stern Gang in September 1948 (Pappé 1992). The UN accused the Israeli government of knowing who the perpetrators were, and indeed Israel made no effort to find the culprits, which showed Israel's "determination not to allow outside peace negotiations to undermine Israel's achievements on the battlefield" (Pappé 1992: 163). Consequently, the Israelis became less successful in the diplomatic arena, but they held the initiative in the prosecution of the war, until its end in January 1949, although negotiations continued until 1951.

This period was followed by the decade of the 1950s, which was characterised by a transitional phase between imperialist control and national liberation, which was also related to technological developments and the discovery of new sources of political and economic power (Oren 1992: 1). In the Middle East, most countries were either fighting for independence or experiencing the consequences of decolonisation. In addition, it is crucial to acknowledge the rising power of the United States in the Middle East. Oren (1992) points out how, having entered the region due to Britain's inability to safeguard it from Communism, the United States

realised that they had vital interests in the Middle East, mainly due to the importance of Arab oil. The intervention of the United States in this area was a key marker in the ways in which Britain related to the Middle East from this point. The United States excluded France from the Middle East in an attempt to move away from the remnants of imperialism and to support moderate nationalist forces in order to gain support in the area. The United States could not, however, ignore Britain's strategic role in the region, so they agreed to coordinate their policies with Britain, without openly associating with them to avoid the connection with imperialism (Oren 1992: 3).

Focusing more specifically on Palestine, the period between 1948 and 1964 is often referred to as the 'epoch of silence' or the 'lost years', reflecting how the Arab Palestinian community ceased to exist as a social and political entity (Matar 2011: 16), including the fact that they were left leaderless and disorganised following the 1948 war (Matar 2011: 55) and that it became incredibly difficult for Palestinians to articulate a coherent political narrative from that point (Matar 2011: 56). At the same time, the conflict, just as the lands, ceased to be Palestinian. Palestinian territories were annexed into Arab spheres of influence, and the conflict with Israel became a pretext to fight for motivations other than the rights of Palestinians (Schueftan 1978). Matar (2011) argues that a "constructed amnesia, shared by all Palestinians" was fed into "discourses of the so-called lost years between 1948 and the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1964", when Palestine seemed to have disappeared from the map, from international public discourse, as a place, as an independent actor, and as a people (Matar 2011: 59). This process of Palestinian vanishing happened while Israel embarked on "a major process of state consolidation" and definition and expansion of its frontiers throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008: 27).

These Israeli expansionist plans, on the one hand, and the rise of pan-Arabism, on the other, provoked serious border tensions that led to the 1956 Suez Crisis (Morris 1993). Indeed, Israel's plans clashed with the struggle for the liberation of Palestine, which was connected with discourses of pan-Arabism in the Middle East in the first half of the twentieth century (Matar 2011: 59). These discourses of pan-Arabism reached their peak in the 1950s and 1960s with the popularity of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, who attempted to make himself the champion of pan-Arabic renaissance and the leader of the

decolonisation movement in the Middle East and Africa (Philo and Berry 2011: 43).

In this respect, Lucas (1996: 7) points out that the control of the Suez Canal by France and Britain until 1956 was an important symbol of the continuing dominance of those countries in the region. The European colonial powers needed to protect their oil interests and their strategic control of the Middle East and Africa, including the Suez Canal, which allowed ships to avoid the long journey around Africa when travelling to India. Arab nationalism, personified in Nasser, posed a risk to European interests. Nasser nationalised the Canal in July 1956 and, consequently, Britain and France, who were shareholders in the Canal, decided that he had to be removed from power (Philo and Berry 2011: 43). In addition, Israel also considered Egypt a threat to their expansionist interests (Hirst 1977; Shlaim 2001), although other authors suggest that Israel's intentions at this point were merely defensive and only sought to improve the security of the country (Sachar 1977).

In order to remove Nasser from power, Britain, France and Israel devised a military plan. In the first instance, Israel launched an attack on the Sinai Peninsula on 29 October 1956. Once Israel and Egypt were engaged in battle, Britain and France demanded that both countries must withdraw their forces from the Suez Canal area. Following the plan that they had devised, Israel complied with this order, but Egypt refused to do so. Britain and France bombarded the Egyptian airfields and Israel managed to take over Gaza and Sinai (Philo and Berry 2011: 44). However, Britain agreed to leave Suez pressured by the United States, with whom they were seeking to consolidate more positive relations (Lucas 1996: 10), and Israel was also eventually forced to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. However, these events constitute a clear example of postcolonial intervention and continuing presence of European powers in the Middle East. Although the Suez Crisis did not involve a direct confrontation between Israel and Palestinians, these events are part of the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict because of the significance of these tensions for the development of the conflict in the ensuing years. In addition, the Middle East became a site of Cold War rivalry in the 1960s, so these confrontations must also be partly understood in relation to the Soviet Union's support of the Arabs and the United States' support of Israel, which eventually resulted in the Six Day War in 1967.

A Land of Violence: Wars, 'Terrorism' and the Search for Peace (1967–1987)

The Six Day War was initially sparked by the fact that the Soviet Union had informed Syria that Israel was organising an attack on Syria (Philo and Berry 2011: 45). This attack followed on from numerous border clashes and rising tensions between both countries, which included some Palestinian guerrilla attacks launched from Syria. The Syrian government sought help from Egypt, and Nasser responded by blockading the Israeli port of Eilat. Two weeks later, on 5 June 1967, Israel launched simultaneous aerial and land attacks on Egypt. Despite the support of other Arab countries, Egypt's resources were destroyed within a day, and Jordanian and Syrian forces were also defeated. The war had dreadful consequences for Palestinian and other Arab territories, as Israel drove the Jordanians out of the West Bank, occupied the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights (Philo and Berry 2011: 46). Israeli expansion, which was made possible thanks to these territorial gains, continued in the following years not only through military occupation of Palestinian lands, but also by creating illegal settlements which contravened UN resolutions (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008: 27–28).

Especially since 1967, political movements defending the rights of Palestinian refugees were established. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which had been formed in 1964, included several nationalist groups that worked for the self-determination of Palestine despite its factional nature. The PLO included groups such as Fatah (the resistance movement led by Yasser Arafat, formed in 1968), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Communists. Arab guerrilla infiltration was not exclusively a post-1967 phenomenon, as there had been attacks against Israeli settlements since the state came into being, mainly small raids across the border (Laqueur 1999: 31; Sachar 1977: 682). After the war, however, it became more difficult to contain popular support for guerrilla operations and a major 'terrorist' campaign began in response to the occupation of the West Bank (Hirst 1977; Laqueur 1999: 31). The movement took over as the political and symbolic representatives of the Palestinians (Matar 2011: 17) and organised an armed struggle which encompassed a diverse range of acts of political violence and resistance against Israel, including hijackings,

bomb attacks and assassinations, to the extent that, until the late 1980s, Palestinians were regarded as 'terrorists'. Supporters of Palestinian rights to self-determination argued that this 'terrorist' strategy was part of a cycle of desperation in response to the denial of political rights or statehood. Others, particularly those involved in policymaking in Israel, United States and other Western countries, were not prepared to tolerate the pursuit of politics through violence (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008: 28).

Indeed, Bregman (2000) refers to the period between 1967 and 1973 as "the six bad years", due to the escalation of violence that followed the Six Day War. This period also included the War of Attrition between 1969 and 1970 (Bregman 2000: 61; Pappé 2004: 208), and regular cases of popular uprisings and use of violence (Pappé 2004). The killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972 and the blowing up of several jumbo jets at Dawson Field in Jordan in September 1970 are some examples of this use of violence (Laqueur 1999). The "six bad years" were followed by the Yom Kippur war, which brought Egyptian and Syrian troops into confrontation with Israel in October 1973. Having attempted to regain the Sinai Peninsula from Israel through diplomatic means, Egypt, together with Syria, attacked Israeli troops in the occupied Peninsula and Golan Heights. Despite early successes by the Arab forces, Israel regained the lands causing the defeat of the Arab armies. This war left, however, a rather negative image of Israel, whose self-confidence and sense of invincibility had been shattered due to the nearly 3000 Jewish casualties, a high number if compared with the few hundred in the 1967 war (Pappé 2004: 209–210).

The period between 1973 and 1979 is denominated "war and peace" (Bregman 2000; Pappé 2004). The Yom Kippur War was followed by the Saudi Arabian oil embargo, in response to the support of the United States to Israel during the war. This oil embargo led to a major global recession that highlighted the need to resolve the conflict. In the following years, the PLO supported various plans to create a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip based on the 1967 borders, although these proposals were rejected by Israel. The European Economic Community also attempted to find a solution to the conflict by issuing statements supportive of Palestinians, but the United States made it clear that it would veto any of their resolutions supporting Palestinian rights (Philo and Berry 2011: 69–70). However, in 1978 Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement, known as the Camp

David accords, by which Israel agreed to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in exchange for a comprehensive peace treaty which included Egypt's abandonment of the Palestinian issue. Although the autonomy of Palestine was part of the accords, they offered no guarantee that a sovereign Palestinian state would be created (Soetendorp 2007: 51). Both countries were criticised for reaching this agreement, and Egypt was particularly condemned for breaking Arab unity and accepting a deal which did not include a positive resolution regarding Jerusalem, Palestinian statehood and full Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory (Philo and Berry 2011: 70).

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was also related to the Palestinian conflict. This invasion was allegedly motivated by the attacks that the PLO was perpetrating against Israel across the Lebanese border while they equipped themselves with a huge arsenal of weapons (Bard 2003, in Philo and Berry 2011: 75). However, other sources suggest that Israel sought to create a new political order in Lebanon and to undermine the PLO as a political and military organisation (Shlaim 2001: 396). In other words, the invasion of Lebanon can be explained by Israel's attempts to terminate Palestinian efforts to establish a nation of their own, and perhaps to force the PLO to undermine its own growing political status by engaging with further 'terrorist' activities (Philo and Berry 2011: 75–76). The invasion ended with the departure of the PLO from Lebanon (Matar 2011: 17) and the ties between Israel and the United States were strengthened after the war (Ovendale 1992).

In the 1980s there were several attempts to find a solution to the conflict, including the Amman Declaration, signed by Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan in February 1985. This document proposed Palestinian self-determination within a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation (Philo and Berry 2011: 76). However, Israel refused to negotiate with the PLO. Margaret Thatcher attempted to help by proposing a peace conference that included PLO members. This conference was never held due to the succession of violent events that followed and the US pressures for Britain to cancel these talks. The link between Jordan and the PLO was broken, and Jordan began diplomatic connections with Israel excluding the PLO from all negotiations. This is the context within which the 1987 uprising, later known as First Intifada, developed.

A Land Without Solutions? Uprisings, Accords and Invasions (1987–2018)

The outbreak of the Palestinian uprising at the end of November 1987 marked the culmination of growing political awareness among young Palestinians who faced the consequences of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in their everyday lives and the lack of freedom to organise themselves politically (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008: 30). The Intifada was "not a mass rebellion but a massive, persistent campaign of civil resistance" (Morris 1993: 561) by which Palestinians rejected anything that represented Israeli rule over their lives. Initially, the uprising was not a planned event, but rather a spontaneous Palestinian protest in which unarmed women and young people used rocks and Molotov cocktails to fight against Israeli control (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008: 31). Despite the use of violence, the fact that they did not use firearms helped create an image of Palestinians which led to media criticisms of Israel for the ways in which they treated unarmed women and children, which meant that human rights abuses came to light and the efficacy of the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were questioned. In February 1988, a new militant fundamentalist group, the Islamic Resistance Movement (*Harakat al Muqawama al Islami*), usually known as Hamas, joined the Intifada (Bregman 2000: 126).

The significance of the First Intifada (1987–1993) lies in the fact that it eventually opened a path for peace negotiations. Israel realised that it was necessary to find an alternative to military actions, and it also had to leave its existing plans of annexing the West Bank out of its agenda. These realisations, together with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, led to an American initiative to secure an Arab–Israeli peace process in the Middle East (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008: 32). Thus, the United States and the USSR co-organised a meeting in Madrid in 1991 with the intention of advancing "the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region" (Institute for Palestine Studies 1994: 3). The US-Soviet letter of invitation to the Peace Talks stated that the co-sponsors would chair the conference (alongside the European Community) and Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would be invited to participate. This initiative was developed after Arafat had declared in 1988 that the PLO would renounce all forms of 'terrorism', in an attempt to become accepted by the international community.

The Madrid meeting was the first multilateral peace conference on Arab–Israeli disputes. It was the first step towards the signing of the Declaration of Principles, or Oslo Accords, by Israel and the PLO in 1993 (Pappé 2004). The accords established a limited Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and provided a future framework for the peaceful resolution of the most important issues, such as the lands, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security and borders (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008: 33). Symbolised by the historic handshake between Israeli leader Itzhak Rabin and Palestinian chief Yasser Arafat, the Accords were meant to establish a meaningful process of trust building. However, around 1996, reality overtook the public discourses that presented Oslo as a peace process, as illustrated by the following quote by Zahar (cited in Hiro 1996), a Palestinian who reflects on the effects of the Accords and argues that they have made things worse for Palestinians:

> With its control of 45 per cent of the Gaza Strip, Israel continues its illegal occupation. And this has been accepted by the international community which thinks that peace has been achieved. It thinks that the Israelis have given us our freedom, which is untrue. (Hiro 1996: 532)

Indeed, the appeal of the Oslo process lasted until 1999, but during this time it failed to improve the situation of Palestinians and, in fact, covered up the fact that the Accords had not delivered what they were meant to provide for Palestinians. Pappé (2004: 247) points out that the question was no longer whether Oslo had brought peace to the torn land of Israel and Palestine, but rather, what price its people had paid for illusions sold to them by short-sighted politicians.

There exist some arguments that suggest that the Second Intifada, which commenced in September 2000, was sparked by the unresolved issues of the Oslo process, particularly the fact that military occupation had not ended (Philo and Berry 2011: 104). However, the second uprising has also been explained in terms of Ariel Sharon's visit to the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. This Mosque is one of the holiest sites in Islam and Sharon's visit angered Muslims, who demonstrated against Sharon's act and what it represented: the fact that the Mosque was under Israeli sovereignty and Jews had the right to visit it. Israel's excessive use of force to control the crowd infuriated Palestinians further, leading the uprising (Philo and Berry 2011: 104–106). A succession of numerous

Israeli and Palestinian violent acts developed, including suicide bombings. The death toll was very high, especially on the Palestinian side. Israel began the construction of a wall in 2002 with the alleged purpose of protecting their population from suicide bombings. Also in 2002, the United States issued some statements indicating that Palestinians must replace their leaders and that the United States would support the creation of a Palestinian state when they elect different leaders. Palestinians were angered by these declarations as they questioned the right of the United States to tell them who they should elect as leaders (Philo and Berry 2011: 110–111).

In 2004 Arafat passed away and in 2005 the Fatah candidate, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected president of the Palestinians. Later during the same year, Abbas and Israel agreed a ceasefire and the terms for the Israelis to release Palestinian prisoners and move their troops out of Palestinian population centres (Philo and Berry 2011: 118). In April 2005 Israel evacuated the Gaza Strip and, in August, Israeli troops removed the remaining Israeli settlers who had refused to relocate elsewhere, completing the Israeli disengagement from Gaza with the objective of achieving a "better security, political, economic and demographic situation" (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004, in Philo and Berry 2011: 119).

However, when Hamas—Fatah's main opposition—won the majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council and formed government in January 2006 (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008), the climate of negotiations changed. European and US reactions to the election results were negative, and they demanded that Hamas recognise the state of Israel, renounce violence and accept all previous agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority before they could accept Hamas as a negotiating partner. Hamas, however, refused to recognise the state of Israel until Israel specified exactly where their borders were. In addition, Hamas refused to renounce violence because, as long as the occupation continued, they had the right to exercise resistance. Furthermore, Hamas reiterated that they would respect a long-term ceasefire if a Palestinian state was created based on the pre-1967 borders, prisoners were released and refugees were allowed to return (Philo and Berry 2011: 122).

The United States and the EU proceeded to the blockade of the Gaza Strip and attempts were made to destabilise the Hamas administration so that new elections were called. However, this strategy did not achieve its objectives and, instead, it led to the development of a violent

confrontation between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008; Philo and Berry 2011). In the meantime, Hamas officially maintained a truce with Israel since February 2005, although other groups in Gaza continued to fire rockets into Israel, most of them unguided and killing an average of four Israelis per year (B'Teselem 2010, in Philo and Berry 2011: 123). The Israeli death toll contrasted with the Palestinian one, as during the same period Israeli attacks killed over 600 Palestinians per year (B'Teselem 2010, in Philo and Berry 2011: 123). After two Israeli attacks in June 2006 (the shelling of seven Palestinians who were picnicking on the beach, and a missile strike on two members of the Islamic Jihad), Hamas announced that they were putting an end to its 16-month ceasefire and they would start firing rockets into Israel.

The factional confrontations between Hamas and Fatah continued, Britain and the United States continued to put pressure on Hamas, and the Israeli and Egyptian blockade of the Gaza Strip was reinforced, provoking a serious humanitarian crisis (Philo and Berry 2011: 133). In June 2008, Hamas and Israel agreed a six-month ceasefire by which Israel was meant to stop the blockade and Hamas was meant to stop firing rockets, although these conditions were never fully met by either side. In December 2008, when the ceasefire was due to expire, both parties expressed interest in renewing the ceasefire, although Hamas were more inclined to fight and continue its objective of resisting Israeli occupation, since the blockade continued to be in place, starving and impoverishing the Gazan population. With the upcoming national elections in February 2009, the Israeli government could not accept Hamas' conditions for renewing the ceasefire, which included opening all the crossings and refraining from attacking Gaza. At that moment, toppling Hamas was a crucial promise in Israeli manifestos. The ensuing invasion of the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009 left a death toll of between 1100 and 1500 Palestinians, including more than 300 children. Immediate condemnation of the Israeli disproportionate use of force and calls for ceasefire were expressed from the beginning of the invasion (Philo and Berry 2011: 141–143).

Since 2009, offensives have continued to take place, including shootings, bombings, air strikes and invasions, most notably the Israeli Operation Returning Echo in March 2012 and the 2014 Gaza War, when over 2200 people were killed and more than 10,000 were wounded during fifty days of violence (BBC 2015). In July 2017, several

Palestinians were killed and more than 900 were injured in an attack over access to the al-Aqsa Mosque (Al Jazeera 2017a, b).

Most recently, in the run-up to the seventieth anniversary of the end of the British Mandate and the creation of the state of Israel, a series of protests commenced in the Gaza Strip on 30 March 2018. Described as the Great March of Return, Palestinians protested against the blockade of the Gaza Strip and the move of the United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and for the return of Palestinian refugees and their descendants to the land from which they were displaced because of the creation of Israel. Although the protests were described as peaceful resistance, there were instances of violent acts that caused some property damage on the Israeli side. In order to "protect the border fence", Israel met these actions by shooting protesters and firing tear gas, causing the death of more than 100 Palestinians and injuring thousands (Holmes and Balousha 2018a). Only on the day of the opening of the embassy in Jerusalem, coinciding with *Nakba* day, at least 52 Palestinians were killed and 2400 were wounded (Trew 2018: 1). Although this book covers the initial six-week period from 30 March until 15 May 2018, coinciding with the seventieth anniversary of the *Nakba*, the protests and acts of violence, including further blockades and restrictions on the Gaza Strip, continued for several weeks. Issues such as Israeli settlements, water rights, the control of Jerusalem, and Palestinian rights, such as freedom of movement and the right of return, remain unresolved, and the humanitarian crisis caused by a history of violence, blockades and embargos remains a serious concern.

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CHAPTER 4

Contextualising the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in the News

This chapter reviews some of the ways in which the British press has contextualised the development of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict throughout the years. The previous chapter has offered a brief overview of the history of Palestine from the latter stages of the nineteenth century, in order to contextualise the origins of the relationship between Palestine and Britain, and their connections during and after the British Mandate. Inevitably, the majority of this historical detail will be lost in the news coverage of the conflict, which is primarily concerned with present-day events and the latest developments in the conflict. Yet, the lack of context for these contemporary issues enables discursive practices, such as inclusion and exclusion of different voices, and legitimisation and delegitimisation of actions, to develop by tactically removing certain agents' burden of responsibility for previous actions.

Among other findings, I will argue that two main processes can be observed in the discursive contextualisation at different stages of the conflict: one, there are processes of decontextualisation, which have contributed to the erasure of the historical background of the conflict, including the British role in its development; and two, there are also processes of recontextualisation, which helped to shift or replace previous representations of various agents at different stages in the history of the clashes. By strategically rewriting, or erasing altogether, parts of history from the view of the current news readership at the time of publication, the chain of cause and effect becomes altered and, with it, the perception of what now appears to be justified and what is not. Since ideological positions

R. Sanz Sabido, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the British Press*,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5_4

and systems of meaning are not fixed, the ways in which the conflict is contextualised historically would vary at different stages alongside other discursive elements that will be discussed later on. In examining and identifying these trends, the postcolonial and critical approach taken in the analysis helps to restore the largely neglected historical connection of the British Mandate with this conflict.

The End of the British Mandate

The British Mandate was marked, for its duration, by growing clashes between British officers, Jews and Arabs living in the Land. On 14 May 1948, when the Mandate came to an end, the new state of Israel was proclaimed. British officers had become the target of Zionist violence for years, and the promise to guarantee a land for the native people of Palestine was officially abandoned. At that point, news articles in the British press were generally framed from one of two main perspectives: one, the fact that British representatives were victims of violent attacks, and two, the argument that Britain had failed to handle the situation adequately.

In total, the British Mandate was mentioned 38 times in the 1948 sample. 25 of these occurrences were published by the *Manchester Guardian*, while *The Times* referred to the Mandate nine times, and the *Daily Herald* used it four times. These references were embedded in descriptions of the events that were unfolding at the time and the ways in which the conflict between Palestinians and Israel was shaping in those early days. So, for instance, the main article published on the front page of the *Daily Herald* on 15 May 1948 read: "UNO decides on mediator as British Mandate ends; Egypt orders troops into Palestine; Truman says: We recognise new Jewish State" (No Byline 1948a: 1). The content of the report informs about the end of the British Mandate and the beginning of new violent clashes between Zionists and Palestinians. After reporting that the Egyptian Government had ordered its Army to enter Palestine, the article stated that President Truman had announced America's recognition of Israel, to the surprise of the United Nations, as they were still deciding on a mediator to deal with the negotiations. In addition, the article also referred to Israel's declaration that the state would be open to all Jewish immigrants and "be based on the precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by the Hebrew prophets, will uphold full social and political equality for all its citizens without distinction of race, creed or sex" (No Byline 1948a: 1). This proclamation

text also offered peace and full citizenship to the Arabs. However, the article also pointed out that the first action that the Jewish National Council had taken was to revoke the British White Paper of 1939, which sought to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine. In doing so, the newspaper highlights the incoherence of Israel's actions in relation to their official stance. To reinforce this critical stance, the *Daily Herald* also quoted directly from a statement issued by the Arab Office in London. The subheading, which was titled 'Tragedy', stated that

> A good deal of cant is being talked about the Mandate at the hour of its burial by the British Government, the British Press and many British public statesmen. The truth of the matter, however, is that the entire Palestine tragedy was created by the Mandate and by Britain's obstinate attempt to carry out for 30 years the disastrous policy laid down in it. By the Mandate the Zionists have been enabled to establish for themselves a position in Palestine, economic, political and military, which threatened with a deadly menace the very existence of the Arabs. (No Byline 1948a: 1)

This statement is highly critical of the ways in which the British Mandate had dealt with the problems in Palestine and makes a direct accusation against Britain for allowing the Zionists to create their own State at the expense of the original inhabitants of Palestine. It is remarkable that, even though the author of the article had questioned the Jewish National Council's proclamation in the same report, on this occasion the author did not add any supplementary remarks to question the Arab Office's statement. This approach illustrates the fact that sectors of the British press were once critical of the policies and decisions that the British Government had made in relation to Palestine, and held them responsible for the problems that it was causing to the Palestinian population.

However, at no point in the sampled articles does the narrative refer to a 'colonial' occupation in relation to Britain's presence in the Land. Although the British Mandate is discussed, this is done to refer to an official, recognised entity that was named as such. However, the fact that the British Government was in charge of administering these lands was never, within the sample, presented literally as a 'colonial' endeavour. This is perhaps due to the fact that, as discussed earlier, Mandate systems are a special type of colonial administration, different from those set up in other territories. In any case, there was no wish to acknowledge the colonial element explicitly. The term 'colony' was used, however, in the

context of Jewish settlements. We see this, for example, when on 24 May 1948, *The Times* reported: "the Egyptians, in announcing their entry into Bethlehem, add that they have linked up with the Arab Legion. The Syrians claim to have raided and damaged old *Jewish colonies* at the south end of Lake Tiberias" (Correspondent 1948: 4, my emphasis).

Furthermore, articles such as the one published by the *Daily Herald*, discussed earlier, provides an example of how the British press contextualised the events that followed the end of the Mandate. The author mentions the Zionist rejection of the White Paper of 1939 to contextualise, through a historical reference, the contemporary stated position of the Zionists after the proclamation of Israel. Thus, historical contextualisation works against the Zionist case. However, it would be inaccurate to argue that the British perspective on the end of the Mandate was undisputed. *The Times*, for instance, published an article on 26 May 1948 (No Byline 1948b: 3) reporting on an interview with General Sir Alan Cunningham, High Commissioner for Palestine, which was also covered by the *Manchester Guardian* (Political Correspondent 1948: 8). The piece published by *The Times* was shorter than the *Manchester Guardian*'s, and reports on the ways in which Cunningham responded to the criticisms that were being made of the Palestine Administration. Cunningham defended the work that British authorities had completed in Palestine, and *The Times* echoed his views by including direct quotations from his answers during the interview. Although the *Manchester Guardian*'s article was also mainly based on direct quotations of Cunningham's answers, this piece was longer and covered more information. *The Times*, by contrast, was more selective in the material it chose to include. The final two paragraphs in the article read as follows:

> Sir Alan Cunningham said the morale of our soldiers remained on the top line throughout, they behaved magnificently. He also commended the conduct of the Palestine police. The method of our going from Palestine and the conduct of the British there for 25 years would be remembered with pride. (No Byline 1948b: 3)

This excerpt provides a more positive view of the ways in which British authorities had handled the Palestinian issue. Rather than being critical, the newspaper summarised Cunningham's positive views on the British administration, which stands in contrast with some of the more critical perspectives that emerged in the news discourse.

The Struggle for Israel

Approximately twenty years later, in 1967, the political context, local and international, had evolved considerably. The clashes between Israelis and Palestinians had escalated and worsened by the participation of international players within the fabric of rivalry of the Cold War. While the present-day references were evidently abundant, the historical contextualisation of the conflict within the Six Day War narrative was generally rather limited. For example, the British Mandate seems to disappear from the narrative at this point. The British Mandate was only mentioned on two occasions (once by *The Times*, discussed above, and once by the *Daily Mirror*). We may argue that newspapers naturally mentioned the colonial power in 1948, as the end of the Mandate was part of the developments that were covered in the news at the time. In this respect, the frequency with which the Mandate is mentioned in 1967 would understandably be lower.

However, this finding can also be interpreted in terms of the lack of contextualisation of the conflict at this stage. It is noteworthy that the events of 1948 and 1949 were, in fact, alluded to on 25 occasions in 20 articles (two articles published by the *Daily Mirror*, four published by *The Times*, ten published by the *Guardian* and four published by the *Sun*), but none of them mentioned the role that the British Mandate played during that time. In contrast, the Suez crisis of 1956 was mentioned 47 times in 28 articles (six articles published by the *Daily Mirror*, six published by *The Times*, 13 published by the *Guardian* and three published by the *Sun*). Based on these quantitative findings, we can conclude that the historical contextualisation of the discourse in 1967 was more concerned with the interests that Britain had invested in the Suez Canal and the defeat during the Suez crisis, than with refreshing memories about Britain's key colonial connection with Palestine.

In the midst of the conflict that led to the Six Day War, the *Guardian* published the article "Struggle for Israel: the 1948 and 1956 campaigns" on 6 June 1967 (Fairhall 1967: 9). This piece begins by describing the 1956 Suez campaign, when war had "erupted along the Suez Canal on October 29 eleven years ago" (Fairhall 1967: 9). The Israelis had launched an attack in the Sinai Peninsula "with the declared aim of eliminating the Fedayeen (Egyptian commando) bases along their southern border". The reason for this Israeli attack, the article points out, was that the Fedayeen had killed twenty-four Israelis and

wounded more victims in the previous fortnight. The second paragraph in the article states that

> Besides pointing to the 24 casualties caused in this way, the Israeli Government reminded the world that it was the declared intention of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian Governments to destroy Israel and that Egypt had been blockading the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. (Fairhall 1967: 9)

By this point, we notice how the discourses around Israel and Palestine have changed since 1948. While in the 1948 sample the Arabs' fight for the Palestinian cause was seen as justified, now Arab forces are described as a threat to Israel's existence. The article continues as follows:

> On the day following the Israeli move, the British and French Governments issued 12-hour ultimatums to both Israel and Egypt which asked the Israelis to stop 10 miles east of the canal, the Egyptians to withdraw to a similar distance westwards, and proposed that Anglo-French forces should take over control of the Canal Zone from Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. (Fairhall 1967: 9)

Here we see how Britain and France, as former colonial powers in the area, intervene in the conflict. The article then explains how, after Egypt's refusal to comply with these proposals, British and French forces attacked Egyptian airfields, leading to the destruction of the Egyptian air force, which greatly improved Israel's position in the conflict. After five days, the Sinai Peninsula was mostly under Israeli control. The intervention of Britain and France sought to support Israel in any confrontations that may threaten its stability. In addition, Britain and France also defended their own interests in the area and to regain control of the Suez Canal, which was considered to be of key strategic importance.

The article also tells us that the Israeli army managed to recapture the town of Gaza eight years after the Egyptian army had taken it on the day when "the State of Israel came into existence". This is when the article shifts its attention from 1956 to 1948, and points out that

> The Israeli declaration at midnight on May 14 and the departure of the British security forces from what had until then been Palestine were the signal for an Arab invasion on several fronts.

> The Arabs claimed they were out to destroy Zionist terrorist bands rather than the Jews of Palestine and indeed, the previous months had punctuated by widespread and serious terrorist attacks, reprisals, and counter-reprisals. (Fairhall 1967: 9)

The mention of the British security forces, rather than the British Mandate, is noteworthy, together with the lack of a fuller contextualisation of the British role in the policies and decisions that led to the eventual proclamation of Israel. The criticisms that the press included in their reports in 1948 clearly contrast with the soft ways in which the British role was now dealt with. In addition, while in the 1948 sample we have seen some degree of reticence to accept the creation of the new state, the reference to Palestine in this text ("what had until then been Palestine") carries an implicit acceptance of its disappearance. Although this is followed by an acknowledgement of the fact that Arabs were fighting against Zionism, the article continues describing the fighting that ensued from then, to conclude that

> During this period the Zionists were mainly on the defensive and already showing the superb fighting spirit which characterised the Israelis 1956 campaign. They had an abundance of small arms but lacked artillery armour or aircraft. (Fairhall 1967: 9)

These descriptions of the Zionist cause and their efforts to create and protect their homeland are very different from the descriptions we have observed in the 1948 sample. What we see during this period is how a newspaper article published in 1967, within the context of the Six Day War, takes a look back at a key moment in the history of Palestine and Israel, 1948, and retells the story from a different point of view. What had previously been described as acts of terrorism were now seen as examples of "superb fighting spirit". This is a clear example of how history is rewritten in the news discourse, and this becomes clearer when we place these narratives in contrast with the original accounts provided as part of the 1948 analysis. In addition, still discussing the 1948 campaign, the article points out that "when a second ceasefire was arranged on July 18 [1948] the Zionists could display a list of successes, and tens of thousands of Arabs had been driven from their homes". This paragraph is followed by a reference to the internal political problems that Israel had at the time. Within this context, and having previously

emphasised the Israelis' "superb fighting spirit" two paragraphs earlier, the fact that "tens of thousands" of citizens (which actually ranged from approximately 700,000 to one million Palestinians, depending on the source) had been driven out of their homes is effectively presented as one in a list of Zionist successes. It is also remarkable that these citizens are usually not referred to as Palestinians, but as Arabs or Palestine Arabs. Palestinians are denied, alongside an explanation of their fate after the *Nakba* their presence in the discourse. For example, there is no mention of the Zionist war crimes of 1948 (Finkelstein 2003), or of the Palestinians' experiences as refugees in neighbouring Arab lands (Masalha 1992).

This approach is also reproduced in other articles. So, for instance, a piece published by the *Daily Mirror* on 8 June 1967 begins by stating that "the fighting spirit of the Israelis today is the heritage of years of persecution, danger and struggle" (Falk 1967: 11). It recalls the history of oppression and struggle that Jews have endured throughout history and the beginning of the Zionist movement and the Jewish immigration waves before the creation of Israel. The article refers to the role of Britain in the fight against the Ottomans and in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which supported the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, despite the promises made by the British Government to Arabs as a reward for their support in the war against the Turks. The article points out that, despite the promises made, a Jewish home was not created, and it was only after the Second World War, "with all its horror for the Jews", that more pressure was put on the success of this movement while clashes between the Arabs and the Jews increased. In addition, Falk describes the Jewish people as having "had to struggle for the creation of their nation and then to bring prosperity out of the desert", and that

> above all, they worked hard. Their achievements are tremendous. Today Israel is a strong and prosperous nation -even though it has always lived under the threat of an invasion from the surrounding Arab nations. (Falk 1967: 11)

Even though the article uses the term 'terrorists' to refer to violent actions that were taken in support of the creation of Israel, the discursive context in which it is embedded highlights the historical conditions of struggle of the Jewish people, before and after the Holocaust, providing a justification for those actions.

'Terrorists' and Guerrillas

Two decades after the Six Day War, an unplanned uprising against Israeli occupation in November 1987 gave way to a succession of clashes, a period that lasted until 1993, and would later be labelled as the First Intifada. The news coverage of this new phase of the conflict indicates yet another discursive shift in comparison with the 1967 sample, as illustrated by the *Guardian* article "Israelis keep up war of words with Damascus", published on 30 November 1987. This piece features the subheading "Cabinet meeting called to discuss Palestinian hang-glider attack". It begins by stating that parts of the dispatch had been deleted "by order of the Israeli military censor" (Black 1987a: 12). As the title suggests, this report deals with the "war of words" between Israel and Syria regarding Damascus' alleged role in the Palestinian hang-glider attack on an army base in which six soldiers had been killed the previous week. Here, we observe references to the Israeli and Syrian uses of the news media to 'construct' news of the events. On the one hand, Syrian media praised the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command while, on the other hand, the Israeli press emphasised Damascus's key role in the "planning and executing of the raid" (Black 1987a: 12). According to the Israeli newspaper *Yediot Aharonot* had reported that the hang-gliders had been trained in Syria under Syrian supervision. Furthermore, this newspaper had also reported that "authorised sources" had confirmed that "the landing site was not accidental". The following paragraph describes the attack:

> The incident took place on Wednesday night when two hang-gliders took off from the Syrian-controlled Beka'a valley in Lebanon. One of the guerrilla pilots landed east of the Israeli border town of Kiryat Shmona and managed to kill six soldiers in a small camp nearby before being killed himself. (Black 1987a: 12)

This excerpt illustrates the use of the term 'guerrilla' to classify the agents of Palestinian violence, while the term 'soldier' is used to refer to Israeli forces. A similar use of the term 'guerrilla' is found here:

> Israel usually retaliates for guerrilla attacks by hitting Palestinian targets in south Lebanon, where PLO fighters were reportedly still on alert in anticipation of Israeli airstrikes. (Black 1987a: 12)

In addition, the article reports that Western observers had argued that Israel could no longer allow Syria to support Palestinian groups without "some kind of direct Israeli response" against Syria. The same article features a separate piece of text within the same report stating the following:

> Five Palestinians were injured yesterday in clashes with Israeli security forces in the occupied West bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinians were demonstrating to mark the 40th anniversary of the UN decision to partition British-ruled Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. (Black 1987a: 12)

Two aspects are significant in this extract. First, we see that the British press, in this case *The Times*, does not only report on Israeli casualties, but also covers details regarding Palestinian victims of Israeli violence. Secondly, the information provided in this paragraph regarding the fortieth anniversary of the UN decision to partition British-ruled Palestine into two states (a decision made by the UN in 1947 and rejected by the Palestinians) serves to provide the latest news about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict with some historical contextualisation, even if this is minimal.

Overall, the analysis of the 1987 sample indicates that the British Mandate was not acknowledged in the selected articles. In fact, the reference to "British-ruled Palestine" in the last excerpt is a rare finding that is inconsistent with the rest of the sample. However, 1948 was mentioned in two articles published by the *Guardian*, which also made references to 1967. One of these articles, published on 21 December 1987, reports on the protests of "Arab citizens" that were taking place on that day against the handling by Israel of the "unrest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that has left 19 Palestinians dead" (Black 1987b: 1). The piece states that

> Hundreds of thousands of Israeli Arabs –those who remained in the Jewish state after mass exodus of 1948– are expected to stay away from work and schools in solidarity with their fellow Palestinians living under military rule in the occupied territories.

This article is particularly noteworthy because of the rare reference to 'Israeli Arabs'. These are the Palestinians who acquired the Israeli

citizenship, as opposed to those Palestinians (still named as such) who remained in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Apart from the fact that the article states that these minorities had remained until that point "docile" but were now undergoing a process of "Palestinisation" in response to the calls by the PLO to identify with their fellow Arabs, what is also striking is the description of the 1948 events as 'mass exodus'. This representation of the creation of a new state in Palestinian land and the consequent forced eviction of Palestinians is remarkably decontextualised as it simply describes the eviction without acknowledging the causes and consequences of these movements. The following day, the *Guardian* reported on the protests that had happened the previous day. This article states that

> The protest by Israel's 750,000 Arab citizens –those Palestinians who stayed behind in the Jewish state after the 1948 war– was dubbed by organisers as a "day of peace", but it was accompanied by several clashes with the security forces, although these were on a much smaller scale than those across the pre-1967 "green line" border. (Black 1987c: 1)

Here, the reference to the 1948 war is also decontextualised, and the historical significance of the pre-1967 "green line" border is not explained either. Israeli Arabs are here described as Israel's Arab citizens and as Palestinians "who stayed behind", which leads to a similar lack of historical understanding in relation to the disappearance of Palestine together with the experiences of Palestinians that followed the handling of the conflict during the British Mandate. The pre-1967 border was also mentioned in another article published by the *Guardian* on 23 December 1987 (White and Black 1987: 1), in an allusion to the thousands of Palestinians who had jobs across the pre-1967 border and had returned to work after the strikes. The *Sun* and *The Times* also alluded to 1967, but they did so in reference to the Six Day War rather than the borders. For instance, in a brief article on 22 December 1987, the *Sun* reported that the mayor's annual Christmas celebrations in Bethlehem had been cancelled due to the "continuing violence in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip" (No Byline 1987: 7). It further stated that

> The mayor's gala is usually held to symbolise peaceful relations between Arabs and Israelis. Bethlehem and the rest of the West Bank was [*sic*] seized from Jordan in the 1967 war. (No Byline 1987: 7)

The Six Day War appears, once more, decontextualised and there is no further analysis of what happened in 1967 and the consequences that the conflict had for the remnants of Palestine.

The Human Tragedy in Gaza

When Operation Cast Lead was launched by Israel in December 2008, the news coverage presented a variety of stances. With regard to the broader historical contextualisation of the conflict, references to the British Mandate in the 2009 sample were, again, very rare. In fact, the *Daily Mirror*, the *Guardian* and the *Sun* did not mention it, while *The Times* only referred to it on two occasions. One of these articles, published on 29 December 2008, stated that “Hamas is committed ideologically to the destruction of the Jewish state and its replacement with an Islamic alternative over the full territory of the British mandate of Palestine” (Beeston 2008: 6), without adding any further details regarding the British role in the early development of the conflict. The reference to the Mandate is, in fact, only mentioned in relation to the role of Hamas, with the sole intention of discrediting the latter, as though the “British Mandate of Palestine” were simply a “territory”. This process of decontextualisation also affects the subsequent post-1948 history of Israel and Palestine. While some of the key dates in the conflict are mentioned in the narrative, this only happens occasionally and without critical engagement. The second article, published on 9 January 2009, offers a brief historical contextualisation of the creation of Hamas:

> Although officially created in 1987, Hamas’s roots go back to the 1930s when Haj Amin al-Hussaini, the Grand Mufti of Palestine under the British mandate, allied himself with Hitler and dreamt of reviving the Islamic Caliphate with himself as Caliph. That Hamas cares little about Palestine as a would-be nation state is clear from its name and charter. (Taheri 2009: 26)

Here, the reference to the British Mandate is, once again, lacking an explanation of the role played by the British government at the time, and the decisions and policies that were implemented before the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. The reference to the Mandate is, in fact, only related to the creation of Hamas, and the sole intention of this passage is to discredit them by questioning the authenticity of their interest in the

Palestinian cause. With the lack of critical references to the (post)colonial connections with Britain, the conflict appears decontextualised in this respect. It is also mainly decontextualised in terms of the post-1948 history of Israel and Palestine. While some of the key dates in the conflict are mentioned in the narrative, this only happens occasionally and without critical engagement.

An exception to this observation was found in the *Daily Mirror*, which mentioned events both in 1948 and 1967 within the same article, published on 8 January 2009 (Shlaim 2009a: 10). A version of this same article was reproduced by the *Guardian* on 7 January (Shlaim 2009b: 2). A similar article was not found in the samples collected from *The Times* and the *Sun*. This is a feature article that begins by stating that "the only way to make sense of Israel's senseless war in Gaza is through understanding the historical context" (Shlaim 2009b: 2). This piece takes a critical perspective towards the historical development of the conflict. Shlaim states that "establishing the state of Israel in May 1948 involved a monumental injustice to the Palestinians" and, writing as someone who had served in the Israeli army, he points out that

> British officials bitterly resented American partisanship on behalf of the infant state. On 2 June 1948, Sir John Troutbeck wrote to the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, that the Americans were responsible for the creation of a gangster state headed by 'an utterly unscrupulous set of leaders'. I used to think that this judgment was too harsh but Israel's vicious assault on the people of Gaza, and the Bush administration's complicity in this assault, have reopened the question. (Shlaim 2009b: 2)

In addition, Shlaim rejects the "Zionist colonial project" that began after the Six Day War in 1967 as the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip "had very little to do with security and everything to do with territorial expansionism", and he further argues that Israel has done "incalculable damage to the economy of the Gaza Strip" (Shlaim 2009b: 2). The article continues by exploring the history of the conflict and offers a critical commentary of Israeli actions and policies and the consequences that these developments had on the people of Palestine.

While the analysis of the previous historical samples indicates that newspapers tended to take a generally similar perspective on the conflict and there was less variety in the views that were offered within each period, in 2009 the coverage of the conflict is less consistent. Israeli

practices (targeting of civilians, use of white phosphorus, denying the humanitarian impact of the invasion and intensifying the attacks) were criticised, but these views were discursively presented in most news articles in relation to Israel's right to self-defence against Hamas' rocket attacks, which ultimately reflects a pro-Israeli bias. However, there were also exceptions that help us to understand the nuances of this latest discursive shift. The piece discussed below, for instance, represents the existence of an alternative standpoint to the generalised condemnation of Hamas and the justification of Israel's operation.

The article "Tanks, rockets, death and terror: a civilian catastrophe unfolding", published by the *Guardian* on 5 January 2009 (Balousha and McGreal 2009: 2), reported on the Israeli attacks that the Gazan population was suffering as follows:

> Most Gazans can only cower in terror in whatever shelter they can find and guess at the cost exacted by each explosion as the toll for those on the receiving end rises remorselessly.
>
> As Israeli forces carved up the Gaza Strip yesterday, dividing the territory in two, the UN warned of a 'catastrophe unfolding' for a 'trapped, traumatised, terrorised' population.
>
> Among the terrorised was Mahmoud Jaro. He was sheltering with his wife and four young children in his home in Beit Lahiya, on the eastern side of the Gaza Strip, within sight of the Israeli border, when he heard the first tank engines in the early hours of Sunday. (Balousha and McGreal 2009: 2)

The broader reference to the Gazan population is personified by the portrayal of Mahmoud's experiences. This is further reinforced by more detailed descriptions of his attempts to save his family:

> He grabbed his children, the youngest only three, and fled. 'I couldn't see anything. The area was dark', he said. 'They cut off the electricity. We were moving in the pitch dark.
>
> 'There were shells, rockets everywhere. I was just trying to protect my children. They were very scared and afraid. My youngest son was crying all the time'. Eventually the family made it across Beit Lahiya to his in-laws' house in a relatively safer part of the town. (Balousha and McGreal 2009: 2)

The fact that these events are described by a civilian, and not an official spokesperson, adds a dimension of human interest to the story and

it helps the readership to understand the consequences of this conflict beyond the official statements which focus on politics and international relations. In fact, as mentioned earlier, official statements often argued that Israeli attacks sought to target Hamas, not civilians. However, this article included information that contradicted the official line:

> Eric Fosse, a Norwegian doctor there, said Hamas fighters were a small minority of the casualties brought in. 'This hospital has been filled up with patients', he added. This morning they [Israeli forces] bombed the fruit market. There were a large number of casualties. (Balousha and McGreal 2009: 2)

Instead of referring to 'Hamas terrorists' or 'Hamas militants', this article substituted this expression with 'Hamas fighters', which does not carry the same negative connotations that 'terrorist' implies. In keeping with this perspective, the article states that more than 500 Palestinians had been killed by Israel since the beginning of the invasion nine days earlier. It also reports that one Israeli soldier had been killed and there were thirty-two other Israeli soldiers who had been wounded. Far from focusing on the Israeli casualties as a consequence of the violence perpetrated by Hamas, the article reports that "Hamas has put up a fight", and it further states that

> Occasionally, through the Israeli attack and Palestinian resistance to it, there came the sound of a Hamas rocket launched into Israel - a reminder that the invading army is going to have to move even deeper into Gaza to achieve its declared aim. (Balousha and McGreal 2009: 2)

Here, we see that Israel attacks while Palestine resists. Semantically, we must acknowledge the difference between this statement and those observed in other articles, in which Hamas attacks and Israel retaliates. In the latter, Hamas initiates the violence and Israel is then bound to defend itself. In the former, however, Israel initiates the violence and Palestinians 'resist' those attacks. The processes by which violence is discursively constructed as justified or unjustified have effectively been reversed in the above excerpt. The article then returns to the initial statement regarding the UN warning of a "catastrophe unfolding" for a "trapped, traumatised, terrorised" population. In the following excerpt, we see a repetition of this quote as well as its contextualisation as part of John Ging's direct quotation:

> John Ging, the head of the UN relief agency in Gaza, described the situation there as 'inhuman'.
> 'We have a catastrophe unfolding in Gaza for the civilian population', he said. 'The people of Gaza City and the north now have no water. That comes on top of having no electricity. They're trapped, they're traumatised, they're terrorised by this situation'. (Balousha and McGreal 2009: 2)

Ging's description of the inhuman situation of the people of the Gaza Strip is followed by another paragraph which states that the UN had been angered at Tzipi Livni, the Israeli foreign minister, who had stated that there was no humanitarian crisis in Gaza (Balousha and McGreal 2009: 2). The article continued by stating that

> Ging also accused Israel of a campaign of destroying public buildings vital to the administration and governance of Gaza. 'The whole infrastructure of the future state of Palestine is being destroyed', he said. 'Blowing up the parliament building. That's the parliament of Palestine. That's not a Hamas building. The president's compound is for the president of Palestine'.

We can argue that the *Guardian*'s reliance on these sources is in keeping with other discursive elements observed in this article (absence of negative terms to describe Hamas, use of neutral terms to describe Hamas, discursive reversal of the justification of violence, and direct quotations to criticise Israeli actions in a credible way). These observations suggest that this is a pro-Palestinian article. Nevertheless, was not the usual way in which the conflict was represented by the British press during this period, so it should be seen as the exception rather than the rule.

The Great March of Return

The analysis of this sample indicates a clear difference between the *Guardian* and the other three sampled newspapers, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Not only did the *Guardian* cover the conflict more often and included the key terms and references with which this study is concerned more frequently, but they also dedicated more space to explaining the background of the conflict. Even though this was also very limited in the *Guardian*, comparatively this newspaper provides more details about the origins of the conflict and the consequences it has had on the Palestinian people.

On the seventieth anniversary of the British withdrawal from Palestine, on 14 May 2018, only three articles published by the *Guardian* mentioned the British Mandate. *The Times*, the *Sun* and the *Daily Mirror* never mentioned it within the sample. One of the *Guardian* articles that referred to the Mandate used the following terms to report on the fact that dozens of Palestinians had been killed in protests against the opening of the US embassy in Jerusalem:

> The Great March of Return movement culminates on Tuesday, 15 May, which marks what Palestinians call the Nakba, when hundreds of thousands were forced out of their homes or fled amid the fighting that accompanied the creation in 1948 of the state of Israel after the end of the British Mandate. (Holpuch and Weaver 2018)

The reference to the British Mandate was merely a temporal description of the events, at best linking the creation of Israel to the withdrawal of Britain from Palestine. There is also a lack of critical references to the role they played or the decisions that were made at the time in the following article:

> It is true that the British mandate in Palestine ended 70 years ago this week, but Britain still knows better than any other country what is at stake: the peaceful coexistence of Jews, Muslims and Christians in the Holy Land and the upholding of international law. Britain has long espoused both of these principles. (Liel 2018)

It is only in the third article, based on the life and death of Arthur Koestler, that we find a little more explanation of what happened in the last months of the Mandate, although it appears as a superficial description of the facts:

> After close to three decades in which the territory had been under the British Mandate for Palestine, the United Nations proposed, in 1947, to split the area into two, forming independent Arab and Jewish states. Civil war erupted, and Jewish leaders later announced Israel's creation. (Holmes 2018a)

These findings continue on the same path that was set in the previous samples, in the sense that the role of the British Mandate in Palestinian history has practically been erased from contemporary news discourse.

This trend appears in contrast to the ways in which other historical references emerge in the sample. Given the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the creation of Israel, and the fact that the Great March of Return was organised to mark that date, references to the *Nakba* are particularly noteworthy. In total, there are 45 instances of this term (35 in the *Guardian*, 6 in *The Times* and 4 in the *Daily Mirror*). The earliest reference within the sample appears on 31 March, when Balousha and Holmes (2018a) wrote that

> Gaza's rulers Hamas back the sit-in, which is expected to last until 15 May. On that date, Palestinians commemorate the Nakba, or 'catastrophe', when hundreds of thousands fled their land or were expelled from their villages during the war around the time of the creation of Israel in 1948.

Among all the descriptions that are provided to explain the meaning of the word *Nakba*, the frames of reference that is most frequently activated is the translation of '*Nakba*' as 'catastrophe' in all newspapers (except the *Sun*, which does not mention it). In addition, the connection of that day to the establishment of the state of Israel and the resulting displacement of hundreds of thousands of people are also frequently mentioned, although not all articles doing so link both facts, and not all of them specify the number of people that were displaced. As for the ways in which this movement of people is described, syntagmatic choices range from the more frequent 'displacement' and 'expelled', to the less frequent 'forcibly expelled', 'forced out' or 'mass uprooting'. People were also said to have been "driven from their homes" or that they had to "flee". The focus on the level of violence that characterised the events therefore varies from article to article, and certainly from one newspaper to another. The *Guardian* gave more attention to the violent and tragic nature of the events, and also to the long-lasting consequences that they have had on the Palestinian population.

Perhaps the most detailed explanation of this concept is also found in the *Guardian*. Hassassian (2018), who takes a more personal perspective in this opinion piece, provides a critique of the current state of the conflict while also looking back at the origins of the problem. The link between Nakba and the expression 'ethnic cleansing' was only counted once within the sample:

> Today is Nakba day. Nakba is an Arabic word that can be translated as 'catastrophe'. It is used by Palestinians to describe the events of 1948 that led to their ethnic cleansing. This year will mark the 70th anniversary of the forced displacement of the Palestinians caused by the violent creation of Israel, when 750,000 Palestinians became refugees virtually overnight. Their descendants number 7 million today. They owned 93% of the land in 1948 and lost 78% of it, over 4m acres. About 400 villages were destroyed. (Hassassian 2018)

Hassassian, who was Palestinian ambassador to the UK at the time of writing the article, reminds the reader that all four British Prime Ministers that have been in office during his tenure as ambassador had one common stand: "their non-recognition of the state of Palestine and their unequivocal political and military support for Israel" (Hassassian 2018).

Apart from these references to 1948, we also find some allusions to events such as the invasion in 2008, which is mentioned only twice, to point out that Hamas has "fought three wars with Israel" since that year (Balousha and Holmes 2018b). The 2014 Gaza War appears more often (17 references in the *Guardian*, two in *The Times*, one in the *Daily Mirror*, and one in the *Sun*), usually to compare the magnitude of the current event to past clashes. So, for instance, the *Daily Mirror* reported on 1 April that "hundreds were injured at the Gaza border during the incident [the previous day], which goes down as the deadliest day in the Israel-Palestine conflict since the 2014 Gaza War" (No Byline 2018: 17). However, in some cases these events were brought into the discourse to provide some additional context about the conflict, for example, when the *Guardian* describes the broken relationship between Fatah and Hamas, and explains that "2,300 Gazans including hundreds of civilians and Hamas fighters were killed" in the 2014 Gaza War, when "Abbas was accused of nodding and winking at Israel to continue attacking and thus weaken his rivals" (Black 2018a).

The inclusion of any form of colonial references is even scarcer. In an article published by Holmes (2018b) in the *Guardian*, the term is used to describe Israel's policies and practices, which have "the common aim of displacing and replacing the Palestinian people, for the purpose of maintaining a colonial occupation", a statement that literally quotes the Palestinian ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Khraishi, in his complaint

against Israel "for what they say are breaches of its obligations under a UN anti-racism treaty" (Holmes 2018b). The description of Israel as 'colonial occupation' appears once more, also in the *Guardian*, and also by including a source that is external to the newspaper:

> Older Palestinians tend to be relaxed about this, but younger activists can be contemptuous about condescension or racism towards 'colourful' natives. Many are keen to assert their growing self-confidence in the face of what they condemn as Israeli 'apartheid and settler colonialism' - in the words of a strategy paper that was drawn up in the cafe Fattoush last December. (Black 2018b)

Black's article, published on 19 April, describes the city of Haifa and states that even though this is Israel's "capital of co-existence" between "mixed Jewish-Arab" populations, the strains and cracks are visible. In depicting the city, Black provides a historical overview of the conflict, including references to the "fateful year" of 1948, the sources of inequality in the Land, the pre-1967 "green line border" and more recent events.

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CHAPTER 5

Situating Political Violence: 'Terrorism' and Discourse

Fairclough (2009: 517) argues that one good reason for analysing language critically is that "language is the 'breeding ground' for ways of thinking", of which we are often unaware. In media discourse, there are ideological and linguistic elements involved in the representation of events and agents that may obscure the understanding of these events and agents. It is not language itself that obscures this understanding, but this obscuration is partially driven by the 'powerful' who have access to the production of discourse and use language to construe social realities in a way that privileges their own interests (Manning 2001). The content of news media, that is, which topics are covered and who 'speaks' in the news, is indicative of how existing relations of power are reproduced in media discourse. Power is also constituted through the use of language itself, that is, through the ways in which things are said (Fowler 1987: 69). The vocabulary of a language is a "system of classification of the ideas and experiences of a community" which "encodes ideology, systems of beliefs about the way the world is organised" (Fowler 1987: 69).

Chilton (2004: 201) argues that "political discourse operates indexically, which implies that one's choice or a layperson's choice [of terminology] will always –implicitly or explicitly– signal some political distinction" (cited in Wodak 2009: 582). Terminological choices involve the selection of a lexical item over other possible ones depending on the ideological meanings that should be emphasised, hence the importance of analysing the terms which are selected to convey those meanings. These choices are made on the basis of linguistic classifications.

R. Sanz Sabido, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the British Press*,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5_5

According to Hodge and Kress (1993: 62–63), 'classification' is the "taken-for-granted" linguistic ordering of the world, which is achieved through the conscious or unconscious use of certain lexical features in texts.

The process of classifying or ordering the world is achieved through the selection of one term among all the available options in a given semantic frame. Semantic frames refer to particular domains of human experience and provide a structured knowledge about the world (Minsky 1975). For example, a conceptual frame for 'legal procedures' might include terms such as 'judge', 'jury', 'defence', 'prosecution', 'jury' or 'court room', as well as associated sequential scripts,[1] such as "accuse-charge-trial-verdict-sentence" (Chilton 2009: 176). Semantic frames include words that have some meanings in common. For example, the words in the 'clothing' semantic frame include 'skirt', 'trousers' and 'jacket' because they are connected by the common meaning 'used to cover one's body' (Andión Herrero 2010: 265). Similarly, the 'political violence' semantic frame includes terms that are related to acts and agents of political violence ('war', 'terrorism', 'bombing', 'guerrilla', and so forth). Thus, even though they all carry distinct nuances that differentiate them from the rest, these terms have related meanings.

The significance of linguistic classifications is based on the options that they provide for shaping discourse in particular ways. Consequently, linguistic classifications and the choice of one term over another in media discourse are indicators of the connections between language and power. This is seen in the fact that classification systems are not similar for everyone. Different social groups have different classification systems that they use to understand reality in their own ways. The diversity of social groups and ways of understanding reality means that the concept of 'classification' becomes a

> site of tension and struggle –on one level between individuals, as each tries to impose his or her system on others or gives way to superior power. On another level, the struggle goes on between social, ethnic, national, or racial groupings. (Hodge and Kress 1993: 64)

This argument is particularly relevant to the analysis of classifications of political violence, as the situated nature of those representations is indicative of existing tensions and struggles between various perspectives. These struggles exist within the context of the political violence itself,

and they are reproduced discursively through the use of particular classifications. 'Dominant' classification systems are determined by the social group that has the power to do so, while other groups may attempt to resist this process with more or less success.

Fairclough (2009: 516) refers to the communicative power to control how particular aspects of reality are construed as a form of 'power over'.[2] He also considers communicative power to be a form of 'power behind', since "those with institutional power control habits and practices of construal". As previously discussed, the 'dominant' group seeks to control discourse in order to defend its 'vested interests'. Fairclough illustrates this point by using the example of construals of 'terrorists' and the military as an example of 'power behind', as two agents of political violence are classified differently depending on the perspective of the 'dominant' group. Consequently, as Vigsø (2010) argues, the labels which are used to classify things and events enter a "discursive struggle of global proportions" in which economic, religious, cultural and scientific interests and positions play a role to make specific classifications prevail over other options (cited in Schrøder 2012: 106). This struggle is based on the principle that a classification that is favourable to a social actor is, in turn, detrimental to another actor. Labels are contested and resisted by actors who are stigmatised by the negative meanings that the specific label carries with it. Fairclough (2009: 513) illustrates the difficulty of construing acts of violence by drawing upon the example of suicide bombings by Palestinians against Israeli civilians. Although these actions can be seen as part of a 'war' or 'insurgency', and are matched by, and are responding to, acts of comparable violence against Palestinian civilians by military or paramilitary forces, we may ask why Palestinians are widely represented as 'terrorists' whereas 'soldiers' using comparable methods are not.

Schrøder (2012: 107) suggests, however, that labels predominate depending on the dramatic appeal they carry. This argument is partly correct, since the media will favour descriptions that are more entertaining and dramatic (Franklin 2004). However, despite the impact of increasing competitiveness, commercialisation and corporatisation of media markets, which certainly privilege the use of dramatic classifications, I argue that prevailing classifications depend, from the outset, on the power of the social actors who are favoured by those classifications. The "discursive struggles" that Vigsø mentions are, in essence, power struggles. Therefore, a solid understanding of these classifications sheds light on how power works within discourse. In this respect, Lazar (2007:

1–2) argues that the analysis of these classifications is a step towards showing "the complex and subtle ways in which taken-for-granted social assumptions and hegemonic power relations are discursively produced, perpetuated, negotiated and challenged".

Hall (1997) also discusses the concepts of 'classifications' and 'power'. When he explains the connections between stereotyping, difference and power, Hall points out that power is not only demonstrated and executed through direct physical coercion or constraint, but there is also

> power in representations; power to mark, assign and classify; of symbolic power; of ritualised expulsion. Power, it seems, has to be understood here, not only in terms of economic exploitation and physical coercion, but also in broader cultural or symbolic terms, including the power to represent someone or something in a certain way –within a certain 'regime of representation'. It includes the exercise of symbolic power through representational practices. (Hall 1997: 259)

Stereotyping is a way of representing, and when social agents are stereotyped, they are effectively classified in a certain way. Hall's insights about power and stereotyping are relevant to the broader discussion about classifications and media representations. On a related note, Graham et al. (2004: 21) point out that the construction of evil 'Others' has been done in historically specific ways that reflect the externally legitimating source of power in each historical period. These sources of power have the ability to legitimise what they consider to be 'just', 'necessary' or 'natural', which in turn serves to perpetuate their privileged access to valuable social resources (van Dijk 1993: 263). Therefore, the 'dominant' group predetermines the qualities and behaviours by which a category is deemed legitimate (Hodge and Kress 1993: 81), by setting up a "symbolic frontier between the 'normal' and the 'deviant', the 'normal' and the 'pathological', the 'acceptable' and the 'unacceptable', what 'belongs' and what does not or is 'Other', between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', Us and Them" (Hall 1997: 258).

Hodge and Kress (1993: 81) further argue that classifications tend to be more successful, that is, they encounter less resistance, if they become naturalised or taken for granted. This is because naturalised classifications act "unconsciously, at a level beneath critical awareness". For example, racist messages may be transmitted continuously until "they penetrate the unconscious, being stored there in the form of images" (Hodge and

Kress 1993: 81). As a result, it may appear that there is an absence of racism in the discourse, when, in fact, racism is still present, but the language has arguably become "more efficient as an ideological instrument" by developing techniques to transmit messages covertly (Hodge and Kress 1993: 82).

Classifications, Change and Social Transformation

The process of classifying the world is continuously taking place in conjunction with other social changes. Hodge and Kress (1993: 64) argue that the social basis of discourse functions as a motor of change in the classification system over time, as "new materials and new interests are incorporated into the old system, leading to a different 'fit' between language and reality, and a different set of relations between existing categories". This means that activities and relationships need to be effectively 'reworded' and discursive practices need to be restructured (Fairclough 1992: 6–7). Change also occurs when new categories evolve, as these new categories can deeply affect the dynamic of the system as a whole, which must adapt accordingly (Hodge and Kress 1993: 64).

Changing classifications are indicative of the social transformations that take place during a period of time in a given context and, consequently, they are also indicative of the shifts that occur in terms of power. Consequently, analyses of linguistic classifications must take into account the fact that the meanings instilled in classifications can and do transform over periods of time according to the interests and ideologies that prevail at different moments in history. Fairclough (1992: 8) suggests that a method of discourse analysis that investigates social changes must meet four conditions. I will focus on the third condition,[3] which is crucial for the analysis of changing linguistic classifications. Fairclough argues that this method needs to be historical on two different levels. The first level is concerned with the analysis of individual texts and with the concept of 'intertextuality', which he defines as the way in which "texts are constructed through other texts being articulated in particular ways, ways which depend upon and change with social circumstances"[4] (Fairclough 1992: 9). The second level is concerned with the longer-term constitution of 'orders of discourse', which he defines as the "total configurations of discursive practices in particular institutions, or indeed in a whole society" (Fairclough 1992: 9).

Fairclough's methodological condition highlights the fact that texts cannot be analysed in isolation since they are not produced or consumed in isolation. Richardson (2007: 100) also points out that "all texts exist, and therefore must be understood, in relation to other texts". In addition, Richardson describes two types of intertextuality: internal intertextuality, which refers to the fact that all texts (and particularly, news articles) consist of, or are composed of, fragments or elements of previous texts (Richardson 2007: 101); and external intertextuality, which refers to the fact that texts "are only fully intelligible [...] when contextualised and 'read' in relation to other texts and other social practices" (2007: 100). In the analysis of changing linguistic classifications and transforming social practices, this latter point is particularly relevant, and more so in relation to news articles about running stories[5] (Franklin et al. 2005: 326–327). The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is an example of a running story, as news articles provide "the latest instalment" in a long textual chain of reports covering the conflict (Richardson 2007: 101). In the latest instalment, the news report

> incorporates, reformulates, reinterprets or re-reads previous texts, every act of communication is grounded in semantic and pragmatic histories which are not simple and linear, but complex, multi-layered and fragmented. Texts generate their publics, publics generate their texts, and the analysis of "meanings" now has to take into account the historiography of the context of production, the mechanisms and instruments of reproduction and reception, ways of storage and remembering. (Blommaert 1999: 5)

In addition to the concept of 'intertextuality', the processes of relexicalisation and overlexicalisation are also useful in the discussion of linguistic classifications and their transforming nature. Relexicalisation consists of relabelling categories with new terms, promoting a "new perspective for speakers, often in specialised areas which are distinct from those of the larger social group" (Hodge and Kress 1993: 210). Relexicalisation may involve the acquisition of new meanings by existing words and the use of neologisms. Overlexicalisation, or "proliferation of synonyms" (Martín Rojo 2010: 161), is "the provision of a large number of synonymous or near-synonymous terms for communication of some specialised area of experience" (Fowler and Kress 1979: 211). Overlexicalisation is important for linguists because it is indicative of the "areas of intense preoccupation in the experience and values of the group

which generates it, allowing the linguist to identify peculiarities in the ideology of that group" (Fowler and Kress 1979: 212). Thus, overlexicalisation refers to the use of different lexical items that have near-similar meanings but provide different connotations. In the study of language and structures of power, overlexicalisation can work as a measure of the ideological positioning of those who have access to the discourse based on the lexical items that they choose to promote their perspectives.

Trew (1979: 135) states that processes and participants may be classified in a multiplicity of ways, determining specific social attributes and "a particular place in the hierarchy of social relations" when they are compared with the ways in which other participants are classified differently within the same hierarchy. In many cases, terminological variation may have little effect on the resulting meanings. However, terms cannot 'vary' when they "register the focal areas of overt ideological conflict" and "can by themselves virtually express a whole ideology" (Trew 1979: 135).

The concept of 'linguistic classifications' is, in fact, crucial not only in media discourse but also in other fields, such as Law and International Relations, that assign labels to different realities and build entire approaches to deal with them accordingly. For example, Laqueur (1999: 49) discusses how the fact that suspected 'terrorists' are not designated as 'prisoners of war', and are instead officially and unofficially labelled as 'enemy combatants', 'unlawful combatants' or 'battlefield detainees', has a serious effect on the ways in which they are treated, including the denial of the right to be subject to the protocols of the Geneva Conventions. This example illustrates how the practice of classifying people into different groups must always be approached critically. Therefore, we must understand that the practice of classifying different agents and their actions is charged with ideological significance, and its effects are not limited to the discursive realm, but they also have very real consequences.

The Concept of 'Terrorism': A Question of Perspective

Here, I apply the concept of 'linguistic classifications' to political violence, and I particularly focus on acts and agents of political violence who are classified as 'terrorist'. The term 'terrorism' has a contested, ideological nature. As discussed earlier, while some social actors are classified as 'terrorists', or as responsible for acts of 'terrorism', other social

actors are classified in other ways such as, for example, 'soldiers'. The reason why there are countless definitions of 'terrorism' is precisely because of its multiple ideological perspectives, practices and motivations (Hoffman 2006; Laqueur 1999; Tuman 2003).

To begin illustrating the purpose of this section, we may refer to the following definition of 'terrorism' by the US Department of Defence: 'terrorism' is the "unlawful use of, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives" (cited in Laqueur 1999: 5). However, this definition is not accepted by everyone. 'Terrorism' is a highly contentious term and, as such, it is very difficult to establish fixed boundaries which can provide a universal definition that everyone can agree with. Martin (2010: 46) points out that perspective is a crucial element in the definition of 'terrorism':

> Those who oppose an extremist group's violent behaviour –and who might be the targets of the group– would naturally consider them to be terrorists. On the other hand, those who are being championed by the group –and on whose behalf the terrorist war is being fought– often view them as liberation fighters; this can occur even when the championed people do not necessarily agree with the methods of the group.

How we classify political violence will partly depend on the ideological implications of that classification, and this will simultaneously depend on the interests that the 'dominant' group wish to defend. The fact that 'terrorism' is a negatively charged classification of political violence, unlike 'soldier' or 'freedom fighter', makes it a useful category for the analysis of the connections between language and power. What counts and what does not count as 'terrorism' depends on the definition that informs such classification and on the relative position of the agents who establish this definition in relation to the agents who commit the violence.

'Terrorism', in basic terms, is a method of violent intervention, and the term is defined and used differently by various agents depending on their particular interests and on their position in relation to the violent act and its perpetrators. If, like Trew (1979), we think about classifications as a type of hierarchy, classifying acts and agents of political violence means that they can be discursively legitimised or delegitimised depending on the 'position' of the classifier in relation to the violence.

So, for instance, on 22 March 2011 nine people were killed and dozens were injured in Israeli attacks on Gaza. After the event, the Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, expressed public regret for the "unintentional killing of civilians" and described the event as a "mistake" and an "accident" (Urquhart 2011a). One day later, a bus exploded in Jerusalem killing one Israeli woman and injuring twenty-five people (Urquhart 2011b). Although Islamic Jihad, which is usually described as a 'terrorist' group by the West, claimed that they were not involved in the bombing, their statement appeared to convince neither Netanyahu nor the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. These two influential politicians referred to this event as an act of 'terrorism', and Clinton stated that "terrorism and the targeting of civilians are never justified and Israel, like all nations, of course has to respond when this occurs" (Rubin 2011). The *Guardian* placed this news item under its 'Global Terrorism' section and relegated the events of the previous day to a secondary position. As Combs (2003: 8) points out, there is an ambiguous relationship between ideology and terrorism, in which different ideological positions advocate the use of violence, "at one point justifying and at another condemning the same act". The close connection between 'terrorism' and ideology leads to changes in the ways in which this phenomenon is understood, and the next chapter provides empirical evidence of the transforming nature of 'terrorism' as a classification of political violence, to the extent that discursive recontextualisations and decontextualisations of past events take place alongside these classificatory changes, as seen in the previous chapter.

Fairclough (2009: 518) argues that the problem with the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' is that these classifications tend to "obscure underlying relations and to be unhistorical", since those who are generally construed as 'terrorists' in the news are in complex historical relations with those they target and those who aim to 'eradicate' them. For example, these terms are widely used to represent Palestinian fighters, while Israeli or American forces are rarely construed in this way. At this point we must ask who has the power to produce 'dominant' classifications of acts and agents of political violence as 'terrorism'. Fairclough (2009: 514) argues that this is explicable in terms of power. Although the news media are not a "mere plaything of the rich and powerful", the balance of power in national and international news media is "clearly in favour of the most powerful states and governments, business corporations, military establishments, and so forth". In addition, as Picard (1993) points

out, ‘terrorist’ acts are often reported and interpreted by authorities who are opposed to the ‘terrorists’, which means that the motivations and objectives of these agents of political violence are rarely acknowledged. Power is therefore a crucial element in this process of classification, in which particular perspectives are also privileged in the media.

There are numerous academic discussions in terrorism studies regarding how best to define this term. In the next section, I explore some of those debates with the purpose of highlighting the definitional issues in this field and exploring why the definition of ‘terrorism’ is so contested.

Defining ‘Terrorism’

The ideologically situated nature of the term ‘terrorism’ is at the centre of the definitional problems in terrorism studies. Riley and Hoffman (1995) state that “there exists no precise or widely accepted definition of terrorism”, and this is because each definition highlights or conceals different aspects depending on the position of the definer in relation to the violence. Schmid and Jongman (1988), for example, carried out a survey in which they identified 109 academic and official definitions of the term. Nevertheless, ‘terrorism’ carries a negative emotional charge regardless of how it is defined and, consequently, it is condemned and described in pejorative terms (White 2012: 6).

Agents who are described as ‘terrorists’ also feel that ‘terrorism’ is a negative act, but they never consider that what they do is ‘terrorism’: this is a label which is always attached to others. This is explained by the fact that the objectives and methods of politically violent movements are part of a moralistic debate (Bandura 1999: 161) that centres on whether certain methods to express dissent are legitimate or not. Paletz and Schmid (1992: 51) point out that the perspective of the ‘terrorist’ is that the violent incidents that they perpetrate are justifiable acts of war “against an oppressive opponent”, thus their tactics are legitimate because, from their point of view, they are ‘freedom fighters’, but not ‘terrorists’. For example, organisations such as Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)[6] declare that they are armies fighting on behalf of an oppressed people and against the repressive measures of the Israeli government (Martin 2010: 53), while Israelis, who do not share this view because they see the conflict from a different perspective, consider them to be ‘terrorists’.

Thus, we see that the definition of ‘terrorism’ and the classification of events and agents under this label are basically a question of perspective.

However, the way in which 'terrorism' is understood not only depends on the perspective or relative position of the definer in relation to the act of political violence, but also on whether the definer is in a powerful position to make such definition valid, credible and acceptable. This is illustrated, for example, by the definition of 'terrorism' by the US Department of Defence cited above, which defines the term as the "unlawful use of, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives" (cited in Laqueur 1999: 5). Laqueur, the renowned expert in terrorism studies, considers this definition to be one of the better descriptions, but he also acknowledges the difficulty in agreeing upon one single approach to the term. Such an agreement would require a consensus on what types of violence, actions, motivations and causes should be included within the description of this phenomenon (Laqueur 1999: 6) so, considering the variety of ideological positions involved in any context of political violence, conformity in this respect is highly unlikely.

One of the most contentious aspects in the definition of 'terrorism' is whether it includes 'state terrorism'. For instance, the definition of 'terrorism' by the US Department of Defence highlights the fact that this violence is perpetrated *against* governments, which seems to indicate that it is not perpetrated *by* them.[7] Since governments are sources of power, they do not classify themselves as 'terrorists'. However, the fact that some Western governments classify other governments as 'terrorists' is indicative of the global power relations discussed earlier in the thesis. In a similar vein, Hoffman (2006: 40) defines 'terrorism' as the "deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of change", and states that 'terrorism' is "conducted either by an organisation with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia)" and is "perpetrated by a subnational group non-state entity". Hoffman explicitly argues that 'terrorism' is a non-state activity. However, other definitions contemplate the possibility that 'terrorism' may be carried out by the state. For example, Crenshaw (1995: 4) states that

> Terrorism is not mass or collective violence but rather the direct activity of small groups, however authentically popular these groups may be [...]. On the other hand, they may act as an extremist offshoot of a larger social

> movement […]. Moreover, governments and their agents can practice terrorism, whether to suppress domestic dissent or to further international purposes […]. Such use is usually carefully concealed in order to avoid public attribution of responsibility.

Crenshaw's argument about the role of the state in relation to 'terrorism' is supported by other definitions that also suggest that 'terrorism' can be used in the exercise of state power. In this vein, Olivero (1998: 142) argues that 'terrorism'

> contains its own rhetoric, which has been transformed throughout history by different states. By claiming to be defining a type of violence, i.e., one that threatened the site of legitimate violence (the state), it is clear that this term is reserved for the art of statecraft.

Olivero's remarks respond to the fact that, by discursively developing the notion that 'terrorism' is carried out *against* democratic states, states have avoided this classification based on the principle that one cannot be the target of 'terrorism' and its perpetrator at the same time. In other words, if 'terrorism' threatens the legitimate power, which is the state, then the state can never perpetrate it because it cannot perpetrate it against itself.

However, it has been documented that many governments practise and have practised 'terrorism' as a matter of both domestic and foreign policy. Thus, from a discursive perspective, the divide between what is and what is not considered to be 'terrorism' is defined by power: 'terrorism' is something that 'we' with the power do not do, so it can only be done by 'them', who are opposed to 'us'. Accordingly, Western democracies are publicly opposed to 'terrorism' and they consider it to be unacceptable because they "have adopted an ideology of democratic justice as a norm. A *norm* is an accepted standard for the way societies ought to behave. Within the context of these norms, terrorism is perceived to be inherently (*malum in se*) criminal behavior" (Martin 2010: 283, emphasis in the original). Hence political violence is classified according to the normative standards that are set up by Western powers.

In order to continue exploring the concept of 'terrorism', it is useful to pay further attention to Olivero's definition, which raises two additional points of concern. First, she observes that the concept of 'terrorism' is susceptible to the process of historical transformations.

Thus, 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are not fixed categories that are always used in similar ways. Based on the previous discussion regarding social transformations, the classification of political violence as 'terrorism' may vary alongside other political, social or ideological changes. Secondly, Olivero makes a reference to legitimacy and, in particular, to 'legitimate violence', which can only be carried out by the state. The ability to decide whether an act of violence is legitimate or not is also a question of power, and the allocation, or non-allocation, of legitimacy emphasises the ideologically situated nature of the term. This is achieved, for instance, by highlighting the senselessness and randomness of the violent act, so that it cannot be understood rationally and there is no desire to consider the motivations that led the group to perpetrate the violence (Martin 2010: 338).

In some circumstances, we could argue that acts of political violence may be legitimate because they are carried out in resistance against tyranny or oppression (Laqueur 1999: 5). Nevertheless, since legitimacy is only allocated by the social group that holds the power to do so, these acts may be classified as 'terrorists' if the dominant social group is opposed in any way to the exercise of that resistance. The concept of 'resistance' is, in fact, rarely connected to the concept of 'terrorism', as it can elicit a more positive or, at least a more rationalised, perspective on the event. Highlighting the concept of 'resistance' in the definition of 'terrorism' may emphasise the fact that there is something which is liable to be resisted, which may turn the attention towards the causes of the phenomenon, and away from the unquestioning stigmatisation of the phenomenon and its agents. However, there are some exceptions to this point, as there is academic literature on terrorism studies which pays some attention to the causes of 'terrorism' and acknowledge that this is violence which is perpetrated against established systems of power (Combs 2003; Martin 2010; Nassar 2010). There is also some literature that connects the practice of 'terrorism' specifically with the struggle against postcolonial power structures (Boehmer and Morton 2010; Krishna 2009).

The variety of ideological and circumstantial issues that complicate the definition of 'terrorism' is indicative of, and leads to, the contested nature of violence. As mentioned earlier, this contested nature is illustrated by the fact that there is a wide range of available definitions of this term. To provide some examples, Gurr (1989: 201) defines it as "the use of unexpected violence to intimidate or coerce people in the

pursuit of political or social objectives", while Whittaker (2003: 257) sees 'terrorism' as

> the use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause of action which involves serious violence against any person or property, endangers the life of any person or created a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.

We could review hundreds of definitions, and some of them will look similar while others will be substantially different. Some differences between definitions can be subtle, but the key point is that those differences are crucial in the projection of the definer's agenda (Tuman 2003: 5).

This myriad of available definitions can lead to some problems regarding the ways in which these classifications are applied beyond discourse. Butler (2006: 78) points out that people who have violent intentions or have been engaged in violent acts should be dealt with accordingly under criminal and international law, as appropriate. However, she criticises the processes by which these individuals are made to look

> exceptional, that they may not be individuals at all, that they must be constrained in order not to kill, that they are effectively reducible to a desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot apply to beings such as these.

Whittaker (2003: 48) raises a similar point when he points out that, in the formulation of counterterrorist policies, policymakers are challenged by the problem of defining 'terrorism', and by the problem of labelling individual suspects. He argues that, while defining 'terrorism' can be an exercise of semantics (which is shaped by subjective political, ideological or cultural biases), the definition of a 'terrorist' (the person, rather than the act) is a more complicated issue, since official designations of suspects will determine how they are dealt with legally. Butler (2006) and Whittaker (2003) both agree that, despite the definitional debates in terrorism studies, we must remember that there are legal repercussions that must also be considered. In any case, the classification of agents of political violence should be done cautiously, since those classifications carry various consequences, both legally and in terms of negative media representations and subsequent social stigmatisation of ethnic minorities.

On a related note, however, the fact that there is no fixed definition of 'terrorism' provides a degree of flexibility that is useful for the definers, as it allows them to classify events and agents differently depending on their own interests at each moment in time. Coincidentally, Martin (2010: 43) points out that the United States "has not adopted a single definition of terrorism as a matter of government policy, instead relying on definitions that are developed from time to time by government agencies".

The points that most definitions tend to agree with are that 'terrorism' is an act of political violence, and that it seeks some social or political change. The remaining part of most definitions is deeply political and ideological. As a result, the label 'terrorism' is attached to groups "whose political objectives one finds objectionable" (Combs 2003: 7), that is, groups which are ideologically and politically opposed to the group which has the power to define it. A fair representation of acts and agents of political violence, however, would involve applying the same criteria to all relevant events and actors, without making distinctions on the basis of ideology, power relations and access to discourse. For instance, Green and Ward (2004: 105) argue, when they refer to the Susurluk scandal involving the PKK and the Turkish state, that "if we are going to apply the language of 'terrorism' at all to such situations, then the label must be applicable to both sides", as applying it only to the insurgents would be to collude in the hypocrisy of those in power who are responsible for these classifications.

This critique of the processes involved in the description of political violence as 'terrorism' also raises questions about other acts that are not classified as such. An example of this point is given by the term 'war', which is sometimes used as a control case to analyse how 'terrorism' differs from other violent acts that are politically motivated. The different nuances of 'terrorism' and 'war' have most recently been discussed in terms of the 'war on terror', where the quality of 'war' as "a morally superior form of violence"—that is, something that 'we' do—stands in clear opposition to the undemocratic, illicit and illegitimate form of violence which is 'terrorism'—that is, something that 'we' do not do (Price 2010: 26). These 'scales of morality' can be understood in terms of the binary opposites discussed earlier. Acts of political violence may also be classified, for example, as 'insurgency', 'guerrilla', or 'freedom fighting'.[8] Regardless of how violence is classified, the key point is that this classification is always based on a 'scale of morality' which is sanctioned by the

social group which has the power to do so, to the detriment of the group which is submitted to, and 'measured' by, this scale. This is how distinctions are made between forms of violence which are acceptable and legitimate and those that are not.

Notes

1. Scripts are background knowledge about sequences of events (Schank and Abelson 1977). According to Chilton (2009: 176), "frames and scripts are held in long-term memory and are activated by the meanings of words when you process texts".
2. Fairclough (2009: 514–515) distinguishes between three types of power: 'power to', 'power over' and 'power behind'. 'Power to' refers to "the capacity or ability to bring about change", which all human beings have to some extent, as they have the power to change their actions, some aspects of their environments, and the actions of other people. 'Power over' refers to "relations of power between people", which is based on the capacity to bring about change by using the capacities and agency of other people. This is where unequal power divisions begin to take shape, and language is an important aspect of it. In this respect, Fairclough points out that communicative power may be used not only to control others in a variety of communication settings (including the media), but it may also be used to control people's behaviour and actions. Finally, 'power behind' refers to the "habitual, often institutionalised" practices that influence what people actually do, and to the power that determines and executes those practices.
3. The other three conditions are that (1) the method must be appropriate for multidimensional analysis, in order to enable relationships between discursive and social change to be assessed and allow the researcher to indicate how textual changes explain, or are explained by, particular changes in social practices; (2) the method must allow multifunctional analysis, which is based on the argument that discourse practices contribute to our knowledge, social relations and social identities, so a change in discourse practices would lead to changes in what we know, how we relate to each other in society and how our identities are shaped; and (3) the method must be critical, in order to expose the non-transparent processes which lead to the construction of texts and its connections with the social order, while also seeking to intervene and contribute to the provision of resources for those who are disadvantaged within this social order (Fairclough 1992: 9).
4. Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 276) state that "discourses are always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently". Thus, they suggest

that the concept of 'intertextuality' should be included within the concept of 'context'.

5. A 'running story' is a "news event that generates, because of related events, further developments or fresh revelations, media coverage over a period of days, months or even years" (Franklin et al. 2005: 327). These authors use the example of the gradual implosion of Prince Charles' and Princess Diana's marriage to illustrate this concept.
6. The Palestinian Information Center explains that Hamas is a popular national resistance movement that is working to liberate the Palestinian people (cited in Martin 2010: 52).
7. Martin (2010: 46) defines 'state terrorism' as "terrorism 'from above' committed by governments against perceived enemies. State terrorism can be directed externally against adversaries in the international domain or internally against domestic enemies".
8. Trew (1979: 117) points out that the difference between 'terrorists' and 'freedom fighters' mark "a comprehensive, systematic kind of difference in thinking about specific matters". While certain terms may seem to differ only in form and not in content, they are in fact firmly integrated in specific systems of thought, which means that each term has a distinct meaning with implicit characteristics that distinguish it from other terms with which it shares other features.

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CHAPTER 6

'Terrorism' and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in the News

The historical context, and the ideological aspects that have taken shape throughout the years are central to understand the discursive shifts that have occurred in the depiction of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Discursive representations are made through the use of language, not only in terms of grammatical structures in the creation of sentences, but also in terms of the choice of terminology which is used to classify actors and events. These linguistic choices carry ideological meanings and, by analysing them, one is able to explore the connection between language and relations of power in society. In this respect, Hodge and Kress (1993: 63) point out that, since language provides individuals with access to the classification system of their society, "the analysis of language provides the easiest way into an analysis of that system". The material and discursive evolution of the clashes within the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is therefore also reflected on the discursive construction of acts and agents of political violence in the news coverage.

In his linguistic study of the representations of violence in the media, Trew (1979: 150) found that there was "near uniformity" in the way that most of the participants were described in his sampled material. However, there was some variation in the ways in which they classified agents and actions. Some of these classifications do not provide much information about the events and participants, as the terms used to describe them are neutral or less charged. Other depictions, however, provide more specific categorisations of the violence, some of which not only describe them, but also evaluate them. This is the case with

R. Sanz Sabido, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the British Press*,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5_6

the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’, which include implicit assumptions about the agents who carry out specific acts of political violence. As discussed earlier, these assumptions are based on the negative meaning of the term ‘terrorism’ and the subsequent positioning of ‘us’ in relation to the agents who perpetrated the act. This chapter charts the representations in the British press of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, focusing particularly on the uses of the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’.

From a quantitative perspective, the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ were used to different degrees by individual newspapers across the sampled articles. The *Guardian* is the newspaper with the highest number of occurrences of the term ‘terrorism’ in most historical samples (see Table 6.1). This is particularly significant in the 2008 sample, when fifteen occurrences of this term were found in articles published by the *Guardian*, against four occurrences in *The Times*. In 1967, *The Times* used this term twice, while the *Guardian* did not use it within the selected sample. In 1987, both *The Times* and the *Guardian* used the term twice, while the other two newspapers did not use it. The *Daily Mirror*, however, is the newspaper that used the term the least, as it was only counted once in 2008. This is followed by the *Sun*, which used the term on two occasions within the sample of articles that were published in 2008.

The *Guardian* is also the newspaper with the highest number of occurrences of the term ‘terrorist’ in all historical samples, with the exception of 1987 (see Table 6.2). It was counted twenty-six times in 2008, while the *Sun* used it nineteen times in the same year. At twenty-two instances, the frequency of the term is also significantly higher in the *Guardian* when compared to the other newspapers. In 1948, the *Guardian* also presented a significantly higher count of the term

Table 6.1 Frequency of the term ‘Terrorism’ per publication in all historical samples

	1948	*1967*	*1987*	*2008*	*2018*	*Total*
(Manchester) Guardian	3	0	2	15	3	23
The Times	1	2	2	4	1	10
Daily Mirror	0	0	0	1	0	1
Sun/Daily Herald	0	0	0	2	0	2
Total	4	2	4	22	4	36

Table 6.2 Frequency of the term 'Terrorist' per publication in all historical samples

	1948	*1967*	*1987*	*2008*	*2018*	*Total*
(Manchester) Guardian	18	5	5	26	22	76
The Times	4	0	9	14	7	34
Daily Mirror	1	2	0	6	5	14
Sun/Daily Herald	2	0	1	19	0	22
Total	25	7	15	65	34	146

'terrorist', with eighteen occurrences, while *The Times* used it four times. In 1967, this term five times in the *Guardian* and twice in the *Daily Mirror*, while it did not appear in *The Times*. However, in 1987 *The Times* used the term on nine occasions, while the *Guardian* employed it five times. Overall, the *Daily Mirror* is, again, the newspaper that uses the term the least.

The total frequency indicates that the *Guardian* has used the term 'terrorism' twenty-three times across all historical periods, over a total of thirty-six occurrences across all newspapers and historical samples. This means that, based on the selected sample, 63.8% of the incidences of the term 'terrorism' were published by the *Guardian*. Similarly, this newspaper used the term 'terrorist' seventy-six times, which accounts for 52% of the total occurrences across all newspapers and historical samples. The second newspaper with the highest frequency of both terms is *The Times*, followed by the *Sun*. The *Daily Mirror* is the newspaper that uses them the least.

In terms of sampled periods, the highest frequency of the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' is observed in the 2008 sample. In 2008, 'terrorism' was observed 61% of the total, as it was counted twenty-two times in the 2008 sample alone. Similarly, 'terrorist' was observed 44% of the total in the same sample, as it was used sixty-five times. This finding can initially be explained by the fact that 2008 is also the year with the highest number of sampled articles (34% of the total across all historical periods, see Table 2.1), and this was followed by 1967 (26%), 1948 (20%), 2018 (12%) and 1987 (7%). Even though 1967 is the second largest historical sample, it is also the year that presents the least occurrences of both terms (5% for 'terrorism' and 4% for 'terrorist'). This contrasts with the 1948, 2018 and 1987 samples, which are smaller in size, and

yet each of them contains 11% of the total occurrences of the term 'terrorism', and 17, 23 and 10% of the total occurrences of the term 'terrorist', respectively. The significance of these quantitative findings is better explained alongside the qualitative discussion that follows. In the following sections, I will explore these findings in further detail, with reference to the contexts in which these terms occurred and in relation to other alternative ways of classifying acts and agents of political violence.

1948: The British Mandate, Zionism and 'Terrorism'

The first historical period coincides with the end of the British Mandate of Palestine and the subsequent creation and independence of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948. As discussed earlier, newspaper articles were sampled from the following day, 15 May, when the press reported this development, and when the First Arab Israeli war began (Janowsky 1959; Pappé 1992), until the day following the beginning of the first ceasefire on 11 June 1948. This tumultuous time was decisive in the history of the conflict. The following discussion is based specifically on the analysis of news articles that covered acts of violence in order to examine how these were represented.

The analysis of the 1948 sample indicates that the four selected newspapers associated the phenomenon of 'terrorism' with Zionist groups, such as the Stern Gang and Irgun zvai Leumi. Table 6.3 indicates the distribution of these terms across newspapers.

'Terrorism' was never connected, during that period, with Palestinian groups, Arabs or Muslims. The *Daily Mirror*, for instance, published an article on 15 May 1948 referring to a *communiqué* issued by the Egyptian Government:

> The Egyptian Premier broadcast that Egypt's armed forces had been ordered to enter Palestine to 'restore security and order' and end 'massacres perpetrated by *terrorist* Zionist gangs'. (No Byline 1948b: 1, my emphasis)

Table 6.3 Frequency of the terms 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 1948

	Manchester Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Daily Herald	*Total*
Terrorism	3	1	0	0	4
Terrorist	18	4	1	2	25

The description of Zionist gangs as 'terrorist' was offered by the Egyptian Government, and the *Daily Mirror* used the term 'terrorist' as part of the original statement issued by the Government, as indicated by the use of the inverted commas. *The Times* also published a similar article the same day, reporting on the Egyptian statement as follows:

> The Egyptian Government issued the following communiqué at midnight: "Orders have been given to Egyptian armed forces to enter Palestine with the object of restoring security and order in that country, and putting an end to the massacres perpetrated by *terrorist* Zionist gangs against the Arabs and against humanity". (Correspondent 1948a: 4, my emphasis)

These excerpts illustrate the apparent similarities among newspapers in the coverage of the conflict (the *Daily Herald* also published a similar quote, No Byline 1948a: 1), suggesting that they all relied on similar sources and reported the events from similar perspectives. Even though the wording of the paragraphs differ slightly, which may be explained by differences in the translation of the statement, they both share a similar reference to "terrorist Zionist gangs" and to the objective of restoring security and order in Palestine. Both newspapers not only describe Zionist gangs as 'terrorist', but they also explicitly state the accusation that these gangs are perpetrators of massacres. In a similar vein, *The Times* also published an article on 17 May 1948 containing two occurrences of the term 'terrorist'. The following passage reports on a statement made by Kashaba Pasha, the Egyptian Foreign Minister:

> The civilised world listens with horror to tales of how Zionist *terrorists* have spared neither women and children, nor old people, and have put their prisoners to the worst kind of torture. [...] The Egyptian Government declares that this intervention is not directed against the Palestine Jews but against the Zionist *terrorist* bands. (Correspondent 1948b: 4, my emphasis)

On both occasions, the term 'terrorist' is paired with 'Zionist', and both occurrences are part of Pasha's original statement. The examples illustrated so far show that the term 'terrorist' occurred as part of original

statements issued by Arab politicians. Table 6.4 indicates that most instances of the terms (fifteen out of twenty-nine instances) were part of direct quotations of Arab sources. However, the following example illustrates the use of the term 'terrorist' by the newspaper on its own behalf. The article was published by *The Times* on 24 May 1948 and contained the subheading "Determined Defence by terrorist groups", which was followed by this paragraph:

> The Arab forces are increasing their pressure on the Old City of Jerusalem and yesterday broke through a number of Jewish defence lines. The city remains isolated from the rest of Palestine, and Jewish supplies are running low. (No Byline 1948c: 4)

The term 'terrorist' appears in the subheading in reference to groups who are executing a "determined defence". The paragraph that follows the subheading indicates that the "terrorist groups" are the "Jewish defence lines" which are resisting Arab pressure. Although not explicitly linked to Zionism, the term 'terrorist' was also used to refer to the Jewish, and not the Arab, side.

Indeed, the term was always associated with Zionist endeavours, although the following example, which was published by the *Manchester Guardian* on 28 May 1948, shows how it was also connected, more generally, to the Jews:

> The Arabs would have accepted the present dreadful condition of a quarter of a million Arabs who have been driven out of their homes, which were looted or destroyed by Jewish *terrorist* gangs. This discrepancy in the position of both sides under the cease-fire makes it mere nonsense for any Arab to accept it unconditionally. (No Byline 1948d: 5, my emphasis)

This is a direct quotation by Jamal Bey Husseini, who had spoken on behalf of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee. On this occasion, the newspaper relies again on the source and decides to quote his arguments literally. Here, we not only see that Jewish gangs are described as 'terrorists', but we can also see how they are accused of looting and destruction of homes.

In addition, the noun 'terrorism' was also observed once in an article published by *The Times* on 25 May 1948. This instance was part of

Table 6.4 Sources using the term 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 1948

	Manchester Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Daily Herald	*Total*
Newspaper's own narrative	4	1	0	1	6
Direct quotation of British source	8	0	0	0	8
Indirect reference to British source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Israeli source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to Israeli source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of US source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to US source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotations of other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect references to other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotations of other Arab sources	9	4	1	1	15
Indirect references to other Arab sources	0	0	0	0	0
Israeli civilian	0	0	0	0	0
Palestinian civilian	0	0	0	0	0
Other sources	0	0	0	0	0
Total	21	5	1	2	29

a literal statement issued by the Lebanese Government. The American Government had demanded the release of forty-one American citizens that had been taken from the ship Marine Carp by Lebanese military authorities. The Lebanese note was reported to state that

> it was manifest that the able-bodied among these illegal immigrants were going […] to join elements of trouble and anarchy in Palestine and attack Lebanese forces which re-establish order and put an end to violence and acts of *terrorism* committed by the Zionists. (Correspondent 1948c: 4, my emphasis)

This instance of the expression "acts of terrorism" was part of the Lebanese statement, so it is not a term chosen by the newspaper to describe Zionist agents. Nevertheless, 'terrorism' and Zionism are once again linked in the discourse and the newspaper had chosen to rely on this source to write the article.

Along the same lines, the *Manchester Guardian* published a news article on 27 May 1948 titled "Arab reply to the Security Council; Will Discuss a Cease Fire; Question of British Officers in Palestine" (No Byline 1948e: 5). The Arab League had told the United Nations Security Council that it was prepared to study any suggestions for a solution to the problem in Palestine and did not reject the option of agreeing to a ceasefire. In addition, Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, the Egyptian representative, had stated that the Egyptian Government wanted to see the principles of the United Nations, that is, a ceasefire, realised. However, Fawzi Bei also added that

> A cease-fire would enable *terrorist* Zionist bands to receive equipment from abroad, which would encourage further trouble and bloodshed. Ships laden with ammunition and arms have been discharging in Palestine ports and others are on the way. (No Byline 1948e: 5, my emphasis)

The Egyptian representative also argued that the ceasefire would not destroy the fortifications that Zionists had built around their new settlements and which were used to attack Arab villages. Furthermore, a ceasefire would not allow Palestinians to feel secure "from Zionist treachery". Based on these arguments, Egypt refused to abide by the recommendations of the United Nations as they did not take into consideration any of these "equitable and reasonable facts" (No Byline 1948e: 5). The article continued under the subheading "Statement of Arab Case", which referred to a message from the Secretary General of the Arab League. This message stated that the Arab States had accepted a previous truce passed by the Security Council on 17 April 1948, and it argued that Zionists had used this truce to their advantage and thus it had been to the detriment of the Arabs in Palestine. The message details some of the "massacres" perpetrated by Zionists before and after the end of the Mandate. Based on these events, the Arab League now felt that it was important to "preserve the Arabs of Palestine, including the repatriation of 250,000 displaced Arabs and to restore peace and order", and that Arabs should now protect themselves in disregard of the mentioned resolution (No Byline 1948e: 5). The message added that

> The Arabs are dealing with *terrorist* gangs who abide by no standard. Had the Arabs been convinced that a ceasefire would lead to no other attacks the position would have been different. Important questions to be asked are: 1. Is a ceasefire likely to stop the flow of Jewish immigrants going to Palestine? 2. Will it stop the import of arms? 3. Is a ceasefire likely to stop terrorists from violence and guarantee the safety of the Arab population? (No Byline 1948e: 5, my emphasis)

In this article, the term 'terrorist' appears three times, two of which are in the form of adjectives, qualifying the names 'bands' and 'gangs'. Trew (1979: 152) argues that the term 'gang' is a less specific term that can occur in the representations of a wider range of actions and participants, including conflict as well as disorder. In this case, 'gangs' and 'bands' are qualified by the term 'terrorist', which emphasises their negative meanings. All three occurrences of the term 'terrorist' in this article are part of direct quotations of Arab statements (by Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, the Egyptian representative, in the first section of the article, and by the Arab League, in the second section of the article). In fact, the entire article is based on Arab sources (the Egyptian representative and the Arab League). In contrast, Jewish, Zionist or Israeli sources are not used. The Jewish contribution was only mentioned ("after the Jewish spokesman had replied the Council adjourned until today"). This reliance on Arab sources indicates that the report only provides Arabs with the space to present their arguments and to explain, in full terms, their decision not to abide by the new recommendations proposed by the United Nations.

According to van Dijk (1993: 264), some strategies are necessary to make statements reliable and credible, such as the use of argumentation, or a negative evaluation that follows from the 'facts'. This article provides an example of this strategy, which follows from the description of the violent actions perpetrated by Zionists. The message issued by the Arab League presents a coherent account of the reasons that have led them to reject the ceasefire, as this rejection appears contextualised and justified in relation to the ways in which events had developed from the previous truce. Within the context of Zionist aggression, the Arab League's suggestion that Arabs should now protect themselves is portrayed as a justified stance. It is also noteworthy that the article does not mention 'Israel' or 'Israelis', but only refers to 'Zionists' and 'Jews'. This suggests that there is a rejection of 'Israel' and 'Israelis' as categories that have not been legitimised yet at this point. In opposition to the Arabs' justified rejection of the truce, Zionist violence is portrayed

as unjustified. Since these representations are based on direct quotations from Arab sources, we can argue that the *Manchester Guardian* considered these to be trustworthy sources with which to develop the story.

Overall, there was consistency in the ways in which the terms were used in 1948 after the Mandate had ended. Since British authorities in Palestine had been the target of Zionist violence, we can argue that the mainstream British discourse was naturally positioned against Zionist actions and interests. While this is perhaps the most straightforward explanation for classifying Zionist violence as 'terrorism', we must also consider the fact that Zionists were not yet recognised as a legitimate power at the time, but Britain was (officially until 14 May 1948). The end of the Mandate meant that Britain was no longer in that position, but it could not be expected that Britain would change its discourse in relation to Zionism overnight, considering the history of clashes and the losses that they had suffered. In addition, although the end of the Mandate led to the proclamation of the new State of Israel, this proclamation did not automatically lead to the universal recognition of Israel as the new legitimate authority.

1967: The Six Day War

The second historical period coincides with the Six Day War, and the sample includes articles published between 1 June 1967 and 15 June 1967, to include the war as well as the immediate build-up to it and its direct aftermath. Table 6.5 indicates the distribution of the terms across newspapers.

The analysis of this sample indicates that there was a shift in the coverage of the conflict in comparison with the 1948 discourse. In 1967, there is a negative representation of Arabs, in general, while Israel is always represented positively. In terms of the representation of violence, 'terrorism' is no longer associated with Zionist groups, but with a variety of Arab forces, including Egypt (led by President Nasser), the Palestine

Table 6.5 Frequency of the terms 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 1967

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Terrorism	0	2	0	0	2
Terrorist	5	0	2	0	7

Liberation Front, and the Syrian Government. The term 'terrorist' appears in the following excerpt published by the *Daily Mirror* on 6 June 1967. The article reported on "mob attacks" against British embassies "and other buildings associated with Britain in Arab countries" following the news of the outbreak of the Six Day War. The term 'terrorist' appears in the following paragraph:

> There were day-long *terrorist* attacks in Aden against British civilians and armed forces. In the main shopping centre, an Arab gunman shot dead the British Naval Press Officer, Captain William Curtis, 55, who lived in Aden with his wife. (No Byline 1967: 12, my emphasis)

Here, we find that the expression 'terrorist attacks' appears for the first time in this analysis and it is used to describe Arab activities. This shift can be partly explained by the fact that the targets of these particular attacks in 1967 were British civilians and officers. Indeed, some definitions of 'terrorism' establish that 'terrorism' is executed against civilians, so the term is applicable within this context. Furthermore, the fact that the victims are British means that Britain is necessarily positioned against the perpetrators of the violence. On this occasion, the newspaper uses the term as part of its own narrative. Newspapers' own narrative is the most frequent source of the terms in the 1967 sample. Table 6.6 indicates the origin of the use of the terms.

These insights are further confirmed by *The Times*, which used the term 'terrorism' in two separate articles, both published on 10 June 1967, and both of them are part of the newspaper's own narrative. One of these articles reports on the fighting between Israel and Arab countries, stating that "Israel armour and infantry penetrated into Syria" in order to "silence Syrian batteries which have been firing on Israel border settlements" (Douglas-Home 1967: 3). The term 'terrorism' appears in reference to

> the activities of about 1,000 Egyptian commandos loose in the Israel-occupied part of Jordan. They have already carried out two acts of *terrorism* and the Israelis have been unable so far to locate most of them and pin them down. (Douglas-Home 1967: 3, my emphasis)

In this instance, "acts of terrorism" were perpetrated by Egyptian commandos, and this was a "concern" for Israel and, consequently, they

Table 6.6 Sources using the term 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 1967

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Newspaper's own narrative	3	2	2	0	7
Direct quotation of British source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to British source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Israeli source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to Israeli source	2	0	0	0	2
Direct quotation of US source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to US source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotations of other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect references to other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotations of other Arab sources	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect references to other Arab sources	0	0	0	0	0
Israeli civilian	0	0	0	0	0
Palestinian civilian	0	0	0	0	0
Other sources	0	0	0	0	0
Total	5	2	2	0	9

were actively searching for them. Similarly, the use of this term by the *Guardian* is illustrated by the article published on 9 June 1967:

> In the north, Syria announced that fighting was continuing, but General Dayan, the Israeli Defence Minister, said that this was only *terrorist* harassment which was 'a nuisance, but not a cause of war'. (No Byline 1967b: 1, my emphasis)

Here, we see that Syria was engaged in fighting against Israel, but General Dayan did not qualify this fighting as warfare but as "terrorist harassment". This reference to 'terrorism' was an indirect reference

to Dayan's statement. This is one of the two instances of the term that appeared in relation to references to official sources rather than the newspapers' own narratives in 1967.

These examples show that there has been a significant shift from the 1948 sample to the 1967 period, as confirmed also by the article "Strait of Tiran seized: tanks near Suez Canal: Jericho falls; Tel-Aviv will seek coexistence settlement", published by the *Guardian* on 8 June 1967 (Prittie 1967: 1). It states that the Israeli Government was considering the peace terms that they would seek after the end of the war, and that "the essence of a settlement, as the Israelis see it, is that their country should be allowed to coexist peacefully with its neighbours", in reference to the Arab States that they were fighting. Israel's objectives were listed in the report, and they included that the Gulf of Aqaba should be declared an international waterway, the Suez Canal should also be declared free to all innocent shipping (that is, not seeking to wage war against Israel), and a firm guarantee from the United Nations for the inviolability of frontiers in the Middle East.

The latter objective is related to Israel's own protection against possible Arab invaders. In this respect, Israel might be prepared to accept the return of a UN force (which had been forced to withdraw before the war) to mediate in the conflict. However, they had two conditions before accepting the return of the UN:

> The first condition is that normal conditions should be restored and maintained on all of Israel's frontiers, and that neighbouring Arab States should undertake to prevent persistent *terrorist* activities of organisations like El Fatah and the Fedayeen. (Prittie 1967: 1, my emphasis)

This instance of the term 'terrorist' is explicitly associated with the activities carried out by Arab groups, such as El Fatah and the Fedayeen, against Israel. This excerpt is not part of any literal quotations attributed to a source external to the publication, but it is expressed through the newspaper's own terms. Having reviewed the findings of the analysis of the 1948 sample, it is clear that the term is no longer associated with the activities of Zionists, but with the violence perpetrated by Arab groups and states.

Israel's second condition to accept the return of a UN force was that this return should be backed by all neighbouring states, as they thought that there was no purpose in restoring this presence if it could

be withdrawn at any moment “at the whim of an Arab ruler” (Prittie 1967: 1). Israel would also propose that there should be freedom of movement between the two parts of Jerusalem, as Israelis had been “cut off physically from their holy places” (Prittie 1967: 1). In this respect, Israel also pointed out that they had treated Arab Jerusalem as a holy city in the fighting, whereas the Jordanians had shelled Israeli Jerusalem during the war. In addition, Israel wanted to see the end of trade discrimination by the Arab States, but they would not be in favour of the return of thousands of Palestinian refugees to their homeland (although the article does not actually acknowledge that the return would be ‘to their homeland’).

The analysis reveals that the perspective from which the article has been written is substantially different from the analysis of the 1948 sample. Although no direct quotations have been used in this report, the information is written from an Israeli point of view, as they are indirect references to an Israeli source, and all their objectives, interests and motivations are stated uncritically, while no space is dedicated to presenting the opposite perspective. In fact, when Arab States are mentioned, this is done negatively. For example, when Jordanians are accused of bombing Jerusalem, it is accepted within the article that Israel had not engaged in similar acts of violence. No alternative viewpoints are included to suggest that this account of events could be contested in some way. Within this context, the use of the term ‘terrorist’ to describe Arab groups in the above excerpt fits in with the overall discursive construction of the events, which has transformed from being supportive of a Palestine without Zionism, to being supportive of Israel to the detriment of the Arab States that fought on the Palestinian side.

An exception to this trend is observed in an article published by the *Guardian*. Recalling the violent clashes of 1948, the term ‘terrorist’ appears as follows:

> Members of one extremist organisation, the Stern Gang, killed British soldiers and officials. The British Army’s general headquarters in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem was blown up by *terrorists*. (Falk 1967: 11)

This instance of the term is similar to the use originally identified in the 1948 sample, as it is a historical reference that links ‘terrorism’ with the activities carried out by Zionist groups during that period. However, the context in which this statement appears is significantly different.

Although the use of the term 'terrorists' in this excerpt maintains its earlier connection with Zionism, the discursive context in which it is embedded highlights the historical conditions of struggle of the Jewish people, before and after the Holocaust, thereby providing a justification for their actions.

1987: Palestinians and the First Intifada

The third historical period coincides with the first month of the Palestinian uprising that later came to be known as the First Intifada. Although there were numerous instances of violence during the entire uprising period, the sample includes the early incidents that took place from 25 November 1987 to 24 December 1987. This new cycle of violence began when six soldiers were killed in a hang-glider attack on the night of 25 November 1987. The analysis of this period indicates that there is a new discursive shift in relation to the 1948 and the 1967 samples, although this new shift is subtler than the one observed between the previous two historical periods. While the 1987 findings are similar to the ones in 1967 in that Zionists or Israelis are no longer considered to be 'terrorists', what we find at the beginning of the First Intifada is a representation of Palestinians, rather than Arabs, as agents of 'terrorism'. Table 6.7 indicates the distribution of the terms across newspapers. In most instances, the terms were part of the newspapers' own narratives (see Table 6.8). This is followed by direct and indirect references to statements made by Israeli sources. As in 1967, the primary definers are Israeli officials and the newspapers sponsor their perspective by selecting their sources and reflecting their stances in the coverage.

The terms 'terrorist' and 'terrorism' were not observed in the sampled articles published by the *Daily Mirror*, but they were counted in the other three newspapers. The four occurrences of 'terrorism' and fifteen occurrences of 'terrorist' in the 1987 sample were found across a total of twelve articles. One of those articles, published by the

Table 6.7 Frequency of the terms 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 1987

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Terrorism	2	2	0	0	4
Terrorist	5	9	0	1	15

Table 6.8 Sources using the term 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 1987

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Newspaper's own narrative	5	5	0	1	11
Direct quotation of British source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to British source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Israeli source	1	2	0	0	3
Indirect reference to Israeli source	1	1	0	0	2
Direct quotation of US source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to US source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotations of other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect references to other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotations of other Arab sources	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect references to other Arab sources	0	0	0	0	0
Israeli civilian	0	0	0	0	0
Palestinian civilian	0	0	0	0	0
Other sources	0	3	0	0	3
Total	7	11	0	1	19

Guardian on 11 December 1987, reported that "disturbances in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip" had escalated following the death of a "Palestinian youth" after he was shot by security forces. Other Palestinians were also wounded while they took part in "pro-PLO demonstrations and tyre-burning" (Black 1987b: 10). The article also points out that these disturbances had begun with the killing "of a 17-year-old Palestinian schoolboy who threw a petrol bomb at an Israeli army vehicle near the Jabaliya refugee camp" (Black 1987b: 10). The report then provides further details about these incidents, before stating that

> In an unprecedented move yesterday, an Israeli judge in the Nablus military court rebuked an army prosecutor for not demanding the death sentence for an Arab convicted of murdering a soldier on instructions from the PLO. The death sentence exists for *terrorist* crimes, but traditionally it has never been enforced. (Black 1987b: 10, my emphasis)

Here, 'terrorist' is paired with 'crimes' in allusion to activities carried out by an Arab. Although the text does not specify the nationality of the Arab, we see a direct connection with the PLO, thus we can conclude that 'terrorism', in this context, is broadly linked to the Palestinian cause. Something similar happens in the following paragraphs, published by the *Guardian*:

> Jerusalem was deeply annoyed by the US decision earlier this year to send its ambassador back to Damascus after revelations of open Syrian support for *terrorism* in the case of Nezar Hindawi, the Syrian agent who tried to blow up an Israeli airliner.
>
> The reported removal from Syria of the dissident Palestinian *terrorist*, Abu Nidal, was used by Washington as justification for the improvement of US relations with Damascus. (Black 1987a: 12, my emphasis)

Aside from the relations between Israel and the United States, a close reading of these paragraphs indicates that 'terrorism' is, in the first instance, used to refer to Nezar Hindawi, who is described as a "Syrian agent". Hindawi's case, also known as the Hindawi affair, refers to his attempt to blow up an aircraft flying from London Heathrow to Tel Aviv by putting explosives in his pregnant girlfriend's luggage in 1986 (Booth 2004). Although the event happened at Heathrow airport in 1986, a direct connection is established between Syria and the Palestinian cause. In the second instance, we see a reference to Abu Nidal, who is described as a "dissident Palestinian terrorist". Nidal was the founder of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, also known as the Abu Nidal Organization, after splitting from Arafat's Fatah, and he "has been linked with the killing or wounding of 900 people in 20 countries since 1974" (Randal 1990). Both individuals have therefore been notorious for their violent acts, but the point of the analysis is that these are the violent actions and actors within the conflict that are susceptible of being classified as 'terrorist' by Israel and their allies.

Another direct reference is found in an article published by *The Times* on 24 December 1987. The report states that the previous day had been “the most peaceful day in the occupied territories for a fortnight” (Murray 1987b: 9). This new, relative peace was partly due to the threat of new policies being imposed by Israeli Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin said that

> ‘any measure in accordance with army orders is justified if it achieves its goal’ of stopping trouble. Army action, he said, was meant to show the Palestinians that they could achieve nothing by *terrorism* and violence. (Murray 1987b: 9, my emphasis)

While part of this excerpt includes a direct quotation of Rabin’s statement, the juxtaposition of ‘terrorism’ and ‘violence’ appears to be an indirect reference to his same statement, which clearly alludes to Palestinians as agents of ‘terrorism’. Another instance of the term was located in an article published by the *Guardian* on 15 December 1987. This article reported that a 25-year-old Palestinian had been shot dead and four others had been wounded in “another day of clashes with security forces in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip” (Black 1987c: 10). The term appears in the following excerpt:

> The Prime Minister, Mr Yitzhak Shamir, said the army was making strenuous efforts to avoid bloodshed in the occupied territories. ‘*Terrorists* and hooligans who attack our security forces are not heroes’, he said. (Black 1987c: 10, my emphasis)

Here, two extremist categories, ‘terrorists’ and ‘hooligans’, are juxtaposed, positioned against “our security forces”, and denied of the category of “heroes”, a positive category which is always reserved for ‘us’, but never for ‘them’. Instead, they are later labelled as “criminals”. This article also includes a reference to the fact that “a left-wing MP complained yesterday that Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza was responsible for the wave of unrest” (Black 1987c: 10).

This hint of criticism matches the tone of the following article, which includes six occurrences of the term ‘terrorist’. Published by *The Times* on 17 December 1987, and titled “Media under siege in the image war” (Murray 1987a: 9), the main focus of this article is placed on the ways in which the media were covering the events that were unfolding in Gaza

since the end of November 1987. Yehuda Litani, the Middle Eastern editor of *The Jerusalem Post*, had lamented that Israeli television had begun broadcasting again after an eight-week strike, because this meant that images depicting Israeli violence against Palestinians became available for Israelis to see. The article states that newspapers had also carried out "substantial reports of what is going on, with witnesses' accounts of events, including beatings by Israeli forces" (Murray 1987a: 9). The following paragraph has been extracted from the same article:

> *Haaretz*, the main independent newspaper, commented: 'As time passes, the hostility of the residents of the territories toward Israel, especially that of the younger generation, intensifies, their hatred for Israeli rule deepens, and their aspiration to free themselves from it grows'. (Murray 1987a: 9)

Here, we see an acknowledgement of the deteriorating circumstances in which Palestinian refugees live. Despite *Haaretz*'s announcement in this statement that the issue would be removed from their national agenda, there is, to a certain extent, an attempt to raise awareness about the situation suffered by the Palestinians. This perspective is emphasised throughout the article, which states that

> the Israeli public has been brought up to fear that all Palestinians are potential, if not actual, '*terrorists*'. The two words are frequently interchangeable in news reporting. After the recent hanglider [*sic*] attack on northern Israel by '*terrorists*', Israeli radio reported that hundreds of '*terrorists* in Lebanon' had left their '*terrorist* camps' to hide in the fields for fear of Israeli reprisals.
>
> Yesterday there was instant condemnation by political leaders of the '*terrorist*' who stabbed a soldier. There is much wider public sympathy for the behaviour of Israeli troops and police in having to deal with rioting '*terrorists*' than for the motivation of the people in the camps. (Murray 1987a: 9, my emphasis, inverted commas in the original text)

With the exception of the expressions "terrorists in Lebanon" and "terrorist camps", which appear to have been quoted from the radio broadcast, it is possible to suggest that, perhaps, the use of inverted commas is recognition of the fact that 'terrorism' is a contested term. However, after analysing other occurrences of the terms in the sample collected

from *The Times*, the practice of using inverted commas around these terms was not observed in any other article.

These two paragraphs include no less than six occurrences of the term 'terrorist'. All of these are used to refer to Palestinians and, particularly, to Palestinian refugees who were rioting in the camps. Some of these occurrences are, in fact, references to what the Israeli public seems to believe and to what the Israeli radio had reported. However, we also observe that *The Times* uses this term as part of its own narrative to describe the agents of the attacks as well as the rioters. Despite this discursive construction, the article draws attention to the inequalities between Israel and Gaza:

> Essentially, Israel and Gaza are a world apart –although the drive from Jerusalem to the Strip takes scarcely an hour. The 10-year-olds in the camps have no relationship with the 10-year-olds in Jerusalem. (Murray 1987a: 9)

Furthermore, having explained the mainstream position in Israel, the article also acknowledges the alternative view by including a direct quote by Mr Yair Tsaban, a left-wing Member of the Israeli Parliament:

> Inside the Knesset (Parliament), the left wing has been angered by what is going on. Mr Yair Tsaban, a member of Mapam –the United Workers' Party- said: 'The Jewish people, victims of the worst negation of human rights ever known to mankind, cannot keep silent in the face of the attack on human rights now taking place in the territories'. But Mr Michael Eitan, of the much larger Likud faction, accused the left of ignoring reality. The defence forces were handling the situation with kid gloves, he told MPs. (Murray 1987a: 9)

This excerpt shows that in this article we find a variety of perspectives that sharply contradict one another. However, Mr. Tsaban's views are acknowledged within the narrative, making a connection between the suffering of the Jews and the suffering that Palestinians are now enduring. The fact that the article portrays, though minimally, the Palestinian perspective seems to indicate that there have been some changes in comparison with the findings derived from the 1967 sample, which did not give any concessions to Arabs.

2008: Operation Cast Lead, Hamas and the Use of 'Terror'

The fourth selected historical period is the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip from 27 December 2008, when newspapers began to cover the bombardments, to 20 January 2009, when the news coverage shifted its focus towards President Barack Obama's inauguration. As in previous sections, the following discussion is based on the analysis of news articles that covered acts of violence in order to examine how these were represented. The analysis of this period indicates that there is another discursive shift, although, as in 1987, this shift is not as radical as the one identified in 1967. The terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are still used to refer to the Palestinian side of the conflict, but rather than describing Arabs or Palestinians as 'terrorists', this classification is now reserved for Hamas and other Islamic groups. This finding is consistent in all newspapers, with only some minor exceptions that I will examine later, and with some variation in frequency across publications. Table 6.9 indicates the distribution of the terms across newspapers.

These figures show that the frequency of the terms has increased considerably in comparison with previous samples. However, as we will see in the following section, these frequencies are still very low when compared with the use of other terms. The following excerpt, published by *The Times* on 30 December 2008, illustrates the use of the term 'terrorists':

> Brigadier General Dan Harel, Israel's deputy chief of staff, said his forces would erase every trace of Hamas from Gaza. […] 'We are hitting not only *terrorists* and launchers, but also the whole Hamas government and all its wings. We are hitting government buildings, production factories, security wings and more'. (Hider 2008: 1, my emphasis)

In this instance, the term was part of Harel's official statement and *The Times* reproduced it literally. It is noteworthy that, based on Harel's own

Table 6.9 Frequency of the terms 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 2008

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Terrorism	15	4	1	2	22
Terrorist	26	14	6	19	65

words, Hamas are also seen as a government, albeit not a legitimate one from Israel's viewpoint. In the same article, the term 'terrorist' appeared again in the direct quotation of a statement made by a White House spokesman:

> Israel has received tacit support from the United States, where a White House spokesman called for a lasting truce but insisted that Hamas had 'once again shown its true colours as a *terrorist* organisation'. (Hider 2008: 1, my emphasis)

The White House spokesman means that, even though Hamas were elected to form a government, they are in fact a group of 'terrorists'. Thus, we see that, even though Hamas are occasionally acknowledged as a government, there is always an immediate re-classification of their status. These instances of the terms were part of direct quotations of official Israeli and US sources, although we also see that the terms sometimes originated from other sources, as Table 6.10 indicates.

In comparison with previous historical samples, in 2008 we observe a more varied distribution of sources, although these are still mainly based on direct and indirect references to Israeli and US sources, as well as the narratives produced by the newspapers themselves. The *Sun*, for instance, used the term 'terrorist' as part of its own narrative in an article published on 5 January 2009, reporting that "Hamas terrorists took to secret tunnels in a chilling twist to the battle in Gaza last night" (No Byline 2009: 1).

Viewing the distribution of sources, we can partly explain the higher frequency of the terms in the *Guardian* by the fact that they provide more direct and indirect references to official statements, and they also include Arab quotations. In addition, for the first time since the 1948 sample, we find the terms being used as part of direct quotations of Arab statements, although the four instances that fall under this category in 2008 (when the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' were counted twenty-two and sixty-five times, respectively) contrast with the fifteen times when the terms were uttered by Arab official sources in the 1948 sample (when 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' were counted four and twenty-five times, respectively). While in 1948 all publications presented at least one occurrence of the terms as part of an Arab statement, in 2008 only the *Guardian* included them in the news coverage. The following excerpt, published on 30 December 2008, illustrates this finding:

Table 6.10 Sources using the term 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 2008

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Newspaper's own narrative	6	7	3	10	26
Direct quotation of British source	5	1	0	0	6
Indirect reference to British source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Israeli source	9	1	3	2	15
Indirect reference to Israeli source	4	1	0	4	9
Direct quotation of US source	3	1	1	0	5
Indirect reference to US source	4	1	0	0	5
Direct quotations of other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect references to other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotations of other Arab sources	4	0	0	0	4
Indirect references to other Arab sources	0	0	0	0	0
Israeli civilian	2	4	0	2	8
Palestinian civilian	0	0	0	0	0
Other sources	4	2	0	3	9
Total	41	18	7	21	87

> Buthayna Shaaban, a Syrian government spokeswoman, condemned what was happening in Gaza as 'a genocide, a crime against humanity, and a *terrorist* operation against the defenceless Palestinian people'. (Black 2008: 6, my emphasis)

The other Arab sources were King Assad, also from Syria (Black 2009: 19) and an Iranian source (McCarthy and Black 2009: 6). The four instances of the terms in these statements were exceptions to the main trend observed in the 2008 sample. The terms were never found, however, as part of Palestinian statements, understood as uttered by Hamas or other Palestinian organisations and leaders, within the sampled articles.

It is also significant that, for the first time in all the sampled articles in this project, we observe that the terms appear in statements made by civilians, as shown in the following excerpt, published by the *Sun* on 6 January 2009:

> Yesterday resident Sylvia Lagrissa, 55, said: ‘The explosion shook the entire neighbourhood. We should be used to it by now –the rockets fall like rain in Sderot. […] Everyone here is thrilled Israeli troops are taking the fight to the *terrorists*. We can't go on living like this'. (Parker 2009: 13, my emphasis)

Descriptions of the experiences lived by civilians and direct quotations of their views help to legitimise the point of view that they represent, as they are not seen as official sources attempting to justify any actions or protect any particular interests, but as innocent people whose suffering must stop. The justification for retaliatory measures is not provided from the politicians' viewpoint, but from a human-interest perspective. The need to deal with Hamas is based on the fact the necessity to target them is declared by a civilian who lives under the threat of their rockets. While other sampled articles deal with Palestinian suffering, this report illustrates the suffering of Israelis and thus helps to make the official standpoint against Hamas ‘real', as ‘real people' can testify to demonstrate that Hamas pose a ‘real' threat. Although articles reporting on Palestinian suffering included numerous quotations of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the terms were not found in any of their statements.

This is also found in the article “War to the bitter end”, published by the *Daily Mirror* on 30 December 2008. It explains that Defence Minister Ehud Barak vowed to fight Hamas “to the bitter end” after three days of air raids (Fricker 2008: 10–11). At this point in the clashes, the death toll was estimated to be 345 casualties, including more than fifty civilians, of whom around thirty were children. The article then states that

> Last night the US urged Hamas–the Palestinian group that rules Gaza– to stop attacking Israel and agree to a lasting ceasefire. White House spokesman Gordon Jolindroe said: ‘Israel is going after *terrorists* who are firing rockets and mortars. They are taking the steps they feel necessary to deal with the threat'. (Fricker 2008: 10–11, my emphasis)

Although this excerpt does not directly describe Hamas as ‘terrorists', the context indicates that the ‘terrorists' that Jolindroe is referring to

are, in fact, Hamas. While the problem for Israel was that Hamas had become a serious geo-political actor, that is, the problem was politically much deeper than being targeted with rockets, these rockets constituted the declared justification for Israel's retaliatory action, as they have a right to self-defence against the threat posed by Hamas. In contrast, the context and motivations for Hamas to fire the rockets were not covered. Chomsky and Pappé (2010) argue that this strategy seeks to monopolise the means of violence and to use the heavy civilian toll to educate the rest of the population. Although Israeli actions had produced hundreds of Palestinian civilian casualties, there was a moral shift of blame towards Hamas, as they were ultimately seen as responsible for the violence. According to Chomsky and Pappé (2010), this served as a message to the population of the Gaza Strip that had elected Hamas to govern them.

The article then focuses on the death of Palestinian children and includes some references to the reactions of Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the attacks. Hamas were also quoted accusing Israel of a "holocaust". In response to these comments, the article ends with a reference to an Israeli spokesman who stated that they had "nothing against the people of Gaza. This is an all-out war against Hamas" (Fricker 2008: 10–11). Even though the majority of casualties were in fact civilians, this statement sought to clarify that Israeli violence did not seek to target them. This article illustrates the discursive trend observed in the 2008 sample: Islamic groups, and mainly Hamas, are now described as 'terrorists'. This description contrasts with Hamas' self-definition as

> a popular national resistance movement which is working to create conditions conducive to emancipating the Palestinian people, delivering them from tyranny, liberating their land from the occupying usurper, and to stand up to the Zionist scheme which is supported by neo-colonist forces. (Palestinian Information Center, cited in Martin 2010: 52)

In January 2006, Hamas were elected by the majority of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to form a Government (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008). Although these facts are sometimes mentioned in the news media, Hamas are not presented as a democratically elected Government, nor as a social movement, but as a 'terrorist' organisation that must be stopped.

Returning to the frequency of the terms, the data indicates that 'terrorism', which has traditionally been used as a term to describe a weapon or tool of political violence, was often substituted by the term 'terror'. Indeed, in the 2008 sample, 'terror' was used a synonym of 'terrorism' and, in fact, it was counted 83 times across all newspapers (32 in the *Guardian*, 17 in *The Times*, 11 in the *Daily Mirror*, and 23 in the *Sun*), which means that 'terror' was, in fact, used more often than 'terrorism'. While 'terror' was used scarcely in previous samples and with its original meaning of "subjective apprehension of fear" (Price 2010), here we find that the frequency of its use has increased sharply and the term has been transformed semantically. Rather than referring to a fearful feeling, 'terror' is now used as a synonym of 'terrorism', as illustrated in the following excerpt, published by the *Guardian* on 5 January 2009:

> Brigadier General Avi Benayahu, an Israeli military spokesman, said the military's goals for 'phase two' of the campaign were: 'To deal a heavy blow to the Hamas *terror* organisation, to strengthen Israel's deterrence and to create a better security situation for those living around the Gaza Strip that will be maintained for the long term'. (McCarthy 2009: 1, my emphasis)

This is a direct reference to Hamas, not as a 'terrorist organisation' as we have observed in previous examples, but as a 'terror organisation'. Similarly, in the following extract, published by *The Times* on 29 December 2008, we see the term 'terror' being described as a "weapon" by President Obama:

> Referring to Hamas, he said that it was 'very hard to negotiate with a group that is not representative of a nation state, does not recognise your right to exist, has consistently used *terror* as a weapon and is deeply influenced by other countries'. (Reid and Coates 2008: 8, my emphasis)

Whether the term used is 'terrorism', 'terrorist' or 'terror', they tend to be used to describe Hamas and its actions. There were some minor exceptions to this generalised discursive construction in 2008. In an article titled "How Israel brought Gaza to the brink of humanitarian catastrophe", Shlaim concludes that Israel

> has become a rogue state with 'an utterly unscrupulous set of leaders'. A rogue state habitually violates international law, possesses weapons of

mass destruction and practises *terrorism* –the use of violence against civilians for political purposes. Israel fulfils all of these three criteria; the cap fits and it must wear it. Israel's real aim is not peaceful coexistence with its Palestinian neighbours but military domination. (Shlaim 2009: 2, my emphasis)

Here, we observe a rare occurrence of the term 'terrorism' being used in reference to Israeli practices, which include international law violations and possessing "weapons of mass destruction". Shlaim's definition of the term 'terrorism' is also noteworthy: "the use of violence against civilians for political purposes". By this definition, all political violence against civilians fits this classification and, according to the author, this applies to Israel.

2018: The Great March of Return

The fifth sample is based on the news coverage of the Great March of Return, from 30 March until 15 May 2018, when Palestine marked the seventieth anniversary of its *Nakba* Day. This was also the chosen date for the US Embassy to open in Jerusalem. The nature of this event was initially different in that it was meant to consist of a series of peaceful protests against Israeli occupation. However, the events turned into violent clashes that were justified by Israel by evoking its right to self-defence, but were condemned by voices that highlighted the disproportionate use of force against Palestinians. In this respect, the discourse is similar to the one found in 2008, although there are more historical references to the origins of Palestinian suffering, due to the context provided by the seventieth anniversary of the *Nakba*. Like in 2008, the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are still used to refer to Hamas, but there are some exceptions that are linked to the inclusion of different news sources in some articles. Table 6.11 indicates the distribution of the terms across newspapers, and Table 6.12 shows the sources that used them.

Table 6.11 Frequency of the terms 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 2018

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Terrorism	3	1	0	0	4
Terrorist	22	7	5	0	34

Table 6.12 Sources using the term 'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' in 2018

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Newspaper's own narrative	3	0	1	0	4
Direct quotation of British source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to British source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Israeli source	16	4	0	0	20
Indirect reference to Israeli source	5	1	1	0	7
Direct quotation of US source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to US source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotations of other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect references to other 'Western' sources	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotation of Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect reference to Palestinian source	0	0	0	0	0
Direct quotations of other Arab sources	1	1	3	0	5
Indirect references to other Arab sources	0	2	0	0	2
Israeli civilian	0	0	0	0	0
Palestinian civilian	0	0	0	0	0
Other sources	0	0	0	0	0
Total	25	8	5	0	38

Indeed, following the same trend identified in the 2008 sample, the news coverage of the Great March of Return in 2018 also used the term 'terrorism' to refer to agents of violence coming from Gaza. Pengelly's article illustrates this use at the beginning of his article on 14 May 2018, by stating that

> The Israeli Defense Forces said on Monday a jet had bombed five '*terrorist* targets' in Gaza, 'in response to the violent acts of the last few hours being carried out by Hamas along the security fence'. Tank fire was also used against Hamas targets, the Israeli military said. (Pengelly 2018, my emphasis)

The majority of occurrences of the terms appeared in direct quotations of official Israeli sources, or as indirect references to their statements. Once again, these news sources primarily define who the terrorists are, although we find some exceptions to this. Most of these exceptions are related to statements made by Turkey's President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on two separate occasions: first, on 1 April 2018 during a television broadcast, and second, during his visit to London on 15 May. On 1 April, Erdogan described Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a "terrorist", a statement that was reported the following day by *The Times* (Anshel 2018), the *Daily Mirror* (Bazaraa 2018: 10) and the *Guardian* (Holmes and Balousha 2018b). *The Times* translated his words as follows:

> In a television broadcast yesterday Mr Erdogan said: 'Hey Netanyahu! You are occupier. And it is as an occupier that are you are on those lands. At the same time, you are a *terrorist*'. (Anshel 2018: 24, my emphasis)

Several weeks later, on 15 May, the *Guardian* reported that "President Erdogan of Turkey accused Israel of state terrorism and genocide. Turkey recalled its ambassadors from Israel and the United States" (Trew 2018: 1). There are two more notable exceptions. One of them appears in Jonathan Steele's piece on 15 May 2018, where the term is included as part of the *Guardian*'s own narrative:

> Imagine the outrage western governments would express if *terrorists* were to kill more than 50 Israelis on the streets of Tel Aviv in a single day. Yet when it comes to the killing that Israeli forces carried out on Monday at the gates of Gaza - and have been doing for the past several weeks - the silence from most western ministers is deafening. Worse still, there are attempts to justify the deaths as legitimate self-defence. (Steele 2018, my emphasis)

Even though 'terrorists' is used to describe the killers of Israelis—that is, Hamas or Palestinians—the argument of the article is critical against Israeli actions and those who are complicit with them. The second exception to note here is the historical reference to Irgun and Lehi militants, who—in the words of journalist and novelist Arthur Koestler—were terrorists, establishing a comparison with Haganah:

> Koestler contrasts what he said was a moderate Haganah with the '*terrorist*' Irgun and Lehi militants, whom he described as religiously motivated extremists who 'fought with uncompromising fanaticism, committed murder, and walked cheerfully to the gallows, with some savage Psalm of David on their lips'. (Holmes 2018a, my emphasis)

Arthur Koestler's quote is included in an article about "the birth of Israel", when the *Manchester Guardian* had published a series of articles written by the author in Tel Aviv, less than a month after the creation of Israel (Holmes 2018a). The article takes a critical stance against Koestler, pointing out that his descriptions of farmers during the 1948 civil war were idyllic and far from reality, and that he rarely ever mentioned Arabs in his writing, and when he did, it was to show them in a negative light. Even though he is said to have "later turned his back on Israel", in 1948 "he was bursting with Zionist zeal" (Holmes 2018a).

Apart from these occurrences, the remaining ones are used to describe Hamas or Palestinians, including the use of 'terror' as a synonym of 'terrorism', as previously seen in the 2008 sample. 'Terror' was counted a total of 21 times (17 instances in the *Guardian*, one in *The Times*, and three instances in the *Daily Mirror*). There were reports of "fears of a terror attack" in Gaza (Lines 2018: 21), and claims by the Israeli government that "those killed were not peaceful protesters but were engaged in 'acts of terror' by trying to sabotage the border" (Anshel 2018: 24). The following article, published by the *Daily Mirror*, also took a similar stance:

> Four more Palestinians were killed in Gaza yesterday by an explosion - bringing the death toll in the past two weeks to 35. Medics in Rafah claimed it was an Israeli tank shell.
>
> Hospital sources said the dead men were part of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad *terror* group.
>
> But the Israeli army said: 'We have no knowledge of any strike in the area'.
>
> Violence has flared since Palestinians camped at the border demanding access to ancestral lands in Israel. (No Byline 2018: 12, my emphasis)

Overall, this is the most frequent use of the terms, which also appear in relation to the protests and the protesters, like in the following instance, published by the *Guardian*:

> In the world according to Donald Trump, schism, self-contradiction and paradox are the new normal. Naftali Bennett, Israel's hardline education minister, had already put what the foreign ministry called the 'murderous rioters' on notice. By taking part in the demonstrations, Palestinians were self-identifying as *terrorists*, he said. If they were shot dead, Bennett implied, it was their own fault. (Tisdall 2018, my emphasis)

Bennett's assertion that protesters are effectively terrorists is an attempt to activate the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1999), a set of news media patterns that typifies mainstream coverage of protest events. The protest paradigm seeks the trivialisation and marginalisation of protesters, provides negative depictions of the protest events as violent confrontations and delegitimises the issues that they want to denounce (Detenber et al. 2007). However, the sampled articles engage with these depictions of Palestinian protesters as terrorists to different extents. First, it is worth noting that the fact that the 'protest' angle was activated more often than the 'terrorism' one. From a quantitative perspective, 'protest' was used 278 times within the sample (of which 205 appeared in the *Guardian*, 27 in *The Times*, 28 in the *Daily Mirror* and 18 in the *Sun*) and 'protester' was counted 110 times (56 in the *Guardian*, 21 in *The Times*, 30 in the *Daily Mirror* and 13 in the *Sun*). Meanwhile, 'demonstration' was used 79 times (67 in the *Guardian*, 6 in *The Times*, 5 in the *Daily Mirror* and 1 in the *Sun*) and 'demonstrator' appeared 53 times (39 in the *Guardian*, 6 in *The Times*, 5 in the *Daily Mirror* and 3 in the *Sun*). The actions of protesting and demonstrating appeared 14 and 21 times, respectively (once again, the majority of them, 9 and 19, in the *Guardian*, while *The Times* used them once and twice, respectively, the *Daily Mirror* used 'protesting' once, and the *Sun* used it 3 times).

Comparatively, the 'terrorism' angle is less frequent but, as discussed above, in the majority of instances the terms 'terrorist', 'terrorism' and 'terror' appear in official Israeli sources to describe Palestinians and Hamas. However, the protests are often (though not always) contextualised in relation to *Nakba* and Palestinian suffering, and Israeli actions are not automatically legitimised as self-defence. In those cases, the context provided by the seventieth anniversary of the creation of Israel and subsequent displacement of Palestinians brings the latter's history of suffering to the forefront, explaining the reasons for the protests in the first place. It is when this context is rendered invisible that official depictions of Palestinian protesters as terrorists have the potential to become more damaging.

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CHAPTER 7

Identity, Conflict and Visibility

The waves of immigration by Jewish people into Palestine from the nineteenth century, and the development of Zionism as a political ideology for the establishment of a Jewish homeland, led to a fragmented landscape in terms of identities found in the Land. Muslims, Jews and Christians had lived peacefully and cordially alongside each other (Harb 2011; Morris 2008), but tensions arose as Palestinians had to deal with the influx of foreigners and a growing and more diverse population. In addition, Palestine gradually became a battling ground for some Arab countries to challenge the existence of Israel and, at the same time, to challenge the Western presence in the Middle East. The localised conflict became a setting for wider imperial ideologies, leading to additional layers of conflict: the Arab–Arab struggle. Said (1984) argues that Palestinians have been turned into exiles by the proverbial people of exile, the Jews, but Palestinians also feel that everyone, and by 'everyone' Said means everyone who is not a blood brother or sister, is an enemy, including those who are meant to be sympathisers but are, in fact, agents of unfriendly powers. In consequence, it can be argued that, having become a pretext for other powers to perpetuate the fighting, the Palestinian people have, in the end, been largely forgotten. Finally, there is a third set of struggle that is worth noting: the Jew–Jew encounter, that is, the encounter of Palestinian Jews with European Jews in the Land, including a range of identities: not only the Palestinian Jew, but the Arab Jew, as well as the Israeli Jew, and the Zionist Jew, and the

R. Sanz Sabido, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the British Press*,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5_7

non-Zionist Jew, among other terms that have come to describe a wide variety of realities in this context.

Maoz et al. (2002: 933) state that identity constructions among Jews and Palestinians are largely based on the conflict that has confronted them for over seventy years. Each national group holds extreme constructions and perceptions of the other group as the enemy, which is inherently evil, while each group thinks of itself as just, right and moral. These constructions, they argue, "justify one's own right to self-determination and fulfillment of identity and security needs, while denying and delegitimizing such rights for the other side" (Maoz et al. 2002: 933). We could say, in fact, that the Palestinian collective identity is based precisely on their awareness of shared grievances and adversarial attributions, which has been deeply politicised (Simon and Klandermans 2001: 327). This is also visible in the Israeli political system, which consists of two types of citizenship: the Jewish citizen and the Arab citizen, where Arab citizens have much more restricted rights when compared to the rights held by Jews, not to mention the non-existent rights of the non-citizen Arab (Peled 1992). Said (1978) states that the Palestinian, in his resistance to foreign colonialists, was a "stupid savage, or a negligible quantity, morally and even existentially". Based on this conception of Palestinians, only Jews could be granted full civic rights, including the Right to Return. Arabs, being "less developed", are given fewer rights, and they do not have the Right to Return, even though they are the Land's original inhabitants. According to Said, orientalism governs Israeli policy towards the Arabs throughout and, based on the same principle, he points out that "there are good Arabs (the ones who do as they are told) and bad Arabs (who do not do as they are told, and are therefore terrorists)" (Said 1978: 307). Meanwhile, however, Zionist thinking in relation to Palestine was ambivalent: "on the one hand, Zionists claimed that Jews were a Semitic people who originated in Palestine, while, on the other hand, they viewed Jews as modern Europeans participating in colonial endeavours" (Massad 2000: 317).

Shohat, an Iraqi Jew who lives and works in New York, describes her own life as a personal narrative that questions the Western notion of Arab Jewishness or, rather, the denial, altogether, of such category. In her "Reflections of an Arab Jew", Shohat (2003) defines herself as an Arab Jew or "more specifically, an Iraqi Israeli woman living, writing and teaching in the United States". Most members of her family were born and raised in Baghdad, and she recalls when her grandmother, who arrived in Israel

in the 1950s, was "convinced that the people who looked, spoke and ate so differently –the European Jews– were actually European Christians". Shohat explains how Jewishness was associated, in her grandmother's generation, with Middle Easterness, but having arrived in Israel, she had to learn to "speak of 'us' as Jews and 'them' as Arabs", while until that moment, distinctions had been based on religious difference—Muslim, Christian, Jew—and being Arab had been understood as a common shared culture and language. Shohat explains how the opposition between Jew and Arab came to their personal lives as a radical, impossible choice: they would either have to give up their Jewishness, or their Arabness.

Shohat's experiences illustrate the core of the identity struggles that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict meant to non-European Jews prior to, and after, the creation of the new state. The concept and the history of Jewishness that were established was a homogenous one, sponsored only by European Jews, excluding the realities of the non-European ones. Said's *Orientalism* becomes relevant once again, when considering not only the position of the Arab Muslim, but also the position of the Arab Jew. According to Said (1978: 307), the Zionist movement led to the bifurcation of the Semitic myth: "one Semite went the way of Orientalism, the other, the Arab, was forced to go the way of the Oriental". Zionism is, therefore, orientalist by definition, because it is based on the Eurocentric perception of the East as inferior, and this inferiority also applies to Eastern Jews. Discriminated by European Jews for being Arab, and rejected by Muslims for being Jewish, the experience of Arab Jews, as Shohat refers to them, provided, and still provides, perhaps one of the clearest illustrations of identity struggles within the conflict.

It is also a largely forgotten one. The ways in which the media construe personal and collective identities must be answered by referring to the construction of boundaries that determine what groups are included and, perhaps more importantly, which ones are excluded from the representation altogether. In this particular case, these boundaries are constructed based on the orientalist discourse that dominates the Western media. This chapter focuses on the degree of visibility or invisibility that different agents in the conflict have received in the news coverage of the conflict, paying attention to the inclusion of Arabs, Palestinians, Muslims, Jews, Zionists and Israelis, as well as Palestine and Israel as key entities in the conflict. The frequency in which these agents and identities appear in the discourse, and the contexts in which they do so, sheds light on the extent to which some of them have been excluded at

different stages of the conflict. In keeping with findings discussed earlier in the book, the analysis reveals that there are noticeable changes in the coverage across the five samples, helping us to identify how ideological shifts have been reproduced discursively in the British press.

1948: Palestine, Jews and Arabs

As previously discussed, the mainstream British discourse in 1948 was positioned against Zionism because British authorities in Palestine were the target of Zionist violence, and Zionists were not recognised as a legitimate power at the time. Even after the proclamation of the state of Israel and the dissolution of the British Mandate, there was a period of readjustment that meant that Zionist identities remained suspect. In essence, the British were depicted in moral terms as right, and the Zionists as fundamentally wrong, as illustrated, for example, in the following passage published by *The Times* on 15 May 1948:

> The Egyptian Government issued the following communiqué at midnight: ‘Orders have been given to Egyptian armed forces to enter Palestine with the object of restoring security and order in that country, and putting an end to the massacres perpetrated by terrorist Zionist gangs against the Arabs and against humanity’. (Correspondent 1948a: 4)

The fact that the terms ‘Zionist’ and ‘Zionism’ occurred 124 times is significant, particularly when compared with the findings in later samples, in which these terms will practically disappear from the discourse. However, on some occasions, it is not Zionism but “Jewish terrorist organizations” that are violating “the local truce arranged by the British authorities before their departure” (No Byline 1948a: 5). Similarly, ‘Haganah’, ‘Irgun (zvai Leumi)’ and ‘Stern Gang’, which were groups associated with Zionist interests and activities, were counted seventy-one, twenty-two and thirteen times, respectively. The term ‘extremist’ was sometimes used to describe them (it appeared seven times in the sample). For instance, three instances of this term were found in the *Manchester Guardian* on 3 June 1948. The article features the subheading “Control of extremists”, which states that

> The Arabs believe that Israel will have at least as much difficulty in controlling the Zionist extremists, especially the Stern Gang and Irgun, as the Arabs will have in restraining the overconfident and undisciplined Arab irregulars. (Correspondent 1948b: 5)

Table 7.1 Mentions of different agents and entities in 1948

	Manchester Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Daily Herald	*Total*
Jews/Jewish	131	283	70	1055	1539
Muslim	0	4	2	4	10
Zionism/Zionist	6	61	4	53	124
Israeli	0	5	0	2	7
Palestinian	1	8	0	8	17
Arabs	93	268	57	389	807
Israel	21	30	33	83	167
Palestine	46	122	27	292	487

Extremism was, therefore, associated with Zionism during this time, much in the same way as 'terrorism' was also paired with the Zionist cause (Table 7.1).

In this context, the term 'Arabs' was counted 807 times in the sampled articles, whereas the terms 'Jews' and 'Jewish' were mentioned 1539 times. These frequencies indicate that these are, by far, the most common ways of referring to the various protagonists within the selected sample. In contrast to the frequencies of the terms 'Arabs' and 'Jews' or 'Jewish', 'Palestinians' only appeared seventeen times, 'Muslims' ten times and 'Israeli' seven times. The scarcity of 'Muslims' is also significant when compared to the use of the terms 'Jews' or 'Jewish', which is the primary option used to describe one side of the conflict ('Arabs' is the term chosen to describe the other). However, the fact that 'Israeli' only appears seven times is not surprising, bearing in mind that Israel had only been created as a new state and the 'Israeli' entity had not yet been fully established. Even though 'Israel' is mentioned more frequently, the new state is sometimes described as the "Zionist state" or "Zionist territory" (No Byline 1948b: 4).

Even though the conflict arises because Palestinians are placed in a position in which they need to defend their rights, they rarely appear either as agents or victims in the narrative. It can be argued that this is because Palestinian identity only emerged later as a consequence of the creation of Israel. In this respect, Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2008: 23) point out that "it is both remarkable and unfortunate that at the same historical juncture both Jews and Arabs became motivated

and conscious of the same themes of self-determination, nationhood and statehood in response to the motifs so strongly associated with nationalism". It is the struggle against Israeli occupation that has marked not only the fate but also the identity of the Palestinian people. When the term 'Palestinian' does appear, it sometimes refers to the Palestinian population or the "Palestinian Arabs", as in the following article published by *The Times* on 19 May 1948:

> The first result of the entry of the Arab States' armies into Palestine has been a heightening of the morale of the Palestinian Arabs and Arab volunteers. […] The presence of Arab armies in a large area of Palestine has also released thousands, and large numbers of Palestinians who had fled the country are now returning to join their hardier Iraqi, Syrian, and Transjordan volunteer allies in the field. (No Byline 1948b: 4)

In fact, the limited number of occurrences of the term 'Palestinian' appear concentrated in a very small number of articles, which use the term more than once. The same article by *The Times* continues reporting on the fate of Palestinian Arabs or Palestinians, adding further context to the conflict between them and the Zionists:

> When the Zionists decided to terrorize the Palestinian Arabs into accepting partition they made a fatal mistake. They put fear into the hearts of Palestinians, but they also put anger into the hearts of the Arab countries and a determination to fight Zionism to the end. The massacre at Deir Yassin had been the turning-point, 'for when the Jews killed Arab village women and children at Deir Yassin they also killed their own child, the Zionist state', and finally convinced the Arab League that Zionism must be crushed. (No Byline 1948b: 4)

On other occasions, we find references to a Palestinian State, as in the following excerpt, also published by *The Times*:

> The Zionists were seeking to create purely Jewish States, but the Arabs were fighting for a Palestinian State in which Jews would have full and equal citizenship, every facility to develop their Jewish life and every encouragement to play a full part on the building up of a united Palestine. There would be no differences and no discrimination between Arab and Jewish citizens. (No Byline 1948c: 4)

In the paragraphs above we see, alongside the mentions of the term 'Palestinian', the inclusion of Palestine in the discourse. Even though 'Palestinians' only appeared seventeen times, 'Palestine' was counted 487 times. We see references to the "area of Palestine" (No Byline 1948b: 4), and it is also often used as an article headline, such as the editorial published on 24 May 1948 by the *Daily Herald*. In this piece, the newspaper states that the Jews had proclaimed the formation of "the Republic of Israel with the frontiers recommended by the UNO Palestine Commission. The Arabs made no such proclamation: the rest of the country is without even a self-established authority" (Editorial 1948: 2). The article puts some emphasis on the suffering of civilians, explaining that "Jewish settlements in Arab-occupied territory have been wiped out. Thousands of Arab refugees have left Haifa, Jaffa and Acre". Furthermore, it states:

> Faced by this situation, the outer world looks on for the most part uncertain what, if anything can be done.
> There are, of course, those who have no doubts. They would have all the Powers at once recognize the Republic of Israel. They would at once allow a free flow of arms to the Republic, and, at the same time, stop all flow of arms to the Arab States.
> Indeed, they would go further, and would threaten the Arab States with 'sanctions' unless they at once withdrew their forces from all Palestine. (Editorial 1948: 2)

Palestine appears, therefore, as a recognised entity within the discourse, whether as a geographical location or as political entity fighting for its rights and self-determination. This is noteworthy as it stands in clear contrast with the findings that emerge in the following samples.

1967: Israelis and the State of Israel

If in 1948 Zionists were represented negatively, a similar process of delegitimation took place in the other sampled periods from 1967 onwards, although by 1967 the side of the conflict that was represented as morally right was Israel. While in the past Zionist groups had exercised resistance against Britain, Israel later began to assert itself in its right to exist and was by this time considered the legitimate power in the conflict. Therefore, Palestinians became the ones who resisted the impact of

Table 7.2 Mentions of different agents and entities in 1967

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Jews/Jewish	35	24	25	18	102
Muslim	2	4	0	2	8
Zionism/Zionist	14	3	1	3	21
Israeli	300	63	115	106	584
Palestinian	6	4	0	0	10
Arabs	235	191	61	80	567
Israel	318	460	73	174	1025
Palestine	17	5	6	3	31

Israeli actions and policies in relation to their lands. Israeli acts of violence were no longer considered to be negative, while supporters of the Palestinian cause acquired the position of the 'terrorist' enemy acting against Israel as the established authority (Table 7.2).

In the 1967 sample, the most frequent term used is 'Israel', which was counted 1025 times, while 'Jews' and 'Jewish' are no longer the most popular options, being replaced in effect by references to 'Israelis' (584 occurrences). This is in clear contrast with the frequency with which 'Palestine' appears within the sample (31 times). Furthermore, 'Israel' often appears as the agent of actions and decisions, although it is also sometimes used to refer to a place or location. However, the scarce references to 'Palestine' appear either as part of the Palestine Liberation Organisation or the Palestine Liberation Army, or as a location. For example, *The Times* referred to Ahmed Shukairy as 'Palestine leader', rather than leader of the PLO (No Byline 1967a: 7), and Leapman's (1967) article in the *Sun* makes a historical reference to Palestine in the following terms:

> The Israelis are fighting because they believe the Arabs want to destroy their country. The Arabs, on the other hand, fear Israel wants to spill over into neighbouring states, especially Jordan. And they re still bitter about what they regard as the injustices surrounding the creation of Israel in 1948.
> After the second world war fighting between Jews and Arabs broke out in what was then Palestine, a British-run territory.
> In 1947 the United Nations decided that the country could be split. The Jewish part was formed in 1948, the Arab states declared war on it. During the war some 700,000 Arab refugees fled from Israel to Jordan and to the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip.

> The refugees now number more than 11 million, and are cared for by the United Nations. The Arab states have refused to assimilate them, preferring to let them remain as a symbol of their complaint against Israel. (Leapman 1967: 3)

The historical context provided in this article helps to situate the conflict in relation to the events of 1948, and the description of "what was then Palestine" as a territory is linked to Britain, even though at this point the British Mandate rarely appears as such within the news discourse. Similar historical references are found in other articles within this sample, such as Lake's (1967: 2) article, also for the *Sun*, which states that "heavy pressure will be put on Israel to behave generously toward the million Arab refugees expelled from Palestine when Israel was created in 1948", or Lee's piece in the *Daily Mirror*, referring to Janin, a city ten miles inside Jordan. This article reports that Israeli troops occupied the city and "every one of the city's 30,000 Arab men, women and children fled when the first ramble of tanks was heard advancing on them":

> The town, which, since the Palestine war of 1948-9, has been ten miles inside Jordan, apparently never expected a frontal Israeli assault. But this is exactly what happened. (Lee 1967: 17)

In appearing only as a territory or as a historical reference, Palestine is never included as a country, as a contemporary entity, or as a form of agency capable of making decisions, but makes a passing reference to the annexation of the city to Jordan after the 1948 war. It is reduced, as the following article illustrates, to an enduring "issue" that transcends borders and time periods:

> King Hussein said that war between Israel and the Arab States could break out in two days, or after a while when Israel hoped that Arab unity would have been weakened. He stressed that all differences between Arab countries had been sunk until the Palestine issue was resolved. Asked if there might be some change in Jordan's new friendship with Egypt after the present tension had relaxed, the King said: 'The differences are gone and will never return'. (No Byline 1967b: 7)

The reduction of Palestine to an issue or to a source of tension—which tends to be more concerned with other agents rather than Palestinians themselves—is indicative of the position that the real core of the problem

has in the overall discourse, which is, in turn, reflective of the material conditions surrounding the ways in which the conflict is dealt with.

There is only one main exception to the emergence of Palestine as a historical reference or as a territory: the substitution of 'Palestinian' by 'Palestine Arabs'. The fact that 'Palestinian' (with only ten occurrences) has an even lower presence in the representation of the conflict is rather telling in terms of the visibility and invisibility of different groups and social forces. So, for instance, the following article, published by the *Sun*, quotes a lieutenant fighting in the Six Day War:

> 'We sliced them up piece by piece just like a cake', said a little lieutenant, a grin creasing his sweat-streaked face under his camouflage helmet.
> The Palestine Arabs fought bravely and fanatically. But most of their Egyptian officers beat a retreat when the going was tough. (No Byline 1967a: 2)

Indeed, there are some exceptions, and 'Palestinian' emerges in the news discourse on some rare occasions, such as the one we see in the following excerpt, published by *The Times*:

> Amman radio announced tonight that Iraq units had arrived in Jordan to take up positions on the Jordan front as they have already done in Egypt and Syria. Earlier today hundreds of chanting Palestinian demonstrators staged a noisy march through Jerusalem streets within easy earshot of Israel. They carried anti-American signs and applauded the new defence agreement between Jordan and the United Arab Republic. (Herbert 1967: 10)

In the *Guardian*, Wall also mentions Palestinians in the following context:

> The Arab States, it is argued, will not attack Israel but insist that any settlement must be based on the fulfillment of United Nations resolutions on the restoration of lands and other rights to the Palestinians. (Wall 1967: 1)

Both articles highlight the non-compromising struggle of Palestinians for their rights, but the articles' stance towards this struggle is not a negative one. The findings from this sample suggest that Palestinians are more likely to appear in the discourse when the article takes a positive stance towards their plight, as we also see in the following piece. Published by

the *Guardian*, the article focuses on China's supportive stance towards Palestine. China presented themselves as their only remaining friend and called on them to ignore the Security Council's ceasefire resolution:

> A Chinese reporter was told by a 'Palestinian Friend' that 'Chairman Mao has shown us the way to the liberation of Palestine – people's war… we need another million badges with the chairman's face on them, so that when we Palestinian people triumphantly return to our homeland, every one of us will wear a badge with Chairman Mao's face on his chest'. […]
> When he [Shukeiry] was asked what would happen to the Israelis if the Arab countries won the war, he said: 'We shall allow their return to their countries of origin'. As for those Israelis born in Israel, any survivors would be allowed to remain in Palestine. 'But I think none of them will be left alive'. […]
> And the Syrian Premier, Yussif Zeayin, mocking the restraint shown by Israel in not taking military action against the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, said: 'Israel's bowing of its head must not be interpreted as final victory. It is only the beginning of the road. The Palestinian Arab people will exercise their legal right to liberate their homeland'. (Zorza 1967a: 13)

In this instance, both Palestinians and Palestine appear in direct or indirect quotes uttered by Shukeiry or by Zeayin, so the article favours the Palestinian stance by including the voice of their representatives and, in doing so, it enables a space for them to define the events. However, the most frequent alternative to refer to Palestinians is the use of the term 'Arabs' on its own, without further reference or recognition to Palestine or to Palestinians as a people. For example, in another article signed by Zorza (1967b: 11), Rumania is reported to have refused to take sides in the conflict, and that "the settlement should take into account 'the legitimate rights of the peoples concerned', that is, of both the Arabs and the Israelis, while Moscow is standing up only for the Arabs' rights".

Meanwhile, Israel has become significantly more prevalent, and 'Jews' and 'Jewish' are no longer the most popular options, as these have been replaced by 'Israelis' (584 occurrences). This choice confirms that, within British discourse, Israel had become a fully recognised entity and the legitimate power in the area, which also explains the shift in the use of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' to describe its enemies. On a similar note, the terms 'Zionist' or 'Zionism' only occur 21 times within the sample. This contrasts with the 124 instances of this term in 1948, which

indicates a wish to move away from the negative connotations animated by the memory of this expression. Nevertheless, British Zionist organisations are mentioned in one of the articles as a positive development characterised by its supportive spirit towards Israel. Lapping (1967: 12) explains that 56 British volunteers had left for Tel Aviv "to bring in the harvest, while Israeli citizens join the army". The article further states that:

> Although this was the first organised party of general volunteers, many individuals, paying their own fares, have gone already, and on Wednesday the Jewish Zionist youth organization, Habonim, sent 40.
> The headquarters of most of the big Zionist organisations in Britain –Rex House in Regent Street– has become a great recruitment centre. The interviews, by young Zionists who have worked on Kibbutzim before, are mostly straight-forward.

On other occasions, Zionism appears in a neutral context in which it is not particularly negative or positive. We see this, for instance, when Page (1967: 2) reported on the statement that Foreign Secretary George Brown's delivered to MPs, arguing that the British government was not "taking sides in the Arab-Israeli war", and that "the immediate thing that mattered was to get a cease fire":

> We will all serve the cause of peace better by not pronouncing on the merits of the case.
> And this, he told them, applied to every MP – 'To Jew or non-Jew, Zionist or non-Zionist, to those with pro-Arab sympathies and to those with non-Arab sympathies'.

Similarly, the following article titled "Zionist pilot 'confessed'" explained that a spokesman had confirmed during an interview with Damascus Radio that 17 British bombers had participated in the fighting the previous day, and "had bombed targets inside Syria and the UAR":

> Damascus Radio said at 3:30pm on Tuesday that, on June 1, British aircraft were observed in a state of continuous movement at the Akrotiiri air base in Cyprus. Vehicles were seen to be transporting bombs and rockets to the aircraft. Three thousand British troops with full equipment left Akrotiiri for Palestine on May 28. (No Byline 1967d)

The fact that the pilot is described as 'Zionist' does not imply a negative or a positive stance in itself, even though he is said to have accused British forces of taking part in the fighting.

Yet, there are also some instances in which Zionism is seen as a threat to Arabs. In this respect, Jones (1967: 1) reports on Nasser's acceptance of the United Nations' call for a ceasefire, which followed after "another day of crushing defeat for the Arabs". Later in the article, Muhammad El-Farra, the Jordanian ambassador to the United Nations, had "an impassioned outburst" despite his country's agreement to the ceasefire. He was quoted stating:

> 'We do not compromise with aggression', shouted Mr El-Farra.
> 'Many more conspiracies may be planned to fulfill the dream of Zionism –to take Amman, Cairo, Damascus- but one thing they cannot take away is our determination to enjoy our liberty'.

The focus of Zionist violence is no longer directed at Britain, as it had been during the Mandate. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, any references to these confrontations between British forces and Zionists are historical references to past events.

1987: Palestinians Without Palestine

By 1987, the overall stance towards Israel is rather similar to that described above, although the analysis indicates that there are some differences in the coverage. 'Israeli' (328 occurrences) and 'Israel' (212 occurrences) are the most frequent terms for naming agents involved in the conflict. Zionism only appears three times, confirming the trend that had already been observed in the 1967 sample. This is also in keeping with the frequency of the terms 'Haganah', 'Stern Gang' and 'Irgun (zvai Leumi)', which have now practically vanished from the narrative, based on the sampled articles. This is not rare because these organisations no longer exist at this point, but it is relevant to consider the absence of these terms in relation to the ways in which the conflict is contextualised historically.

One of the most significant findings, considering the data discussed earlier, is the fact that 'Palestinian' has become the third term with the highest frequency (197 instances), which is in sharp contrast with the

Table 7.3 Mentions of different agents and entities in 1987

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Jews/Jewish	18	9	1	0	28
Muslim	7	8	2	0	17
Zionism/Zionist	3	0	0	0	3
Israeli	165	143	13	7	328
Palestinian	105	82	6	4	197
Arabs	73	47	7	6	133
Israel	89	113	6	4	212
Palestine	5	7	3	0	15

seventeen occurrences in 1948 and ten occurrences in 1967. Therefore, there is a change in the preferred way of identifying this group in comparison with the previous historical sample (even though we still find the term 'Arabs' 133 times), so that Palestinians are given some visibility in the discourse (Table 7.3).

However, the visibility that Palestinians have gained is not a positive one, as they only appear in the discourse in order to be described negatively. It can be argued that the term 'Palestinian' is used more often in 1987 because Palestinians are direct agents of the events that were unfolding during this period (and because Arafat and the PLO had taken over Palestinian affairs, which had previously been dealt with by Arab states), while in 1967 other Arab countries, namely Egypt, took the lead in the conflict. In addition, 'Palestine' only appears fifteen times, a frequency rate that is closer to the 31 instances counted in 1967 than to the 487 instances counted in 1948. This confirms that the increased frequency of 'Palestinians' in the discourse does not respond to a change in the stance towards the recognition of Palestine as an entity in its own right. The roles of culprit and victim are, however, not always clearly defined, as Palestinians are sometimes seen as both agents and victims of violence. So, for instance, Black (1987a) refers to the latest cases of violence, in which several Palestinians had died, and explains:

> The crucial question now is whether this week's level of attrition and sacrifice can be maintained by the Palestinians for much longer. Tyre-burning, stone-throwing, and makeshift roadblocks can be ignored by the Israelis if the heat from the Americans becomes too intense. But daily demonstrations and repeated attacks on army patrols will clearly not be tolerated.

In the same article, Black provides context to the news story both in terms of the recent events that had led to the latest surge of violence, while also describing the conflict in broader terms:

> It is not difficult to trace the immediate causes of this week's violence. When, on Tuesday last week, four Arabs were accidentally crushed to death by an Israeli truck in Gaza, it provided the signal for the release of years of pent-up anger with the Israeli occupation. So, in a different way, did the recent Palestinian hang-glider attack on the northern border, when six Israeli soldiers were killed. […]
> Twenty years after Israel conquered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the balance of hope is still weighed heavily against the Palestinians. Egypt is at peace with the 'Zionist enemy', and the border with Jordan is hermetically sealed. The Shin Bet security service has its informers and inducements and there is a whole class of Arabs who benefit, directly or indirectly, from the continued occupation. (Black 1987a)

In this excerpt we also see how Palestine has been notably substituted by references to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which appeared more scarcely in previous samples but are, by this point, the recognisable remnants of what used to be Palestine. Indeed, Palestine only appeared 15 times, often as part of the group Palestine Liberation Organisation. The following excerpt includes two of those occurrences, one of which counts for one of the rare references to Palestine as a recognisable entity:

> From his distant headquarters in Baghdad, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Yasser Arafat, boasts emotionally of the 'great heroic popular uprising' that is taking place in the West Bank and Gaza, all that is left of his dying dream of Palestine regained. (Black 1987a)

Elsewhere in the article, it is the Gaza Strip, and not Palestine, that is suffering the consequences of the violence:

> It is not necessary to visit the mean, rubbish-strewn alleys of the refuge camps in the Gaza Strip to realise that it can be very hard to see clearly through clouds of tear gas or think straight when the air is filled with the sound of hissing bullets, flailing batons, and cries of 'Allahu Akbar'. (Black 1987a)

In yet another article by Ian Black, the writer describes instances of Israeli violence in which Palestinians had been killed, and the ensuing reactions from the people in Gaza:

> I can vouch for there being at least one death in the Gaza Strip yesterday. I saw the body of 17-year-old Talal al-Huweihi brought home to the village of Beit Hanoun, north of Gaza city, for burial after he was shot by the Israelis during a demonstration earlier in the day.
> The army had, wisely enough, left the village by the time the Gaza bush telegraph had alerted us. But the arrival of four newspaper correspondents brought hundreds of young men and boys milling around, shouting and screaming about what the Israelis had done. 'The Jews are killing us', wailed an old woman, tugging at my sleeve. 'They are killing us'.
> They left us alone only when the victim's shrouded corpse was driven into the village square, following the makeshift hearse and chanting the slogan they keep for days of martyrdom: 'We will redeem you with our blood, O Palestine'. The way things are going, they will be chanting it again in Gaza very soon. (Black 1987b)

The appearance of Palestine in this article is in keeping with previous occurrences, as the term is part of a quote (in this case, a slogan or chant) that is uttered by Palestinians themselves. Palestine otherwise continues to lack presence not only in quantitative terms, but also in relation to what it represents in the discourse: not a country or an entity in its own right, but increasingly an ideal or a memory, one that is more firmly rooted in the past than in the present. It remains something to fight for, but not something that exists in itself.

2008: Israel, Israelis and Palestinians

The analysis of the 2008 sample has also shown that 'Israel' and 'Israeli' are, once more, the most frequent terms, with 2109 and 1655 occurrences, respectively (Table 7.4).

Unlike Palestine, 'Israel' is used both as a location and as an agent in its own right, which takes actions and makes decisions. The following excerpt, published by *The Times* on 8 January 2009, Israel appears as an active agent of violent actions against Gaza:

> Photographic evidence has emerged that proves that Israel has been using controversial white phosphorus shells during its offensive in Gaza. […]

Table 7.4 Mentions of different agents and entities in 2008

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Jews/Jewish	63	94	6	51	214
Muslim	60	9	5	27	101
Zionism/Zionist	17	8	3	2	30
Israeli	847	510	121	177	1655
Palestinian	567	237	67	95	966
Arabs	147	63	10	8	228
Israel	1177	580	149	203	2109
Palestine	32	23	4	11	70

> There is also evidence that the rounds have injured Palestinian civilians, causing severe burns. (Evans and Frenkel 2009: 6)

In this excerpt we also observe the term 'Palestinian', which is the third most frequent term to refer to actors within the conflict (966 instances). Thus, 'Palestinian' has now become more visible, and it is often in the role of victim. Even though the term is so prevalent, we also see frequent references to the civilian population in Gaza and their suffering at the hands of Israel:

> John Ging, the head of the UN relief agency in Gaza, described the situation there as 'inhuman'.
> 'We have a catastrophe unfolding in Gaza for the civilian population', he said. 'The people of Gaza City and the north now have no water. That comes on top of having no electricity. They're trapped, they're traumatised, they're terrorised by this situation […] The inhumanity of this situation, the lack of action to bring this to an end, is bewildering to them'. (Balousha and McGreal 2009)

The article is not only concerned with the human losses and the trauma of the conflict, but also with the possibility of a "future" Palestine and the damage that the conflict was inflicting on the infrastructure:

> Ging also accused Israel of a campaign of destroying public buildings vital to the administration and governance of Gaza.
> 'The whole infrastructure of the future state of Palestine is being destroyed', he said. 'Blowing up the parliament building. That's the parliament of Palestine. That's not a Hamas building. The president's compound is for the president of Palestine'. (Balousha and McGreal 2009)

When reporting on some of the military strategies that Israel have followed in Gaza, Balousha and McGreal describe the tactic of using tanks to cut "Gaza in two", therefore "making movement between the halves impossible for Palestinians". On some occasions, the victimhood assigned to Palestinians is sometimes intertwined with their condition as 'tokens' within a conflict involving several countries and parties within Israel. So, for instance, Palestinian children appear in this excerpt, which seems more concerned with the political differences between UAL and Kadima:

> UAL chair Ahmed Tibi was equally scathing in his attacks on the Israeli government, asserting that 'any vote given to Kadima is a bullet in the chest of a Palestinian child in Gaza'. He had short shrift for those accusing his party of undermining the Israeli status quo: 'We never said that we don't recognise the state of Israel. We are part of it, but we will never accept Zionism, which is an ideology that aspires to banish us from our homes'. (Freedman 2009)

Even though Palestinians are now included more frequently in the news discourse, 'Palestine' (70 occurrences) is, once again, comparatively excluded from it. Due to the events that unfolded during this period, newspapers' narratives tend to focus their attention on Gaza:

> Always the suffering of Gaza, most potent symbol of the tragedy of Palestine. In 1948, during the Nakba –or 'The Catastrophe' as Palestinians describe the war that gave birth to the state of Israel– 200,000 refugees poured into Gaza, swelling its population by more than two-thirds. Then Gaza fell under Egyptian control. (Beaumont 2008)

Palestine appears, as seen in some of the 1987 instances, as a symbol of a history of suffering, rather than an entity in its own right. Palestine is, like the following excerpt illustrates, a dream or an idea, a utopia rather than a reality that has any chance of resembling past times:

> Israel believes it has struck a blow against Hamas, but the true casualty of this war is its own moral legitimacy.
> If, as is evident now, even some of its former most ardent backers lose faith in the legitimacy of the moral argument for Israel, one can almost afford to dream of a day very soon, when Muslims, Jews and Christians live together and peacefully side by side, on a land that has always been recognised as Palestine. (Altikriti 2009)

More rarely, Palestine appears in quotes uttered by Hamas, when the party insists on referring to them as a recognisable entity. Therefore, the emergence of Palestine is, once again, linked to the source's stance and the decision to include or exclude that source in the article:

> Israel's military said its first wave of 60 warplanes hit 40 targets of 'terror operatives, training camps and weapons storage warehouses'.
> But Hamas quickly retaliated, firing homemade rockets into Israel - killing at least one person - and vowing to send suicide bombers over the border.
> The Hamas government leader in Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, said: 'Palestine has never witnessed an uglier massacre'. The party's spokesman Fawzi Barhoum said: 'Hamas will continue the resistance until the last drop of blood'. (Rockett 2008: 28)

Despite these discursive trends, it is worth noting an exceptional mention of Palestine as a contemporary reference, precisely because of its oddity, which is further highlighted by the fact that it does not appear in a source's direct quote, but in the newspapers' own narrative. Following a summit co-hosted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the *Sun* reported that the summit

> was held hours after a ceasefire between Israel and Palestine came into effect.
> Mr Brown [PM Gordon Brown] said: 'Too many innocent civilians, including hundreds of children, have been killed during the military offensive. Three weeks of tragedy must be followed by immediate action to secure a permanent peace settlement'. (Whelan 2009: 4)

The equal footing between Israel and Palestine in the same statement is, indeed, a rare occurrence, as Hamas or the Gaza Strip would normally appear in its place.

Finally, following the same trend observed in previous samples, the terms 'Zionist' or 'Zionism' (30 occurrences) have nearly vanished from the news coverage, partly because of the negative connotations associated with the term, and because 'Israel' and 'Israeli' are the preferred, recognised options to refer to this side of the conflict. The terms usually appear in contexts that are critical of Israel or its actions. So, for instance, Ward's article in the *Daily Mirror*, on 16 January 2009, reports on the Israeli strikes that had taken place the previous day. A UN warehouse

containing aid for refuges was hit, also targeting 700 civilians who were sheltering at the compound. In addition, the article refers to the death of Hamas minister Saeed Seyyam:

> Meanwhile, Hamas vowed vengeance for the death of interior minister Seyyam.
> An official said: 'The blood of Saeed Seyyam will be a curse on the Zionist entity'.
> Seyyam, his son and his brother were killed in an air strike that flattened a rented house in the Jabalya refugee camp. He was in charge of 13,000 Hamas police and security men. (Ward 2009: 15)

The mention of Israel as a 'Zionist entity' carries an implicit refusal from the unnamed Hamas official to acknowledge its existence while highlighting its roots. The same quote was included an article by the *Guardian*, which provided more context to the "killing" of Seyyam (transcribed as Said Siam in the *Guardian*). The piece stated that Siam was "the most senior Hamas leader to be killed since 2004 when Israel assassinated Dr Abdel Aziz Al Rantissi, a founding member of the militant Islamist group" (O'Loughlin 2009).

2018: Palestinians, Israel and the Role of Palestine

In the sampled coverage of the Great March of Return, the analysis has shown that 'Israel' (765 instances) and 'Israeli' (590 instances) are, once again, among the most frequent terms. The difference in relation to the 2008 sample is that, at 654 occurrences, 'Palestinian' appears, for the first time since 1948, more often than 'Israeli'. At 11 occurrences, references to Zionism within the sample reach the lowest frequency since 1987. All of those mentions were published by the *Guardian* (Table 7.5).

Even though 'Palestinian' maintains a relatively high visibility, the frequency of 'Palestine' (58 occurrences) is further reduced in comparison to the 2008 sample, far from the 487 instances counted in 1948. Therefore, Palestine remains excluded from the discourse to a large extent, although it should also be considered that the sample size in 2008 was approximately three times larger than the 2018 one (362 articles were sampled in 2008, against 128 in 2018). Comparatively, therefore, the rate of frequency of Palestine is higher in 2018 although this

Table 7.5 Mentions of different agents and entities in 2018

	Guardian	The Times	Daily Mirror	Sun	*Total*
Jews/Jewish	148	21	4	2	175
Muslim	15	9	0	0	24
Zionism/Zionist	11	0	0	0	11
Israeli	412	69	63	46	590
Palestinian	467	80	66	41	654
Arabs	93	9	5	1	108
Israel	552	101	67	45	765
Palestine	49	0	3	6	58

does not deny the fact that there is a near absence of Palestine in the news coverage of the conflict, particularly when we compare the 58 instances of 'Palestine' to the 765 references to 'Israel'. One of the newspapers, *The Times*, did not include it at all, while the *Guardian* was, once more, the publication with the highest number of instances of the term.

Palestine usually appears in one of three main contexts. Two of these contexts are defined by Palestine's connection to other entities. One of them is in relation to the British Mandate of Palestine, so it is embedded in discussions about past events, often connected to the anniversary of *Nakba*. The second context makes reference to the Israel–Palestine conflict, as seen in this excerpt published by the *Daily Mirror*: "Hundreds were injured at the Gaza border during the incident, which goes down as the deadliest day in the Israel-Palestine conflict since the 2014 Gaza War" (No Byline 2018: 17).

The third context in which Palestine appears is in articles that give this term an identity of its own, that is, it is recognised as a place, a state or an entity in its own right, rather than one that is subordinated to something else. Most of these occurrences are historical, for example, when Tisdall stated on 14 May 2018: "If Monday was bad, what is going to happen on Tuesday? Forget the crass embassy shenanigans. Tuesday is the anniversary of the actual day, 70 years ago, when Palestine disappeared off the map" (Tisdall 2018).

However, there are also some references to Palestine in a contemporary context. Saif (2018) first refers to Palestine in a historical context, when he discusses the refusal to recognise Palestine as a state, and describes Jaffa as "one of Palestine's most vivid cities during the first half the 20th century". He then places Palestine in the present day,

denouncing “the international community’s hypocrisy towards Palestine” and stating that “the Great March of Return might end tomorrow, but the questions it raises will not only remain but continue to pile pressure on Palestine’s prison perimeters”.

Indeed, there is a higher occurrence of Palestine as an entity in its own right in articles that are critical of how the conflict has been managed, often linked to calls for its recognition as a state. In this respect, Liel (2018) states that “Britain should be the first in line”, referring to the need to recognise Palestine as a state in order to “bolster hopes of peace in the Middle East”. He points at the end of the British Mandate seventy years earlier, and claims:

> Whatever may have been the British intention in 1917 with the Balfour declaration, or in 1948 when Britain left Palestine, is it the wish now that the ‘national home’ for the Jewish people will become a Middle Eastern fortress while the indigenous Palestinians turn into its unwilling subjects? This outcome should not be accepted. (Liel 2018)

Similarly, Moran (2018) quotes Hamas leader Ismail Haniya in the aftermath of the violent events that started on 31 March, at the beginning of the Great March of Return. Here, we also see a connection between past and present:

> Referring to refugees seeking to go back to land they fled, or were expelled from, in 1948, Hamas leader Ismail Haniya said: ‘There is no alternative to Palestine and no solution except to return’. (Moran 2018: 25)

Quoting another Hamas leader, Lines (2018: 4–5) also includes Palestine in his news report of 15 May in the *Daily Mirror*, when 55 people were killed in protests as the US embassy opened in Jerusalem:

> Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar urged youths to rebel, calling yesterday and today a ‘vital and crucial 48 hours in Palestine history’. He said: ‘What’s the problem if hundreds of thousands storm this fence, which is not a border of a state? What’s the problem with that?’ Israeli Defence Forces said 40,000 Palestinians took part in ‘violent riots’ at 13 points along the Gaza Strip security fence. They said demonstrators were being used as cover for terrorists aiming to kill or kidnap civilians or plant bombs.

Even though Palestine sometimes appears as an entity that is recognised within specific articles, it very rarely appears as an active agent of any actions. We find an exception to this in an article titled "Palestine files complaint against Israel under anti-racism treaty" (Holmes 2018b). In the main text, Holmes clarifies that "Palestinian diplomats in Geneva have filed a complaint against Israel for what they say are breaches of its obligations under a UN anti-racism treaty, triggering what may be a lengthy and high-profile investigation". The article also includes a historical reference to the Land, stating that

> Violations in the occupied territories, which the complaint defined as the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, sought to maintain 'a Jewish demographic majority in the entirety of historic Palestine', claims the 350-page document, of which the *Guardian* has seen a summary. (Holmes 2018b)

On a different note, the sample includes some scarce references to the ethnic and religious diversity in the Land. In terms of religion, there are very few references to Muslims or Islam (24 instances) and to Christians (34 instances). When Christians are mentioned, they sometimes appear in conflict with Jews, as illustrated by the following paragraph published in the *Guardian*: "Christians in Jerusalem's Old City say their presence at the geographical heart of their faith is under threat from intimidation and aggressive property acquisition by hardline Jewish settlers" (Sherwood 2018). In fact, 18 occurrences of the term 'Christian' or 'Christianity' appear in Sherwood's article alone. On most occasions, however, they are discussed in relation to the coexistence of Muslims, Jews and Christians in the Land, or regarding the meaning that Jerusalem has for the three faiths:

> Jerusalem is a city unique in the history of civilisation. No other place on earth can claim significance to three major religions. Each day Jews pray at the Western Hall. Muslims bow in prayer at Al Asqa mosque, and Christians worship at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. (Holpuch and Weaver 2018)

Liel's (2018) article also includes one of the references to "the peaceful coexistence of Jews, Muslims and Christians in the Holy Land".

In terms of the original inhabitants of the Land, there are very few mentions of the native people of Palestine, and no specific references to

Arab Jews within the sample. In Holmes (2018a) article about Koestler, we find one of the rare references to "the native Palestine Arabs", who are presented, in Koestler's words, as never having fought seriously "because they had no reason for fighting, having accepted the presence of the Jews with its economic benefit and the de facto partition as accomplished facts". Meanwhile, in his article about Haifa and the racial segregation that exists there, Black (2018) points out that:

> Older Palestinians tend to be relaxed about this, but younger activists can be contemptuous about condescension or racism towards 'colourful' natives. Many are keen to assert their growing self-confidence in the face of what they condemn as Israeli 'apartheid and settler colonialism' - in the words of a strategy paper that was drawn up in the cafe Fattoush last December.

Overall, the news coverage of the conflict cannot represent an accurate and comprehensive view of the identity and history of the 'Other', as the only view that they can offer is an orientalised and more simplistic one that denies its true complexities. Postcolonial thought criticises Western discourse as it carries the essence of superiority characteristic of Western power, which places the colonial 'Other' in an inferior position (Pawling 2011: 143). In addition, identities are never unified and, in late modern times, they are increasingly fragmented and fractured. After the analysis of historical and contemporary news media, it can be concluded that Western news discourse fails to represent those fragmentations fairly, a practice that, as Fairclough argues, not only represents, but also reproduces and perpetuates those representations.

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

Only nine days after the proclamation of the state of Israel in May 1948, *The Times* published an article, titled "Palestine", announcing that the Arabs "have in fact now lost in their long struggle to prevent the establishment of a secular Zionist State. The fears they expressed when the Jewish National Home was first set up under the British mandate have been borne out" (No Byline 1948: 5). The piece points out that, from the Arab perspective, the Jewish state had been "set up by intrigue and force against the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants in a country where the Jews have for centuries been allowed to dwell unmolested and in peace", while their own cause had failed to gain support, regardless of how just it is. The article does, indeed, acknowledge the justice of the Arab cause, but also highlights the international actors that had turned their backs on Palestine, putting Britain at the centre of the developments in the Land:

> The mandatory responsibilities which Britain so long discharged obliged her to hold the balance true between Jews and Arabs – as indeed she wished, and still wishes, to hold it. Since she laid down these responsibilities, however, two things have happened. Zionism has achieved sudden and decisive victory through the dramatic emergence of the State of Israel; and the United States, a country to which Britain is bound by the closest ties of gratitude, obligation, and community of interest, has rallied at once to Israel's support. (No Byline 1948: 5)

R. Sanz Sabido, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the British Press*,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5_8

Even though the article argues that even though "Britain has long cultivated the friendship of the Arab peoples and has encouraged them to build up their political and economic resources as a bulwark against any aggressor", it also claims that British officers must no longer be associated with Arab operations in the Holy Land precisely because of the use that those resources were being used by Arab States:

> [Britain] is bound to them [the Arab people] by treaties of a solemn kind, which pledge her to assist them in the training and equipment of their forces. These treaties are a substantial contribution to international security. Their purpose –peace and order in the Middle East– must equally be the concern of other Powers, not least the United States. It is the use which the Arab States, supported by these treaties, are now making of their armies in Palestine which invites criticism. It has been condemned by a formidable consensus of opinion throughout the Christian world, and Britain cannot remain indifferent to this opinion. (No Byline 1948: 5)

The discursive shift to justify Britain's role in the conflict, and its withdrawal in particular, are already emerging at this point, although it is still argued that Britain should "seek to persuade them [Palestinians] to reconcile themselves to the existence of the new State of Israel" and that assurances should be obtained from Israel on the questions that made the Arabs feel "deeply and naturally anxious". Britain, Israel, the United States and the United Nations are named actors that, according to *The Times*, had a role in managing the situation at the time:

> the boundaries of the new State must be defined and guaranteed by the United Nations to prevent the 'creeping expansion' at the expense of the Arabs which extreme Zionists are already demanding; the Arab population of Israel must be assured of full civic rights and generous economic opportunities. It is of the utmost importance that the growing divergence between British and American policy in the Middle East should be corrected, but the United States, as well as Britain, has a large and indispensable part to play in the process. It is their common interest that the entire structure of international security in the Middle East should be saved from the peril which now threatens it. (No Byline 1948: 5)

The analysis provided by this piece, and the prophecies implied in the description of the way things were—including the threats that were already perceived at the time—seems remarkable in light of the events

that are taking place more than seventy years later. The references to the success of Zionism, to the tensions, divisions and lack of trust between the different sides, and the use of "intrigue and force", ring alarmingly contemporary now. The text also gives insight into a cause—the Palestinian one—that seemed "just" but had nevertheless failed, and begins to shed lights on the ways in which international relationships and future actions would take shape in relation to this conflict. The demands then are still the demands now.

At the time of writing these lines, on 30 March 2019, Gaza is marking the first anniversary of the beginning of the Great March of Return. They are doing so by holding another demonstration, after a year in which Israeli soldiers have shot thousands of people (Holmes 2019a). According to the United Nations, 194 Palestinians, including 41 children, have been killed during the weekly protests, and about 29,000 Palestinians have been wounded in the past year. According to the same UN report, "more than 6000 unarmed demonstrators were shot by military snipers, week after week at the protest sites by the separation fence" (United Nations Human Rights Council 2019). The UN believed that Israeli snipers are shooting at "clearly recognizable" journalists, health workers, children and persons with disabilities. In particular, the targeting of children and disabled people has been described as "alarming", and 122 people have had a limb amputated since 30 March last year, twenty of whom are children. During the same period, four Israeli soldiers were injured at the demonstrations, and one Israeli soldier was killed on a protest day but outside the protest sites (United Nations Human Rights Council 2019).

These are the casualties of yet another year of clashes and rising tensions between two sides: one that is fighting against the occupation of Palestinian lands, and another that claims legitimate defence when they are attacked. During this time, the escalation of violence is also explained by the forthcoming elections that are taking place on 9 April 2019 in Israel. After a year of weekly protests, or what Israel considers to be "violent riots" (Holmes 2019a), the Israeli government is under pressure to put an end to Hamas and these demonstrations. There is no regard for the background that motivates the protests in the first place: the occupation of Palestinian lands and "the blockade that has trapped the enclave's 2 million residents and to push for recognition of the right of return for Palestinian refugees" (Holmes 2019a).

The violence has, of course, spanned over decades, and the consequences are seen in every aspect of contemporary life in Gaza: over half of the population live under the poverty line, homes get fewer than six hours of power a day, and over 97% of the water is undrinkable (Trew 2019). Every day of clashes and blockades make the situation more unsustainable. Medecins Sans Frontieres has warned that "Gaza's collapsing health system did not have the capacity to treat everyone and that a 'slow motion' emergency was unfurling across the strip" (Trew 2019).

The UN believes that Israeli soldiers have committed violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the Great March of Return. Some of those violations, the UN report argues, "may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, and must be immediately investigated by Israel" (United Nations Human Rights Council 2019). Even though the onus has been placed on Israel to investigate "every protest-related killing and injury, promptly, impartially and independently in accordance with international standards, to determine whether war crimes or crimes against humanity were committed", Israeli authorities have not responded to repeated requests (United Nations Human Rights Council 2019).

Hamas and the protest organisers have also been urged to ensure that the demonstrations are peaceful, as "acts of significant violence" by demonstrators have been reported. These acts include stone-throwing, molotov cocktails and, in several cases, the use of explosives at the fence and Israeli troops behind it. However, the UN report also made it clear that "such actions did not amount to combat or military campaigns, rejecting an Israeli claim of 'terror activities' by Palestinian armed groups", and that "the demonstrations were civilian in nature, with clearly stated political aims" (Holmes 2019b). According to Santiago Cantón, Chair of the Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza protests, the UN understands that the protests are "a call for help from a population in despair" (United Nations Human Rights Council 2019).

This is a history of violence, and what this study has done is to trace the evolution of the discursive representations of this violence in the British press. The choice of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' as the focal point of the analysis was based on the contested nature of violence and the various interpretations of the term 'terrorism' (Schlesinger 1991). From the discussion above, the UN's descriptions of Israeli and Palestinian acts of violence make it clear that both sides are engaging in some sort of violent action, but it is not the level of aggression, neither in terms of the

number of victims it targets nor the amount of damage it causes, that determines which label is given to that violence. As an ideologically situated term, the discursive use of 'terrorism' is relative to the 'position' of the actor who defines the violence.

Based on this, the initial hypothesis in this project was that there must have been variations in the ways in which the term has been used historically alongside any ideological evolutions. Indeed, tracing these changes has provided insights into the ways in which the British press has stood in relation to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict at specific points throughout the past 70 years, since the end of the British Mandate. The analysis has revealed that transformations have occurred in the ways in which the conflict has been reported in Britain. One of the study's main findings is that the visibility and invisibility of certain terms to denote agents in the conflict has evolved over time, depending on the dominant political discourse and the specific interpretation of events evident in each sampled period. The diachronic evolution of these representations demonstrates that meanings and ideological positions are not fixed.

This is precisely one of the main advantages of discourse-historical approaches (Carvalho 2008; Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 2001), as they attempt to explore discourse throughout time, consequently identifying the ways in which it has evolved and situating their findings within the historical background of those evolutions. The historical approach of Postcolonial Critical Discourse Analysis highlights the importance of exploring the contexts in which news articles were published, both in terms of the contemporary socio-political conditions of their production, and in terms of the discursive contextualisation of those events in the news discourse. This has enabled several insights into the representation of the conflict in the British news, including the evolution of ideological stances that are translated into discursive practices, including the use of the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' in different ways across time. A comparative study of additional contexts marked by what is usually described as 'terrorism' by the British press would be required to provide further insights about the orientalist nature of the discourses about those other contexts.

This analysis has also provided examples of the ways in which some violence was discursively justified while other cases of violence lacked an equal justification within the specific context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Olivero (1998) points out that 'terrorism' is the focus of so many definitional efforts precisely because definitions help distinguish

illegitimate violence and dissent (practised by those in opposition to the state) from legitimate violence and repression practised by the state itself, as we still see in the most recent coverage of the conflict. The empirical analysis carried out in this study shows that 'terrorism' is political violence that is practised against the state and its interests. Therefore, it denies the possibility of 'state terrorism', because neither Britain in 1948 nor Israel in later samples are defined as such in the news coverage.

According to Martin (2010), three factors illustrate why 'terrorism' is unacceptable from the perspective of Western governments. First, Western governments have adopted an ideology of democratic justice as a norm, by which 'terrorism' is perceived as criminal and anti-democratic. In this respect, Perse (2001) also points out that the media coverage of 'terrorism' provides a window for citizens to observe how well their government officials deal with this problem, nationally or internationally, so the authorities' response to these acts must be in line with widely accepted discourses of democracy and justice. Secondly, Western countries are often a target of 'terrorism' so, being at the receiving end, their relative position to the violence is not only defined in terms of their ideological position, but it is also incompatible in practical terms because they are the victims of this violence. Thirdly, the only type of political violence that the West recognises as legitimate is what they classify as 'warfare', and this 'warfare' must adhere to the rules and conditions that they have pre-established for it to qualify as such, mainly in the Geneva Conventions and UN resolutions. In terms of victims, since there is no intention to cause harm to 'innocent people' (civilians, rather than operatives of the state), violent actions perpetrated by a Western country within a 'war' are presented as valid, while 'terrorist' actions are unacceptable because of their intention to cause harm to civilian targets (Martin 2010: 285).

However, Western powers, including Israel, do target civilians, even if these attacks are discursively represented as unintended. In this respect, we observe a clear difference between official statements regarding campaigns of political violence (which are never self-classified as 'terrorism', but as more morally superior categories of violence), and the events that take place on the ground. Here, we see a different tactic, which consists of attacking vulnerable points on the battlefield and, generally, targeting opponents who are relatively powerless (Price 2010: 27). The attacks on the Gaza Strip by Israel in 2008, in November 2011, and the violence against protesters since the Great March of Return started, are just some

examples of how the Israeli armed forces targeted and shocked a largely civilian enemy. Notwithstanding the fact that the nature of most warfare directed by formal authority is malevolent despite the continued insistence on a moral distinction between forces (Price 2010: 26), Martin's arguments summarise the reasons why the United States, Britain, and other countries consider that Israel (a country they support) is not an agent of 'terrorism', but Hamas is—despite the UN investigations that lead them to report differently.

These views contrast with those held by groups and organisations, including governments in the developing the world, which find that 'terrorism' is an acceptable tool to fight for their objectives. First, this is partly explained by the fact that, in many instances, the leaders of resistance movements in colonial times (who could be labelled as anti-colonial 'terrorists') became leaders in the new independent countries. Secondly, 'terrorism' was used as a practical method to lead colonial powers to the point when they would relinquish their control of the colony. In the third place, leaders of resistance movements have argued that their violent tactics are justifiable and legitimate because the causes they fight are just and their motivations are rational (Martin 2010: 286). These insights are also applicable to the violent actions perpetrated by the Zionist movement during the British Mandate and the fact that it was them (and not Palestinians) who replaced the British Mandate as the new state power in the area.

There is also Nassar's (2010: 24) argument that terrorism is violence that is motivated by either the struggle for power and domination, or by acts of desperation in response to this power struggle. After the First World War, terrorism was executed by groups, such as the Zionist movement, struggling for national independence. In this case, the target of those struggles was Britain, which was the dominant power in the area after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. According to Nassar, the imposition of imperial rule, which is violent in itself, does not only incite actions to gain national power and independence, but the injustice and oppression of the imperial rule can also incite desperate violent actions. If violence and terrorism thrive under conditions of injustice and social, political and economic inequality, we may once again refer to the Palestinian conflict as an example, as Israeli subjugation has devastated the economies of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Nassar 2010: 37). Nassar argues that, with the independence of Israel as a new nation-state after the Second World War, "many Palestinians felt and continue to feel

that they have been denied their right to establish their own national home –their own Palestinian state" (Nassar 2010: 37), adding to the sense of disparity and deprivation that contributes to the perpetuation of the conflict. This argument echoes Cantón's words above that the protests in Gaza are in fact a call for help from a population in despair.

With regard to the meaning of the term and its suitability as a key term in the empirical analysis, the empirical findings have indicated that the violence that was exercised by Zionist groups against Britain was labelled by the British as 'terrorist', whereas the violence perpetrated by Palestinians did not receive this classification in 1948 as it was not directed against British targets. Carmichael (1993) points out that Britain attempted, in vain, to contain the growing pressure of the Zionist movement and began to turn against any pro-Zionist interpretation of the Mandate, to the point that, in 1943, the anti-Zionist bias of the Mandate was unmistakable. This was reflected in the British press accordingly.

However, once Britain ceased administering the territories, the need to protect its strategic interests in the Middle East and to ally with the United States led to an ideological shift that was also reflected in the press. In addition to the variation in Britain's position and interests, we must also consider other possible aspects to explain this shift. In 1948, the official power in the area was Britain until the moment of independence. By 1967, Israel had become the official power as the recognised state in the conflict. Therefore, we can also argue that Israel may have been classified differently when it became a state actor, even though this change in classification was not implemented immediately in the British press. This possible explanation is in line with those definitions of 'terrorism' that exclude the possibility of 'state terrorism' and suggest that 'terrorism' is only perpetrated by non-state actors (Hoffman 2006).

The classification of political violence as 'terrorism' does not happen in isolation, and there are other discursive aspects that take place alongside this practice. These findings, and those concerned with the visibility and invisibility of various agents within the conflict, need to be understood in relation to the broader discursive contextualisation of different stages of the conflict and the extent to which previous historical events are given more or less significance in contemporary narratives. The historical connection with the British Mandate is one of the key events that have been considered in this analysis, so as to examine the relative visibility of Britain's role in the history of Palestine. The piece

published by *The Times* in May 1948, at the beginning of this chapter, is very clear about the British role in the conflict. It acknowledges the British Mandate and the ways in which its involvement, and subsequent separation from the Land, determined the ensuing succession of events. It also suggests what Britain should do going forward, both in relation to the United States and to Arab countries. The data in this study has shown how the presence of the British Mandate and Britain's overall role in the development of the conflict have been progressively erased from the discourse, with some exceptions that have appeared throughout the discussion.

We have also observed that in the coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict events and actors have been contextualised, and sometimes recontextualised, differently in each sampled period. This contextualisation, which has been achieved by reinforcing certain aspects of the conflict while overlooking other areas, goes hand in hand with the way that the media have represented different actors in the conflict. As discussed earlier, the clearest illustration of a substantial ideological shift in the sample took place between 1948 and 1967, when the 1948 events were reviewed and narrativised from a perspective that contrasted sharply with the ways in which they had originally been covered in 1948. In each case, understanding the context of the ideological debate helps to deal with the justifications offered in contemporary times for 'terrorist' acts.

Regarding the erasure of the British Mandate from the discourse, and the ways in which the conflict has been contextualised at different points, we can draw some conclusions regarding the application of PCDA to the analysis of the news coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. First, we can recognise the ways in which the concept of 'Orientalism' applies to the media representations of Palestinians, including both negative representations as well as their exclusion from the discourse (as seen in the post-1948 samples). Indeed, the British coverage of the conflict takes the Israeli perspective as the 'us' position in the system of binary opposites (Hall 1997; Said 1978; van Dijk 1984), while Palestinians are discursively represented as 'them' or the 'Other', particularly in those articles in which the Palestinian viewpoints are absent from the narrative. The oversimplification of the complex history of the conflict, and the very fact that it can be rewritten by certain powers at certain moments, are themselves indicators of orientalist thought.

Moreover, the retelling of past events from different perspectives can be partly explained by the postcolonial nature of those representations.

Indeed, the fact that the British Mandate vanishes from the discourse and, when it is mentioned, is presented in a recontextualised form tells us something about the ways in which the press in Britain recasts the nation's past responsibilities as colonial power and, consequently, reformulates its central role within the conflict. As discussed, this reformulation means, in the majority of cases, that there is a lack of reference to the British Mandate and the historical facts that underpin Britain's role in the development of the conflict before 1948. This represents an attempt to move away from the historical responsibilities derived from colonial encounters, and amounts to an impulse to defend contemporary political, financial and strategic interests. In sum, the orientalist perspective promoted by the western media cannot represent a comprehensive view of the identity and history of the 'Other', as this approach can only offer an orientalised and more simplistic view that does not recognise the complexities of the situation. In effect, the predominance of episodic framing (Iyengar 1991) and the superficial news coverage of the Palestinian history impedes an accurate and in-depth understanding of contemporary struggles for political recognition and, above all, the deeper meaning of the urgent debates taking place in the mediated public sphere.

Meanwhile, clashes have continued to develop, consistently putting pressure on the Palestinian population, removing their human rights and further raising the toll of fatalities, including a large number of civilians, in a context of continued occupation and unequal share of power.

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https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52646-5